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ABSTRACT
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS AND
THE SOCIAL JUSTICE IMPACT
Michael Patrick Ryan, Ed.D.
Department of Leadership, Educational Psychology, and Foundations
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Dr. Rosita Lopez, Director
While our nation’s best students can generally be found in predominately white,
suburban, and middle to upper-middle class school districts, our weakest students can generally
be found in predominately inner-city school districts with high minority populations. To address
the disparities between schools a variety of reforms, initiatives, and programs have been created
and implemented – with seemingly little if any long-lasting positive effects. It is this researcher’s
contention that the one reform movement that is different from the other measures is school
choice. It is different because it is the only reform measure that leaves the decision on what is
best for a student up to the parent. While the topic of school choice is expansive, this paper
focuses exclusively on school vouchers as a possible option for low-income families who reside
in a large urban school district.
Framing this study is Professor Derrick Bell’s theories on social change. Professor Bell
postulated that four conditions must be present in order for social change, such as access for
blacks and minorities to quality schools, to be cemented. This study examines political and legal
events to judge whether or not Bell’s theories can be employed at times when state legislation or
important court decisions supported or prevented low-income families from attending the school
of their choice.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background
It has been thirty years since the 1983 report “A Nation at Risk,”1 a report which brought
to light the serious state of our elementary and secondary education across the country, and in
that time not much has changed for inner-city, low-income, minority students. The report’s
ominous warnings of a “rising tide of mediocrity”2 have been debated by both public school
supporters and their detractors. However, the thirty year debate has generated few tangible
solutions on ways to improve the public education for low-income minority students living in our
big cities. While our nation’s best students can generally be found in predominately white,
suburban, and middle to upper-middle class school districts, our weakest students can generally
be found in predominately inner-city school districts with high minority populations.3
After the “A Nation at Risk” was published, the response mechanisms went into
overdrive.4 According to John W. Hunt, university professor and past Illinois public school
superintendent, the report “A Nation at Risk” had “struck a chord” with the American public in

1

National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 1983). http://datacenter.spps.org/uploads/sotw_a_nation_at_risk1983.pdf.
2
Id. at 9.
3
Gary Orfield, Reviving a Goal of an Integrated Society: a 21 st Century Challenge, January 2009 (arguing that
school segregation has increased dramatically across the country and that minority students are more likely to attend
poor performing schools than their white counterparts) http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12education/integration-and-diversity/reviving-the-goal-of-an-integrated-society-a-21st-century-challenge/orfieldreviving-the-goal-mlk-2009.pdf.
4
John W. Hunt, A Nation at Risk and No Child Left Behind: Deja Vu for Administrators? Phi Delta Kappan , Vol.
89, No. 8, April 2008.
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such a way that it dramatically changed the lives of school administrators.5 He cites three major
areas or movements that were the result of the federal report. The first was the excellence
movement6 which set policies to increase standards for students, teachers, and administrators.
During the excellence movement more attention was paid to graduation rates. In addition,
administrators were not immune and were encouraged to adopt business models in operating and
managing people and resources. The next movement, the restructuring movement7 contained
what Hunt called the “golden age of site-based management” where district administration was
encouraged to hand over more responsibility to the schools.8 The conventional wisdom of sitebased management was that the people closest to the problem had a better chance of coming up
with the most viable solutions. The third movement was the standards movement.9 The
standards movement moved attention away from teacher behavior and teacher activities and
shined a spotlight on student achievement. Specifically, new learning standards were created to
increase student achievement. Hunt cites the Principles and Standards for School Mathematics,
produced by the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics as one apparatus created as a
result of the “Nation at Risk.”10 As we will see in the next section, these mechanisms spilled over
into the next couple of decades and as the new millennium approached a new federal initiative
would be created to address student achievement.
Over the past thirty years a variety of reforms, initiatives, and programs were created and
implemented – with seemingly little if any long-lasting positive effects. A myriad of instructional

5

Id at 580.
Id at 581.
7
Id at 582.
8
Id at 582.
9
Id at 583.
10
Id at 583.
6
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reforms were implemented and they included: an emphasis on improved and varied teaching
methods; longer school days and school years; after-school tutoring programs; smaller class
sizes; and most recently the No Child Left Behind11 initiatives. An improvement in teacher
quality is another area that received a lot of attention and discussion. Programs that addressed
the teacher quality issue included: improved training; increased credential standards; higher pay
to attract more qualified applicants; performance incentives or merit pay; and an emphasis on
teacher evaluation to weed out low-performing teachers. Other reform topics seeking
improvements have included: increased access and use of technology in schools; tracking and
reducing absenteeism and drop-out rates; and mainstreaming special education students. Lastly,
another reform movement that was created in response to the poor performance of public schools
was school choice. School choice options include magnate schools, charter schools, and school
vouchers.
Several of the school reforms mentioned above can be broken down into two main
categories: improving the schools (e.g. smaller class sizes, longer days, more technology, etc.)
and improving the way we prepare teachers (e.g. more rigorous training, higher standards for
evaluations, merit pay, etc.). It is this researcher’s contention that the one reform movement that
is different from the other measures is school choice. It is different because it is the only reform
measure that leaves the decision on what is best for a student up to the parent. While the topic of
school choice is expansive, this paper will focus exclusively on school vouchers as a possible
option for low-income families who reside in a large urban school district.
11

Enacted on January 8, 2002 No Child Left Behind is the common name used to describe Public Law 107-110.
(Quoting from its introduction the Federal Law concerning public education addressed “closing the achievement gap
with accountability, flexibility, and choice, so that no child is left behind.”) For the complete bill see http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ110/html/PLAW-107publ110.htm.
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Background on School Vouchers

First, what is a school voucher? There are two general, but separate, definitions for the
term school voucher. One definition of school voucher is when parents receive a tax credit from
their state for private school expenses.12 Another more customary definition for school voucher
involves the government (in most cases state governments) awarding money directly to parents
who then spend it, in most instances,13 on the private school of their choice.14 For the purposes of
this paper, the latter definition of school vouchers will be used.15
When one mentions the words school voucher as an option for parents whose children
attend underperforming public schools, two distinct opposing opinions – each with its own
assertions – are often raised. Pundits on both sides of the discussion present compelling reasons
for and against school vouchers.
Arguments representing the pro-voucher side include: the values assertion16 – vouchers
allow all parents the right to send their children to schools which reflect their values; the civil
rights assertion17 – vouchers provide poor children the same opportunity to a quality education
12

Currently thirteen states (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia) provide their residents with income tax credits when they
send their children to private schools. http://www.edchoice.org/School-Choice/School-Choice-In-Your-State.aspx.
13
In 1995 the State of Ohio enacted the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program. Part of that program allotted
funds for public school parents to use a voucher at a public school that bordered their own public school or at State
approved private school. More details on this program will be provided in subsequent chapters.
14
Three states (Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia (through funding from the federal
government) are currently the only ones offering this type of school voucher.
15
Definition of voucher: for the purpose of this study voucher shall mean: a coupon issued by the government to a
parent or guardian to be used to fund a child's education in either a public or private school. http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/voucher.
16
David M. Powers, The Political Intersection of School Choice, Race, and Values 60 Ala. L. Rev. 1051, 1063-1064
(2009).
17
Id. and Terry M. Moe, Schools, Vouchers, and the American Public. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, (2001).
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as children who come from wealthy families; the free market assertions18 – vouchers create
needed competition between private and public schools and this competition makes both schools
better; and vouchers eliminate the monopoly public schools have, and as a result it affords
parents the option to choose the best environment for their children.
On the anti-voucher side typical opinions include: the funding assertion19 – vouchers take
money away from already cash-strapped public schools and further damage the meager
conditions for poor urban students; the extra scrutiny assertion20 – if the government provides
money to private schools, then more intrusive government oversight of those schools will follow;
the religious assertions21 – vouchers for private sectarian schools promote religion and violate
the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution; and vouchers have the potential to cause
increased religious conflict in our country.22 The feelings on either side are strong and the
arguments are contentious.23

18

Milton Freidman, The Role of Government in Education, Economics and the Public Interest, 123-44, (1955). and
Milton Freidman, Capitalism and Freedom, (1962).
19
Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 Am. U.L. Rev. 1461, 14741475 (2003) (warning that school vouchers will only worsen public schools by taking away needed funds).
20
Peter A. Swift, Mitchell v. Helms: Does Government Aid to Religious Schools Violate the First Amendment? An
Extensive Analysis of the Decision and Its Repercussions, 41 Catholic Law 169, 183-184 (2001) (raising the concern
that with more government funds comes the potential for more government interference) and Paul Finkelman,
School Vouchers, Thomas Jefferson, Roger Williams, and Protecting the Faithful: Warnings from the Eighteenth
Century and the Seventeenth Century on the Danger of Establishments to Religious Communities,
2008 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 525, 542 (2008) (claiming that vouchers “would naturally lead to greater state supervision of,
and interference with, religious schools and religious institutions”).
21
Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Church and State Should Be Separate, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2193, 2207 (2008)
(advocating that tax dollars should never be used to promote any religion).
22
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639, 686, 729 (2002) (Steven, J., dissenting) (citing potential for vouchers to
cause “religious strife”); (Breyer, J., dissenting) (fearing that vouchers can cause “religiously based conflict” in
society); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
23
The National Education Association (NEA) adamantly opposes any type of school voucher. For more information
on their opposition to school vouchers see http://www.nea.org/home/16970.htm. On the other hand, arguments in
support for vouchers can be found at the Center for Education Reform, see http://www.edreform.com/issues/choicecharter-schools/ and at the Freidman Foundation, see http://www.edchoice.org/.
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Framework for the Study

This study assumes that access to quality public schools is both a legal and a moral right.
Further, scholars maintain that our system of public education is predicated on social justice.24
One group of educational scholars referred to social justice as “…the quality of fairness that
exists within communities or societies. The extent to which fairness and equity exist in a school
community is, in part, the responsibility of its leaders.”25 Thus, it is fair to further assume that
access to quality public schools would be a right for all students, regardless of race, family
income, or the location of their home. It would be unfair and unjust for any society to deprive
any student equal access to a quality education. In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
separate educational opportunities for whites and blacks were unconstitutional.
The landmark case Brown v. Board of Education26 found that separate public schools was
detrimental to black students. Brown was really five cases rolled into one. Though the facts of
each case were different, the central idea to each was the constitutionality of state-sponsored
segregation in public schools. Future U. S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall and the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund handled these cases.27 Even though Marshall
highlighted a wide range of legal issues on appeal, the most common one was that separate
public schools for blacks and whites were essentially unequal, and consequently violated the
24

For a more detailed view on Horace Mann and John Dewey’s opinions on social justice as foundation for the
American public school system see Brick, Blanche, Changing Concepts of Equal Educational Opportunity: A
Comparison of the Views of Thomas Jefferson, Horace Mann and John Dewey, American Educational History
Journal v32 n2 p166-174 (2005).
25
Susan Toft Everson and Leslie Hazle, Educational Leadership for Social Justice: Enhancing the Ethical
Dimension of Educational Leadership, Catholic Education: A Journal of Inquiry and Practice, v11 n2 p176-187 Dec
(2007).
26
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27
Federal Judicial Center. Histroy of the Federal Judiciary. http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/tu_bush_bio_naacp.html .
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“equal protection clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.28 In addition,
Marshall relied on the testimony of social scientist Kenneth Clark, who performed sociological
tests on school children.29 In his arguments to the Court, Marshall used the results of these tests
to maintain that segregated schools had a propensity to make black children feel inferior to white
children, and therefore this arrangement was unconstitutional.30
The Court ruled in Brown that segregating black students in so-called equal but separate
public schools was unconstitutional. While Brown addressed the rights of all students to attend
quality public schools, this study goes one step further from Brown and asks: how fair is the
environment in which poor performing public schools are the only option for blacks and other
minorities? Is it inherently unequal when some families get to choose a better school, be it
private or public, merely based on the location of the house they reside in or the income the
family has? More precisely – sixty years after Brown do we still have de facto segregation in our
schools? Brown guaranteed all students equal access to quality public schools, but what if those
public schools do not offer the “quality” parents are looking for? If inequalities still exist, then
another question should be asked: what options do black and other minority parents have if they
are not satisfied with the public schools?
In order to fully develop this process of thought and answer the pertinent questions,
Professor Derrick Bell’s theories on social change will be employed. Professor Bell theorized
that four conditions must be present in order for social change, such as access for blacks and

28

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 487-492 (1954).
Gordon Beggs. Novel Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Rights Litigation. The American University Law Review,
45, p 9-16 (1995).
30
Id.
29
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minorities to quality schools, to be cemented. The following are complete presentation of
Professor Bell’s conditions:

1. “Initially or over time, the issue gains acceptance from a broad segment of the populace,
2. The issue protects vested property in all its forms through sanctions against generally
recognized wrongdoers,
3. The issue encourages investments, confidence, and security through a general upholding
of the status quo, and
4. While recognizing severe injustices, the issue does not disrupt the reasonable
expectations of society.”31
For the purposes of this study, conditions 1, 3, and 4 are of primary relevance and,
therefore, will be considered. This study examines political and legal events to judge whether or
not Bell’s theory can be employed at times when state legislation or important court decisions
supported or prevented low-income families from attending the school of their choice.
To what degree can Professor Bell’s concepts be applied to the political and legal issues
facing legislatures and courts when they consider opportunities for low-income families? This
examination is especially relevant when framed within the current context where lawmakers and
judges are asked to consider the circumstance around providing those same families access to
alternatives to poor performing public schools.

31

Derrick Bell, Colloquium: Relearning Brown: Applying the Lessons of Brown to the Challenges of the TwentyFirst Century, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 633, 635 (2004).

9
This question creates the environment in which the 1st, 3rd, and 4th conditions are of
primary academic significance. For Bell’s first condition, were there political and legal issues
facing the legislatures and the courts during the 1870s (a time of increased immigration to the
U.S.) which prompted Representative James Blaine from Maine to author an amendment to the
U.S. Constitution that would make it illegal for the government to provide any funds to religious
schools?32 For Bell’s third condition, by defining the school voucher movement as an
opportunity to exercise a choice in the free market, have voucher proponents encouraged
investments, confidence, and security through a general upholding of the status quo for public
education? For Bell’s fourth condition, are the political and legal issues surrounding the
disenfranchisement of the black and minority citizenry so complete, visible, and compelling that
legislators and justices felt compelled to rectify the past wrongs and provide blacks and
minorities alternatives to poor performing public schools?

Origins of School Vouchers

The idea for school vouchers was first disseminated by economist Milton Friedman.
Professor Freidman was a libertarian who promoted free markets and capitalism. His resume
included holding a prominent spot on the faculty at the University of Chicago from 1944 until
1977. Later, as an advisor to President Ronald Reagan, Freidman was considered a leading
economic scholar. His views on economics influenced the government from the late 1950s

32

Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First
Amendment Concerns, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 551(Spring, 2003). (providing an examination of the origins,
history, current status of State Blaine Amendments).

10
through the 1980s.33 Friedman first mentioned school vouchers in a 1955 journal article, but not
until 1962, when he dedicated an entire chapter to the topic in his book Capitalism and Freedom,
did the idea of school vouchers become part of the public debate. Freidman passed away in 2006,
but his foundation continues to fight for school vouchers. The foundation maintains a website for
the sole purpose of advocating for school choice for parents.34
While Friedman was supporting the idea of vouchers in his publications, the federal
government tried instituting a school voucher program in California. The first opportunity for
school vouchers to reach parents came in the Alum Rock school district in California in the early
1970s. The Office of Economic Opportunity assisted in funding a voucher program, but it was
met with resistance from a teachers’ union and folded after three years. However, the subject of
school vouchers would continue to receive attention from researchers and educators.

Pro School Voucher Studies

While Alum Rock was not a success, two major studies, one in 1982 and the other in
1990, kept the debate alive. The 1982 study, conducted by a research team lead by James S.
Coleman, reported that students in Catholic schools did better academically than their public
school counterparts. Coleman, a sociologist and professor at the University of Chicago at the
time of the study, interpreted the findings and concluded that students learned more in an

33

For and in depth study of Milton Friedman and his life see e.g., Alan O. Ebenstein, Milton Friedman: A
Biography. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, (2007).
34
Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice at http://www.edchoice.org/.

11
environment where there were strong bonds between parents, teachers, and religious leaders.35 In
1990, a reanalysis of Coleman’s findings was completed by John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe.
Chubb and Moe’s conclusion was that private schools had more autonomy and therefore, were
more inclined to be better organized and be run with more efficiency than public schools.
Echoing Milton Freidman’s assertion that parents should be given a choice when it comes to the
education of their children, Chubb and Moe deemed parents – not the government – as the best
judges for selecting the appropriate school for their children. As an alternative to the inherent
deficiencies they saw in public schools, Chubb and Moe supported the idea of school vouchers as
an option.36

Counterarguments to School Vouchers

Two groups that counter the findings by Coleman, Chubb, and Moe are the Center on
Education Policy (CEP) and the National Education Association (NEA). The CEP cites their own
research stating it is difficult to decipher results from school voucher studies and the NEA
contends that vouchers do not improve conditions for public school students.
In 2011, the CEP came out with a report on school vouchers.37 The report, titled Keeping
Informed about School Vouchers, synthesized findings on school vouchers and found it was
difficult to draw any conclusions about their effectiveness and the positive impact that some

35

James S. Coleman, J. S., Achievement and Segregation in Secondary Schools: A Further Look at Public and
Private School Differences. Sociology of Education. 55, 162-82. (1982).
36
Chubb, J. and Moe, T., Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990.
37
The CEP calls itself “a national, independent advocate for public education” and seeks ways to inform Americans
on issues facing public education. For more information on the CEP see http://www.cep-dc.org/.
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studies claim.38 After reviewing twenty-seven different studies, the CEP found the majority of
those studies were funded or otherwise supported by pro-voucher organizations.39 According to
the CEP, when school voucher studies are supported by organizations sympathetic to vouchers –
then it is possible that an unfair bias played a role in the positive conclusions drawn about
vouchers.40 The CEP recommended that an “independent advisory committee” be established to
certify that school voucher studies be conducted in a fair and evenhanded manner.41
The NEA, the largest union in the United States, has vehemently fought against any
voucher program.42 The NEA lists several reasons why vouchers are unsuccessful and
impractical. According to the NEA, vouchers actually deny access to a large majority of
students. Where vouchers exist, the NEA claims lotteries inherently exclude a majority of
students from receiving a voucher. In addition, limited space is available in private schools for
public school students wishing to transfer to a private school. NEA also contends that student
achievement is not significantly increased with vouchers. Using the results of studies done on
voucher programs in Milwaukee and Cleveland, which found no significant academic growth for
voucher recipients, the NEA argues that vouchers have failed to improve student test scores. The
lack of accountability with state oversight of private schools and the cost to the taxpayer for
sending students to private schools are other arguments set forth by the NEA in opposition to
vouchers.43
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While the school voucher debate heated up among academics, over the last few decades
state legislatures have enacted laws that would funnel public tax dollars to private schools. Some
of those laws have remained while others have been overturned by the courts. Over the course of
seventy years a myriad of court cases, both state and federal, have addressed public funds
reaching private schools, but not until 2002 did the U.S. Supreme Court take up the school
voucher issue. In the 2002 case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,44 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
school vouchers were permissible, under certain circumstances, thus flaming a debate that is still
controversial today.45 Legislators, judges, parents, teachers, and school administrators have
argued about school vouchers and continue to do so. This study explores the assumption that
access to a quality public school is both a legal and moral right. If our system of public education
is built on social justice, is it fair to assume that access to quality public schools is a right for all
students, regardless of race, income, or the location of their home? This study examines the
question of social justice and the importance of quality public schools being accessible for all
students, regardless of race, family income, or the location of their home. Moreover, this study
will address the inequality that may exist in our public school system that may deprive any
student equal access to a quality education. This study also uses the history surrounding the
Supreme Court decision in Zelman and reviews the legal issues surrounding the debate over the
implementation of vouchers in Illinois. Ultimately, this paper suggests possible ways the State of
Illinois could implement a limited school voucher system in the City of Chicago.
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Statement of the Problem

Social justice concerns itself with equal economic, political and social rights and
opportunities. Social justice in education advocates for our society to make available the best
possible education to all students. 46
Here in Illinois reforming a system as large and complex as the CPS is, indeed,
challenging. While the attempts in 2012 to create ten so-called “turnaround” schools may have
had an impact on a few thousand students, more than 400,000 students, of which eighty-six
percent are minorities, were not afforded an opportunity to go to a better school.47 If our society
is to hope for significant growth, we may need to prepare for systemic change.
Adding to the complexities of the situation is the problem with continued segregation in
public schools. In his 2009 study on public school segregation, scholar Gary Orfield reported that
“Fifty-five years after the Brown decision, blacks and Latinos in American schools are more
segregated than they have been in more than four decades.”48 According to Orfield, millions of
non-white students are forced to attend high schools that he called “dropout factories,” where
large percentages do not graduate, have bleak futures in a tough economy, and are not properly
prepared for college.49
Public education in America is faced with many distinctive challenges as educators
attempt to provide equal educational opportunities to an ever-growing diverse group of students.
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Among those struggles is the changing composition of the student population. Over the past few
decades public school demographics have seen an increase in: student minority representation,
students with lower English language proficiency, and students coming from homes with higher
poverty levels.50 In August of 2014 the U.S. Department of Education released their projections
on the demographics of public schools.51 In 2012, white students made up 51 percent of public
school enrollment and that will dip to 49.7 in 2014 – marking the first time white students will
no longer be in the majority.52 In 1997, white enrollment was 63.4 percent. It is projected that in
2022, minority students will make up 54.7 percent of the public schools and whites, 45.3
percent.53
Do these statistics suggest that one would find more minority students in any randomly
selected public school? On the contrary, while minority student populations have increased, our
public schools have become even more segregated.54 In 2012, the Civil Rights Project at UCLA
found a preponderance of evidence that segregation has “increased dramatically” for both black
and Latino students.55
While the report found numerous amounts of proof suggesting student segregation had
increased, a few statistics bear mentioning here. First, the typical black or Latino student attends
a school with almost double the amount of low-income students in their schools than the typical
50
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white or Asian student.56 Second, 15% of black students, and 14% of Latino students, attend
“apartheid schools,” where whites make up 0 to 1% of the enrollment.57 As for Chicago, the
researchers found that half of the city’s black students attends these so-called “apartheid
schools.”58 Finally, the 2012 report stated that whites make up just over half of the nation’s
enrollment and the typical white student attends a school where three-quarters of their peers are
white.59 Coupled with the segregation, minority students are more likely to attend high-poverty
schools.60 It follows, then that this study concerns itself with these disparities and the social
justice in our educational system. The point is – how can we offer every child a quality education
when there are differences in schooling environments across low and high-poverty schools?
Almost a hundred years ago educational scholar John Dewey, in his book Democracy and
Education, delineated a thoughtful dichotomy as a means to developing a populace able to
contribute to the American Ideal. According to Dewey, a school system must provide students
with both a rigorous curriculum that emphasized the acquisition of content knowledge and with
the knowledge on how to live productive lives.61 While both elements of this school are an
important part of developing a society, it is the later that finds its focus, clearly, in the realm of
social justice. If a society is to hope for a school system that does place students in a position to
possess the myriad of skills, conceptual understandings, and personal abilities needed to be a
fully formed, productive adult, that society may need to address the negative results that manifest
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when large parts of specific populations are not afforded the opportunity to participate in an
educational culture and setting that facilitates such development.

Significance of the Study

Since the voucher question is not going away, Illinois legislators need to make a decision:
embrace the idea of vouchers wholeheartedly and institute an Indiana-like program, incorporate
some components of a voucher program, or reject the idea entirely. The possible implications
for public education in the state could be far-reaching. Implement vouchers, and we risk
violating the U.S. Constitution. Ignore them, and we could prolong the debate on the solution to
our state education crisis indefinitely, thus subjecting children, many of whom are already
struggling, to sub-standard educational opportunities.

Research Questions

This study investigated the following research questions:
1. What is the legal history of school vouchers?
2. To what extent do the legal and political frames (social justice) meet Bell’s conditions for
social reform?
3. What affect do school vouchers have on assuring that low-income minority students have
access to an equitable quality education?
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Summary
Beginning with the 1983 federal report “A Nation at Risk” up to the 2002 No Child Left
Behind legislation, the United States has sought ways to improve public school education – with
special attention placed on making improvements for the most disadvantaged students. Despite
the best efforts of legislatures, governors, presidents, commissions, and pundits, few positive and
sustainable effects have been realized. Reform after reform has been created, implemented, recycled, and shelved – most with minimal success. Regardless of the intentions of the reformers,
our nation’s reality is that there still exists a chasm between the more affluent high performing
public schools and the low-income public schools of our nation’s inner cities.
This study will analyze school vouchers as a possible solution for those parents whose
children are stuck in poor performing public schools. Of course, there are strong opinions on
both sides of the voucher aisle. Chapter Two will begin to frame this discussion by employing an
historical perspective on the legality of school vouchers. In addition to this historical analysis,
Professor Bell’s theories on social change will provide a framework for examining the viability
of a school voucher program.

CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction
In the United States laws are created by our federal and state legislatures.62 The U.S.
Constitution leaves most of the responsibility of educating the citizens to the states. As a result,
state legislatures create educational laws.63 The individual state constitutions place boundaries on
the laws created by the legislatures.64 Additionally, state legislatures are obligated to follow the
U.S. Constitution.65 Laws enacted by state legislatures that run afoul of either the U.S.
Constitution or its own constitution are considered unconstitutional and unenforceable.66 Over
the years state governments, and sometimes the federal government, have created educational
laws that have been challenged in the courts. This study will examine the legality of school
vouchers and the social contexts in which they may are may not be suitable.
Chapter Two provides a summary of the legal issues involved with these challenges to
school voucher legislation. It begins with an historical perspective of the First Amendment and a
review of the purpose of the Constitution’s Religion Clauses and an examination of the court
cases that helped define the Establishment Clause Tests. What follows is an investigation of the
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Establishment Clause and its relationship with public schools. Through a detailed
examination of relevant court cases, I discuss the difficulty our legislatures have with how,
when, and where it is permissible to allow religion into our public schools. Religious schools
right to exist, as decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, will also be examined.
After addressing the Establishment Clause and its relationship with public schools, I turn
back to the relevant judicial precedent determining the constitutionality of school vouchers. In
this section the cases are divided into three groups. The first group of cases contains an analysis
of legal decisions from 1947 to 2000 which opened the door or set up roadblocks for school
vouchers. The second part of my analysis concentrates solely on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002).67 Many thought that this was the seminal case for
school vouchers.68 After a review of Zelman, my examination turns to the third group of cases
that followed the Zelman decision. Covering the years 2002 to the present, I analyze five court
cases, both federal and state, where the support for Zelman vacillates between solid to suspect.
The final part of Chapter Two examines the school voucher programs in Milwaukee,
Cleveland, Washington, D.C., and Indiana. Attention will also be given to failed programs in
Florida and Utah. Publicly funded vouchers and public opinion polls on the subject are also
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considered. Finally, Chapter Two concludes with outlining the issues facing the Chicago Public
Schools System as well as recent attempts in Illinois to create a voucher program.

First Amendment Historical Perspective
Purpose of the Constitution’s Religion Clauses

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”69 The first section of the First Amendment
is designed to prevent two things: one, the establishment of a national religion, often referred to
as the Establishment Clause and two, the preference of one religion over another, often referred
to as the Free Exercise Clause.70 However basic and straightforward these clauses may seem, the
issues of establishment and free exercise have been debated in State Courts and the United States
Supreme Court on numerous occasions. One area where agreement on the intent of the First
Amendment usually ends involves the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and their
relationships with religious schools.71 Whereas some are convinced that there should never be a
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connection between government and religion, others maintain that such a relationship is
inevitable.72 When this debate reaches the courts, contradiction and confusion are inherent in the
discussion.73 During the past sixty years, both sides of the argument have been well-represented
in our court systems as the result of lawsuits challenging the interpretation of these clauses.

Blaine Amendments

Before a deeper discussion on the history of school vouchers can begin, it is important to
look back at what is referred to as the Blaine Amendment74 and its influence on state
constitutions.
In 1875, Representative James Blaine of Maine proposed an amendment to the
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U.S. Constitution that would forbid federal funds going to private organizations. The Blaine
Amendment came about at a time when there were strong nativist feelings about immigration.
The 1850s had seen an increase in European immigration to the United States. Many of these
new immigrants were Catholic and their assimilation into a predominantly Protestant culture
proved to be difficult – especially in the area of education. Some have accused James Blaine of
actively discriminating against Catholics by creating an amendment that would deny them funds
to support their schools.75 Blaine’s amendment to the U.S. Constitution passed in the House, but
it fell short by four votes in the Senate.76
After the defeat of the Blaine Amendment at the federal level, new states that were added
to the Union began including Blaine Amendment language in their constitutions. Even though
the Blaine Amendment failed at the federal level, it still resonates in thirty-seven state
constitutions today.77 While the specific language in the state constitutions varies from state to
state, the purpose of any of the states’ Blaine amendments is to stop public money from reaching
sectarian institutions – particularly private schools. For example, Illinois’ Blaine Amendment
reads:
“Public Funds for Sectarian Purposes Forbidden – Neither the General Assembly
nor any county, city, town, township, school district, or other public corporation,
shall ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever,
anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain
any school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific
institution, controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor
shall any grant or donation of land, money, or other personal property ever be
75
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made by the State, or any such public corporation, to any church, or for any
sectarian purpose.”78
Those that oppose vouchers often cite a state’s Blaine Amendment in their arguments against
school voucher enactment, while those that support vouchers often cite the unconstitutionality of
Blaine Amendments.79

The Continual Debate on the Meaning and Impact of Blaine Amendments

There continues to be a debate on the intent and the influence of the Blaine Amendment.
One example is from 2007, when the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (CCR) took up the issue
and summoned a conference in Washington D. C. on the status and effect of Blaine
Amendments.80 The CCR heard from two different groups – those in support of state Blaine
Amendments and those opposed. The backdrop for this investigation included how Blaine
Amendments place constitutional restrictions on school vouchers.
In their written report to the CCR, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL)81 appropriated a
pro-Blaine stance. The ADL reported that Blaine Amendments “further the interest of religious
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Washington, D.C. on the status and effect of Blaine Amendments had on state constitutions and legislation. They
heard testimony from four separate legal experts on the legitimacy and the unconstitutionality of Blaine
Amendments.). See also, e.g., Steven K. Green, “Blaming Blaine: Understanding the Blaine Amendment and the
‘No Funding’ Principle, 2 First Amendment L. Rev. (Winter 2003). (advocating a pro-Blaine Amendment argument
that no public tax dollars should ever reach private schools). And See, e.g., Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State
Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 Fordham L. Rev. Pol. 493, at 528 (December, 2003). (suggesting
that state Blaine amendments have superseded the church and state separation mandated by the Establishment
Clause).
80
Id.
81
The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) began in 1913 as an association dedicated to stopping the defamation of
Jewish people. Since then the group has grown into what it calls itself the “nation's premier civil rights/human
79

25
liberty in America because they ensure that government does not provide financial support to
religious institutions.”82 The ADL went on to state that Blaine Amendments prohibit states from
using tax dollars for sectarian purposes. While the ADL admitted that anti-Catholicism may have
been at the root of the Blaine Amendments in the 1870’s, the ADL’s contention was that presentday Blaine Amendments are no longer filled with any bias against Catholics. The ADL listed
several reasons why they believed school vouchers are not advantageous. They argued that
school vouchers are “bad public policy” because they threaten the constitutional principle of
separation of church and state.83
Without government control, the ADL feared that vouchers would support schools that
discriminate against minorities and would promote the creation of private schools that may not
be as inclusive as our current public school system.84 The ADL’s final concern about vouchers
was that they do not help the poorest of the poor. They argued that most vouchers do not cover
the entire cost of attending a private school. This leaves the poorest families with bills they
cannot hope to pay. As a result, the ADL reasoned that vouchers only served a select few who
can supplement the costs of private school tuition.85
The ADL contended that because of our diverse population we need a public school
system that unites and ties us all together. School vouchers take needed funds away from the
poorest parts of that diverse population and the neediest children suffer the consequences. In the
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opinion of the ADL, Blaine Amendments help prevent this from happening. The ADL concluded
that the introduction of school vouchers undermines our American system of public education.
One argument countering the ADL’s position was posited by the Institute for Justice
(IJ),86 represented by, Richard D. Komer, Senior Litigation Attorney for the IJ. Calling the
American public school system a “hideously expensive failure”, Komer argued that the
education monopoly held by the government was disproportionality affecting minority
students.87 Using civil rights as the foundation for his argument, Komer argued against the
Blaine Amendments and the negative impact it had on minority students and their lack of
opportunities.
Komer disparaged our K through 12 public school system. According to Komer, public
schools were not meeting the needs of a large portion of the student population – namely lowincome students who are primarily members of minority groups. Komer argued that low-income
minority students “deserve[d]” an education equal to the education more affluent students
receive.88
According to Komer, school choice would level the playing field for disadvantaged
students. However, Komer contended the Blaine Amendments inhibit the opportunity for
minority groups to have a choice. To break free from the poor conditions of many public schools,
school vouchers were a necessity, but Komer argued that Blaine Amendments must first be
stricken from state constitutions. Komer believed that once this was accomplished school
vouchers would become more readily available to low-income students, and as a result provide
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them equal opportunities to a quality education that their more affluent counter parts already
enjoyed.

Development of Establishment Clause Tests

The first amendment’s religion clauses have confounded judges and justices since their
inception.89 However, for the purposes of this study I will be concentrating on the Supreme
Court rulings after World War II that set up the various Establishment Clause tests. The Court’s
rulings in four cases, Everson v. Board of Education (1947),90 Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971),91
Agostini v. Felton (1997),92 and Mitchell v. Helms (2000),93 have evolved over time and have
defined Establishment Clause test language for future courts.94 Later in this Chapter I devote
more attention to these cases as they apply to school vouchers, but here my concentration is
exclusively on how these cases relate to the Establishment Clause.

Everson Opens a Door

The Everson case concerned a New Jersey law that allowed public tax dollars to be
funneled back to private school parents to pay for the cost of transporting their children to private
religious schools. Examining the New Jersey Law as an effort to assist parents in transporting
89
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their children to sanctioned, albeit private religious schools, the Court ruled that the State was
not indirectly or otherwise subsidizing religious schools and that the wall between church and
state had not been broken.
Everson sent mixed signals, making it challenging for lower courts to distinguish the
fundamental boundaries enacted by the Establishment Clause. On the one hand the Court went to
great length to explain the conditions imposed by the Clause, but on the other hand the Court
ultimately upheld the New Jersey law as constitutional. Lower courts would have to wait for
future decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court to elucidate the limits imposed by the
Establishment Clause. The justice system would have to wait until 1971 and the decision in
Lemon for a clearer picture on applications to the Establishment Clause.

The Lemon Test

If covering the cost of transporting private school students did not crack the wall of
separation of church and state, as decided in Everson, what would? The 1971 case Lemon v.
Kurtzman concerned a Pennsylvania statute that provided tax dollars to pay religious school
teachers’ salaries for teaching secular subjects (math, modern and foreign language, physical
education, and physical science) in their religious schools. The question before the Court was
whether the Pennsylvania statute violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. For
several years the Court used a three-pronged test, described in Lemon, when answering this
question. First, any government aid to a religious institution must have a secular purpose.95
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Second, the aid may neither advance nor inhibit religion.96 Finally, the aid must not create “an
excessive government entanglement with religion.”97 Using this three-part test, the Lemon Court
struck down two laws that funded religious schools through funded teachers’ salaries, textbooks,
and instructional aids.98

Agostini Gives Lemon a Twist

In 1997, the Court made a ruling in Agostini v. Felton that reshaped the Lemon Test and
upheld a New York program that sent public school teachers to religious schools.99 Specifically,
the Agostini case involved public school teachers providing remedial education to at risk private
school students.100 The Court presented three new requirements when analyzing government
action and whether it established or advanced religion. First, the government action could not
result in governmental indoctrination.101 Second, it could not define aid recipients by reference to
religion or discriminate against religion.102 Third, it could not create an excessive entanglement
that advanced or inhibited religion.103 The important takeaway from Agostini was the Court
determining that the New York program was “neutral” toward religion.104 For the Court
“neutral” toward religion meant that the aid was available to a broad group of people (religious
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or non-religious) and the aid did not prohibit or advance religion.105 Because the New York
program provided assistance to all qualified private and public students, the program was neutral
and did not advance religion.106

Mitchell – Two Parts Lemon and One Part Agostini

In the Mitchell decision, the Court applied and defined the new Agostini test. In 2000, the
Court held that a Louisiana law that provided educational materials and equipment to both public
and private schools did not violate the Establishment Clause.107 Using Lemon’s first and second
prongs and the latest ruling in Agostini, the Court rendered its decision. The Court reasoned that
the Louisiana statute did not violate the Establishment Clause because the law met Lemon’s first
condition of having a secular purpose and it met Lemon’s second condition of not inhibiting or
advancing a religious purpose. The Court replaced Lemon’s third prong (whether a government
action resulted in an excessive entanglement between government and religion) with its decision
in Agostini.108 Using Agostini, the Court replaced the excessive entanglement component with a
primary effect component. In other words, the Court determined whether the legislation had an
immediate and direct effect of advancing religion. The Court in Mitchell deemed the program did
not advance religion.
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The majority summed up their decision by focusing on the ideas of “neutrality” and
“private choice”, as they pertained to public funds reaching private schools.109 In other words, a
program was neutral towards religion if a government action neither favored nor disfavored
religion.110 True private choice occurred when parents made their own decisions where to apply
government aid. The concepts of neutrality and private choice would become the foundation for
the decision in Zelman.111
Before attempting to lay out the arguments concerning school vouchers and the use of
government funds to support religious education, background should be provided on Supreme
Court cases that have involved the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment. As an illustration, some past cases involving the First Amendment and legislative
encouragement of religion in public schools have dealt with the infusion of religion into the
educational program,112 the approval of release time for religious education,113 the
implementation of state-sanctioned prayer,114 and the use of public school facilities by religious
groups.115 These cases illustrate the difficulty faced by the judicial branch in interpreting the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.
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Establishment Clause and Its Relationship with Public Schools

A basic search on the relationship between the Establishment Clause and public schools
will generate myriad opinions on the topic. The novice researcher would more than likely walk
away confused by the inconsistency of these opinions. Consider the following examples. Illinois
public schools are mandated to have all students recite the Pledge of Allegiance.116 Every day
thousands of Illinois public school students declare out loud the following words “one Nation
under God.” Conversely, attempts to promote a religious message in schools or other
government buildings by displaying a copy of the Ten Commandments has been ruled
unconstitutional. In addition, teachers and students are forbidden from saying prayers at school
sponsored activities. However, public schools are required to provide meeting space for students
and religious organizations who wish to conduct sectarian meetings on school property. To the
uninitiated, American jurisprudence on this topic can be puzzling and perhaps uneven. The
following cases elaborate some more on this topic.

Disagreement on How the 1st Amendment Is Applied To Schools:
Infusion of Religion into Public Schools

After the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Everson, but before their decision in Lemon,
other cases involving the educational program had come before the Court in response to
legislation that conflicted with the First Amendment. For example, in the 1968 Epperson v.
116
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Arkansas 117 decision the Court struck down a state law which made it unlawful for any public
school teacher to teach the theory of evolution. While the Court believed that control of the
curriculum was the responsibility of the school officials, it reasoned that in this particular case
the law was meant to force teachers to teach creationism, which in the Court’s opinion came
from a literal reading of the Bible. While Epperson predates Lemon, the Court found this law to
be in conflict with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.118
Almost twenty years later, the Court invalidated a Louisiana law authorizing public
school teachers to balance the teaching of “creation-science” and “evolution-science”. The Court
ruled in Edwards v. Aguillard 119 that the State statute was designed to “advance the religious
viewpoint that a supernatural being created mankind.”120 The Court found that Lemon’s first
prong was not met and struck down the law because it supported a religious viewpoint and thus
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Release Time from Public Schools for Religious Instruction

Earlier in 1948 and again in 1952, the Court had to consider the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses in two cases involving release time for public school students to receive
religious education. Both cases involved establishing a period of time when students in public
schools were, upon parental request, to receive religious instruction. In the first case, McCollum
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v. Board of Education,121 religious classes were conducted during the regular school day in the
public school building by outside teachers representing the Protestant, Roman Catholic, and
Jewish faiths. Parents gave written permission for their children to attend religious instruction
during the school day. Attendance for this religious instruction was taken and reported to the
school principal in the same way other classes took attendance. Students not attending the
religious instruction followed their normal schedule. The Court found this to be an improper
relationship between the public school and religious groups. Even though this case was decided
before Lemon, the Court ruled that because the public school played a part in supporting
religious instruction it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Four years later in 1952, in another case predating Lemon, the Court upheld a different
release time program in Zorach v. Clauson.122 In this case, parents gave written permission for
their children to leave during school hours to receive religious instruction at their respective
churches. While those students who remained behind followed their normal schedule, attendance
was taken by the churches and reported back to the public school. The Court ruled that allowing
release time for religious instruction did not violate the First Amendment. The Court
differentiated their ruling in McCollum and in Zorach because, unlike McCollum where the
public school hosted the religious instruction, religious instruction in Zorach took place outside
public school grounds, which the Court deemed permissible.
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Prayer in Public Schools

Another issue involving the entanglement of religion in public schools concerns statesanctioned prayer. In the case of Engel v. Vitale123 the Court found in 1962 that a New York
school could not require each class to begin with a recitation of the following prayer: “Almighty
God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessing upon us, our
parents, our teachers, and our country.”124 The Court ruled that the invocation violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it appeared that the State of New York
was sanctioning religious prayer. The Court was not influenced by the fact that the prayer
seemed to be nondenominational and students were not forced to recite it.
Following the Engle case the Court ruled on two cases in which parents disputed the
requirement that each school day begin with readings from the Bible. In its 1963 opinion in
Abington Township v. Schempp,125 the Court ruled that Bible readings were an endorsement of
religion and a violation of the Establishment Clause, despite the State’s contention that the Bible
readings promoted moral values, endorsed tradition, and encouraged reading. Twenty-two years
later in 1985 the Court held in Wallace v. Jaffree126 invalid an Alabama statute authorizing a
one-minute period of silence in all public schools “for meditation or prayer.”127 The Court ruled
that the first part of the Lemon Test had been violated because the statute’s purpose was religious
in nature. The key component for the Court was that the statute authorized a period of silence for
"meditation or voluntary prayer" in public schools was a law in conflict with the Establishment
123
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Clause, which ran contrary to the First Amendment, since the only articulated reason for the
statute was to provide an opportunity to voluntarily pray in schools.

Religious Groups Using Public School Property

In addition to the cases involving the educational program, release time, and statesanctioned prayer in public schools, the courts have had to render decisions regarding religious
groups using public school property. In Widmar v. Vincent128 the Court ruled that in 1981 the
University of Missouri could not prevent a student-led religious group from meeting on public
school property. The Court decided that this kind of entanglement between the religious group
and the school did not run afoul of the Establishment Clause because the University had allowed
different outside groups to use their facilities. The Court also stated that allowing religious
groups to use University property would not violate any of the three prongs of the Lemon Test.
Nine years later in Education v. Mergens129 the Court, relying on the Lemon Test, ruled
that a student-led religious group could use the public high school for its meetings. As a result of
its decision the Court upheld the Equal Access Act,130 maintaining that public schools could not
use the Establishment Clause to prevent after-hours use of public school property by religious
groups.

128

Widmar, supra note 115.
Westside Community Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
130
Pub. L. 98-377, title VIII, 98 Stat. 1302 (1984); 20 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 4071-74. (Created in 1984, the act is a
federal law that ensures that any public high school receiving federal aid must ensure equal access to their building
for after school meetings for the school’s extracurricular clubs. The Act reads in part, a school may not
“discriminate against any students who wish to conduct a meeting…on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.”) http://www.justice.gov/crt/cor/byagency/ed4071.php ).
129

37
This study assumes that access to quality public schools is both a legal and a moral right.
The issues that this study will raise will primarily focus on the term “quality.” There is little
disagreement that education affords one the best chance of bettering themselves and improving
their ability to actualize the American Dream. There is, however, disparity amongst those in the
field regarding the means of achieving an educational system that allows for this. The case
summaries above offered background for the legal aspects of the research and examined the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment as they pertain to the funding
of private schools through government-supported vouchers.
What the prior cases do not address is the issue of tax money going directly to parents of
private school children -- a highly controversial topic. The U. S. Supreme Court has authored
several decisions that specifically influenced how government funds could or could not benefit
private school parents. The first two decisions to address this constitutional debate were Everson
v. Board of Education131 and Board of Education v. Allen .132 In Everson the question before the
Court was whether a New Jersey law to provide public funds to parents for transporting their
children to private schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The
constitutional question in Allen was whether a New York law that compelled public school
boards to furnish textbooks to private school students free of charge violated the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses. In both cases the issue of providing state funds directly, in the form
of reimbursement for the cost of taking a bus to school, or indirectly, in the form of free secular
textbooks, to parents whose children attended private schools was brought to light.
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Religious Schools’ Right to Exist – 1925
and
Parents’ Rights Determining Their Child’s Education – 1972

Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)133

In 1925 the U.S. Supreme Court first established the fundamental right for parents to
decide what was in the best interests of their children’s education when it struck down an Oregon
statute that made it mandatory for children to attend a public school. The statute’s requirement
was ruled unconstitutional because it “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”134 Basically,
the Pierce decision confirmed the fundamental right of parents to be able to choose a private
school instead of a public school. However, the subject of government funding of religious
schools was never addressed in Pierce, but voucher advocates look upon this case as support for
parental choice.135
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Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)136

In 1972 the Court again addressed the question of parents’ rights in Wisconsin v. Yoder.
An Amish parent in Wisconsin sued the State for compelling their child’s education past the
eighth grade. In Yoder the Court wrote that it is of vital importance for parents “to guide the
religious future and education of their children.”137 In its unanimous decision the Court found in
favor of the Amish parent and wrote, “This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”138 According to
the Court, parents had a fundamental right, guaranteed by the religious clause of the First
Amendment, to be able to use their religious beliefs in determining the best educational
environment for their children. In terms of educating their children, the Court basically held that
the parents’ religious rights superseded the interests of the State. Pro-voucher advocates believe
the decisions in Pierce and Yoder begin to lay the foundation for their view that parents have a
right to choose between private and public schools.139 However, the decisions in Pierce and
Yoder did not address the funding of private schools.
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Pre-Zelman: Relevant Judicial Precedent
Determining the Constitutionality of School Voucher Programs

1947 – 1968 Tax Dollars and Private Schools – The Door Opens for School Vouchers

Introduction
The decisions in Everson and Allen begin to address the matter of state legislatures
providing assistance to religious schools, or their students and parents, without establishing or
endorsing religion.140 The U.S. Supreme Court decisions in these two cases are a first glimpse at
the idea that as long as public aid went to students or their parents, and not directly to the private
schools, then the government aid would not contradict the First Amendment.

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)

In 1947 the Everson case reached the United States Supreme Court on an appeal from the
Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey, which at the time was New Jersey’s
highest state court.141 The Court ruled on the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute142 that
authorized public school districts to provide transportation for students to and from school. The
statute stipulated that if a public school district provided transportation for public school
children, it then had to supply the same resources to those children who attended a school other
140
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than a public school. Parents who sent their children to public and Catholic schools were
reimbursed if their children used their city’s bus system.
In carrying out the statute, the Ewing Township Board of Education authorized
transportation reimbursements to all parents whose children used the city’s public transportation
system to go to and from school. All parents were to receive reimbursements no matter what type
of school – private or public – their children attended. Because some of the reimbursements went
to parents who had children attending Catholic schools, taxpayers filed suit in a State court
arguing that the Board of Education of Ewing Township violated both the State and U. S.
Constitutions concerning the establishment of religion. The State court found that the statute was
in conflict with the New Jersey State Constitution, thus preventing the Board of Education from
providing transportation reimbursement to private school parents. The Board of Education
appealed to the Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey which reversed the lower
court’s decision and stated that the statute did not violate the State Constitution or the U. S.
Constitution. The taxpayers appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that the statute
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Writing for the majority, Justice Black examined the issues before the U. S. Supreme
Court through two questions. First, did the statute violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because public taxes were used by a select group for its own personal
benefit? Second, did the statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by
providing public funds to help support religious schools?143
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In a 5-4 vote the majority held the New Jersey statute as constitutional. The majority
contended that reimbursement for the busing of private school children was akin to the police
and fire protection provided to churches and other private entities.144 The majority stated that the
First Amendment “does not require the state to be their [religious believers] adversary. State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.”145 As for the
first claim that taxes were being used for a special group against the wishes of some taxpayers,
the majority believed that a public good was served when tax dollars provided transportation for
students to attend either public or private school.146
As for the second claim that public funds were being used to support religious schools,
the majority found that parents were free to pick between public and private schools and that
transportation reimbursement for parents who opted for private education for their children did
not mean that the government was supporting religion.147 As an illustration, the Court referred to
its ruling in Pierce v. Society of Sisters148 that parochial schools could coexist with the public
school system as long as parochial schools met the state’s educational requirements. Parents’
right to choose a suitable school for their child was supported by the decision in Pierce.
Consequently, if parents were free to choose a school free from government entanglement, per

144

Id. at 17 (stating that, “…state-paid policemen, detailed to protect children going to and from church
school…would serve much the same purpose and accomplish much the same result as state provisions intended to
guarantee free transportation” for children attending any type of school. Similarly, the Court reasoned that parents
would not want to send their children to private schools where the “state had cut off general government services
[such as] police and fire protection, connection for sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks”).
145
Id. at 18.
146
Id. at 18.
147
Id. at 18.
148
Pierce, supra note 133.

43
the Court’s reasoning in Everson, there would be no more interference if it provided
reimbursement to parents for transportation to a parochial school.149
In conclusion, the majority notably stated in Everson that “the First Amendment has
erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable.”150 The
Court ruled that the New Jersey statute did not “breach”151 that wall. However, the decision in
Everson was a “mixed” bag.152 While the Court emphasized the importance the Establishment
Clause, the 5-4 majority approved a statute that provided funds for parents to send their students
to religious schools.153 Though the Court’s ruling found in favor of travel reimbursement for
parents to send their children to religious schools, the decision in Everson was not the last case
defining how state funds could reach religious schools.154

Board of Education v. Allen (1968)155

Twenty-one years later the Court heard a case similar to Everson. The Supreme Court
would hear in Board of Education v. Allen about legislation that provided free textbooks to
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private school children. In 1965 the State of New York amended a law156 stipulating that public
school districts were responsible for supplying textbooks free of charge to all students, including
private school students. The amendment stated:
…boards of education…shall have the power and duty to purchase and to loan
upon individual request, to all children…who are enrolled in grades seven to
twelve of a public or private school which complies with the compulsory
education law, textbooks. Textbooks loaned to children enrolled in…private
schools shall be textbooks which are designated for use in any public [school] of
the state or are approved by any boards of education. Such textbooks are to be
loaned free to such children subject to such rules and regulations as are or may be
prescribed by the board of regents and such boards of education, trustees or other
school authorities.157
The Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 in Rensselaer and Columbia
Counties brought suit158 against James Allen, Commissioner of Education for the State of New
York,159 claiming that the law violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The trial court agreed with the School Board that the law violated the First
Amendment.160 Reversing the trial court’s decision, the New York Court of Appeals found that
the School Board had not made their case in contesting the statute.161 Stating that the law assisted
all students, the Court of Appeals found that the statute did not violate the U.S. Constitution
because books were approved by public school officials, making the type of school irrelevant.
156
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There was no evidence that religious books were ever loaned by the public school boards to any
private school students. Important to the Court of Appeals was the fact that private school
parents and students received this benefit and not the private schools. The Board of Education’s
appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court questioned whether the State of New York had violated
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it required public schools to furnish
textbooks to private schools free of charge.162

In a 6-3 decision the U. S. Supreme Court voted to uphold the New York law. Prior to
1965, the New York law163 stated that a community could initiate a special tax to pay for public
school books. In 1965 the law was amended and starting with the 1966-1967 school year, school
boards were obligated to provide books and lend them free of charge to both public and private
school students in grades seven to twelve. The only books that could be loaned had to be
approved by the State Board of Education or ones already in use in any public school.164
The majority saw a direct connection between Allen and Everson.165 Writing for the
majority, Justice White stated that the reimbursement for transportation in the Everson case was
equal to providing secular books to students attending private schools.166 As in Everson, the
majority did not see support for religion in Allen. They contended that the travel reimbursement
in Everson and the loaning of textbooks in Allen benefitted the parents and students, not the
private schools.167 The books loaned to private school students were secular books that were
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similar, if not the same, as the books used in public schools.168 Relying again on the decision in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,169 the majority asserted that if the State mandated compulsory
education, then it was also responsible for ensuring that all students, both those who attended
public schools and those who attended private schools, had the proper tools to complete their
education.170
By supplying secular textbooks to private school students, the Court’s ruling in Allen
appeared to expand on the decision in Everson. The decision in Allen recognized that private
schools were operating in two worlds, that is, they provided secular and religious education to
their students. The majority in Allen saw this as two distinct and separate functions. Along with
Everson, the Allen decision would be used by the Court in a number of future cases involving
public funding and private schools.
The Court’s decisions in Everson and Allen followed this premise: as long as public funds
went to students and their parents, and not directly to the private schools, then the benefits
received would not be in conflict with the First Amendment. Accordingly, state legislatures
began to enact laws that followed this line of thinking. However, opponents to any kind of
private school funding continued to file suit. Subsequently, six cases that reached the U. S.
Supreme Court helped to put the Court’s interpretation of this issue more into focus. In Levitt v.
Committee for Public Education,171 Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,172 Meek v.
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Pittenger,173 Wolman v. Walter,174 Mueller v. Allen,175 and Grand Rapids v. Ball176 the Court
began to define its parameters as to how public funds could be used to support private school
families and private school education.

1973 – 1985 Successes and Roadblocks:
State Legislatures Continue to Test the Waters with Public Money Going to Private Schools
Introduction
In this section several cases are examined. Beginning with the Levitt decision (where the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down a New York law because it provided funding to private schools
for the cost of state-authorized testing) and concluding with an analysis on the Ball decision
(where the U.S. Supreme Court found a Michigan law unconstitutional because it required public
school teachers to deliver special instructional programs to private school students in their
private schools). Mixed in between are a number of other U.S. Supreme Court decisions that
involve tax credits and tuition reimbursements for parents who send their children to private
schools. In addition, other cases presented in this section explore the constitutionality of public
funds being spent on books, instructional materials, and diagnostic services for the benefit of
private school children. For a school voucher supporter there are some hits and misses with these
decisions – but mostly misses.
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Levitt v. Committee for Public Education (1973)

Following the decisions in Everson and Allen, the Supreme Court would hear in Levitt
about a different kind of tax dollar support for private education. In 1970, the State of New York
enacted a law that allowed reimbursement to private schools for the cost of state-authorized
testing and record keeping.177 New York taxpayers sued in District Court on grounds that this
statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Rejecting the argument that
reimbursements were only for non-religious activities, the District Court found the statute
unconstitutional. The District Court contended that testing students was an essential part of a
teacher’s role and paying for religious school teachers to administer tests created an improper
relationship between church and state. Therefore, the District Court ruled that the New York law
violated the Establishment Clause and religious schools could not be compensated for the cost of
state authorized testing. The State of New York appealed the lower court’s decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
In an 8-1 vote the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling that
compensating private schools for the cost of state-mandated testing was unconstitutional because
it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice
Burger wrote there was a “substantial risk” when the state subsidized private education through
“state-supported examinations, prepared by teachers under the authority of religious
institutions.”178 The majority emphasized these examinations would be “drafted with an eye…to
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inculcate students in the religious” teachings of the church.179 The majority claimed that “the
potential for conflict” required that the state avoid any action that would seem to support
“religious indoctrination.”180
The State of New York argued that decisions in Everson (transportation costs reimbursed
to private school parents) and Allen (secular books lent to private school students) demonstrated
that in some cases it was permissible for the state to provide funds to private school parents. The
State’s assertion that this applied to private schools as well was contradicted by the majority’s
claim that the “state-supported activities [are] a substantially different character from bus rides or
state-provided textbooks.”181 The majority maintained that “routine teacher-prepared tests” are
fundamental to the teaching of students.182 In making this comment, the majority argued that
characteristics of religion would inevitably find their way into the private school teacher’s exams
and therefore create an unwarranted link between church and state.
Ultimately the question before the Court, according to the majority, was whether the
statute had a “primary purpose or effect of advancing religion or religious education or whether
it leads to excessive entanglement by the State in the affairs of the religious institution.”183 While
the majority agreed there were some legitimate areas where the State and private schools would
intertwine, for the majority it did not mean that the Establishment Clause should allow a “State
to pay for whatever it requires a private school to do.”184 The majority concluded that the statute
violated the Establishment Clause because the money given to the private schools could find its
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way to supporting religious views. As an illustration, the Court reasoned that a teacher in a
religious school could construct tests which would be inherently religious.
While decisions in Everson and Allen seemed to open a door for state aid to find its way
to religious education, that door was closed slightly in the Levitt decision. In Levitt the Court saw
a significant difference between bus rides or state-provided textbooks and teacher-prepared tests.
Likewise, future cases would further illustrate what the U.S. Supreme Court deemed permissible
involving state aid and private schools.

Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973)

In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist185 the Supreme Court would make a similar
decision to their ruling in Levitt. The case concerned a New York statute providing tax credits to
the parents of children enrolled in private schools, including religious schools, for the purpose of
reimbursing parents for tuition. The Court found the statute violated the Establishment Clause
because the statute supported religious schools and because parents with children in public
schools were unable to participate.
In 1972 the State of New York amended their education laws and created “three financial
aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.”186 The first part of the program
gave money to private schools in poor urban areas for “maintenance and repair” and for the
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“health, welfare, and safety” of the students.187 The second part gave money directly to parents
for “tuition reimbursement” whose children attended nonpublic schools.188 The third part gave
“state income tax relief” to those parents who sent their children to nonpublic schools.189 An
unincorporated association, known as the Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty
and several New York taxpayers filed suit in District Court in the Southern District of New York
claiming the amended laws violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. New
York State Education Commissioner Ewald B. Nyquist was named as the defendant. The District
Court struck down sections one and two as violating the Establishment Clause, but ruled that
section three did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty and New York taxpayers appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court on grounds that
the lower court’s decision with respect to the third portion of the law was not valid.190
The question before the U. S. Supreme Court was whether or not the New York law “has
a primary effect that advances religion, or which fosters excessive entanglements between
Church and State.”191 The Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling with regards to sections one
and two, but the Court reversed the decision as it applied to section three and found it to be
unconstitutional as well.
Section one of the New York law dealt with “maintenance and repair.”192 The majority
wrote that the “maintenance and repair” provision in section one violated the Establishment
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Clause because it made direct payments to nonpublic schools. The vast majority of these schools
were Roman Catholic schools in low-income areas.193 This fact “had a primary effect that
advances religion in that it subsidizes directly the religious activities of sectarian” schools.194
Section two of the New York law dealt with tuition reimbursement.195 The majority
stated that the tuition reimbursement plan also violated the Establishment Clause. The grant
money went directly to sectarian schools that, as a result, benefitted from the aid.196 By
reimbursing parents for a portion of the tuition bill, the State relieved the financial burden on
parents. This in turn allowed parents to continue to choose private schools and the result was that
government funds played an improper role in supporting parents’ decisions to enroll their
children in private schools. The effect of the aid was to support private schools. This violated the
Establishment Clause.197 Irrelevant to the Court was the fact that parents had free choice to spend
the money on any private school. The mere offer of money was incentive enough to parents to
choose a private school over a public school. The Establishment Clause was violated when the
money was offered, regardless of where the money was spent.198
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Section three of the New York law dealt with tax relief for private school parents. 199 The
Court ruled that the tax credit for parents who sent their children to private schools violated the
Establishment Clause. The Court saw little difference between the tax credit in section three and
tuition reimbursement in section two. In both situations the parent received special consideration
in the form of encouragement and reward for sending their children to private schools.200
The State of New York argued that a) tax relief went directly to parents and not to
schools and b) religious organizations enjoyed tax exemptions and in turn parents should receive
the same consideration.201 The majority countered that parents were getting a financial break
because of their own personal choice to send their children to private schools. In affect this
amounted to a tuition waiver. Adding to their argument, the majority stated that history pointed
to many instances of tax relief for religious organizations, but there was no such history of tax
benefits for parents whose children attended private schools. They reasoned that recent financial
burdens experienced by private schools may have been the impetus for such legislation.202 The
majority maintained while the benefits aided parents who sent their children to private schools,
the aid had the effect of advancing religion. The granting of aid would tend to increase rather
than limit the involvement between church and state.203
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Relying on the Lemon Test, the majority concluded the New York law violated the
Establishment Clause because it had a “primary effect of advancing religion” and it infringed on
the constitutional provision of “respecting an establishment of religion.”204 Justices Rehnquist
and White both dissented on the Court’s ruling concerning the third part of the program that
allowed tuition reimbursement and tax relief for private school parents. Their dissents would be
a prelude for future arguments concerning public money reaching private schools.205

Meek v. Pittenger (1975)

Decisions in Levitt and Nyquist struck down state statutes that provided funds directly to
private schools and aid that went to private school parents. One case that approved some
assistance to private school students but denied other assistance was Meek v. Pittenger.206 In July
1972 the Pennsylvania legislature enacted Acts 194 and 195,207 which provided supplementary
services to all children enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools.208 In Act 194 these
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supplementary services included counseling, hearing and speech therapy, psychological services,
and testing.209 Basically the supplementary services were to be provided to private school
students in much the same way as they were provided to the public school students.210
Act 195 also provided for the loan of free textbooks to private school students and
instructional materials and equipment to private schools. Instructional materials included
periodicals, maps, charts, sound recordings, and films. Instructional equipment included
projectors, record and cassette equipment, and laboratory equipment. The items loaned to the
private schools were to be similar to the items provided to the public schools.211
In 1975 taxpayers sought a review in District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. The District Court found all segments, except one,212 of Act 194 and 195 to be
constitutional. The taxpayers appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on grounds that the laws
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
In a 6-3 vote the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the loan of books was constitutional
because the books were loaned to private school students and not loaned to the private schools.213
The books were secular in nature and therefore they could not be used to advance a religious
message.214 The Court ruled unconstitutional the loaning of other materials and services because
these items went directly to the private schools.215
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Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The loaning of instructional materials
and equipment to private schools was unconstitutional because it had the “primary effect of
establishing religion.”216 The majority asserted that while the aid was superficially limited to
secular instructional materials it had the direct impact of advancing religion.217 The majority also
pointed out that Act 194 also provided for “auxiliary services”218 on private school property, thus
running afoul of the Establishment Clause.219
Act 195 set up a system for nonpublic school children, both elementary and high school,
to receive “textbooks without charge…that meet the Commonwealth’s” guidelines.220 The lent
books would be the same as the books used in the Commonwealth’s public schools.221 The other
part of Act 195 allowed nonpublic schools to secure “instructional materials and equipment,
useful to the education”222 of nonpublic school children.223
Comparing Meek to Allen’s textbook loan program, the majority asserted that Act 195
makes “textbooks [available] to the students…and not to the nonpublic school itself.”224 The
majority’s argument was Meek and Allen were similar because in both programs parents and
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students benefitted from the loaning of textbooks. They did not see the benefit directly helping
the private school.225
However, issues were quite different for the majority when instructional materials and
equipment were to be provided to the same nonpublic schools.226 Agreeing with the lower court,
the majority ruled “that the direct loan of instructional material and equipment has the
unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion because of the predominantly religious
character of the schools benefiting from Act 195.”227 Calling this assistance “massive aid”, the
majority argued it “is neither indirect nor incidental.”228 While the majority agreed that the
nature of the instructional materials and equipment being loaned was “wholly neutral” and
“secular”, the end result was “the direct and substantial advancement of religious activity…and
thus constitutes an impermissible establishment of religion.”229
According to the majority opinion, Act 194 violated the Establishment Clause because of
the “auxiliary services” provided to the nonpublic schools.230 While Act 195 centered its
provisions on books, instructional materials and equipment, Act 194 supplied “professional staff,
as well as supportive materials, equipment, and personnel” to nonpublic school children.231
These services were provided only at the private schools.232 Believing that placing public
employees on private school property would create an environment where religious teaching
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could creep into the secular instruction, the majority found this untenable with the Establishment
Clause.233
Another issue for the Court concerned “political fragmentation and division along
religious lines.”234 The Court pointed to the likely confrontation between those in favor of the
auxiliary service program and those opposed to it.235 This created a “serious potential for divisive
conflict over the issue of aid to religion.”236 The majority concluded there was enough
“potential” for an improper association between church and state that would cause a violation of
the Establishment Clause.237
Justice Brennan dissented in part.238 He agreed with the majority on all issues except that
of the loaning of books to nonpublic students.239 He criticized the book deal and pointed to a
“political-divisiveness factor” born from the textbook loan program outlined in Act 194.240
Justice Brennan delineated the incongruity with the majority’s argument that permitted textbooks
to be loaned, but disallowed the loaning of instructional materials. For Justice Brennan there was
no difference between the two.241

233

Id. at 370.
Id. at 372.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id. at 373.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 377.
241
Id. at 378-387. (Justice Brennan outlined two reasons why he believed the loan of textbooks to nonpublic
students in Act 195 was just as unconstitutional as the offer of instructional materials and equipment to nonpublic
schools. Justice Brennan’s first point was “…it is pure fantasy to treat the textbook program as a loan to students.”
He pointed out that the “nonpublic school, not its pupils, is the motivating force behind the textbook loan, and that
virtually the entire loan transaction is…conducted between officials of the nonpublic school…and the officers of the
State.” He argued that the exchange of books involved the private school and State officials and left the students and
their parents out of the mix. Books are ordered by nonpublic school officials, delivered to the nonpublic school and
distributed by those same officials to nonpublic students. Justice Brennan’s second point that the loan of books goes
234

59
Wolman v. Walter (1977)

In 1977 a similar case to Meek would be heard by the U. S. Supreme Court. In Wolman v.
Walter242 the issues concerned a State of Ohio law243 that granted state aid to private religious
schools.244 Taxpayers sued the state on grounds that the aid violated the Establishment Clause.245
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio sustained the State’s program.246 The
taxpayers appealed and sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court.247 In a 5-4 decision the U.S
Supreme Court supported some but not all of the lower court’s decision.248 They ruled that the
program, which provided textbooks, standardized tests, and services such as speech, hearing,
psychological and therapeutic services, was constitutional and did not violate the Establishment

to the school or to the students was “wholly irrelevant”. What trumped the particulars of the exchange of books is
the “divisive political potential” that was born from the aid programs. He believed “Act 195 was intended solely as a
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Clause.249 However, the Court, in a 7-2 vote, ruled that the State could not provide instructional
materials and fund field trips and stay within the confines of the Establishment Clause.250
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The majority referenced the
Lemon251 Test in their arguments that supported sections of Ohio’s program. The Lemon Test
states that a law “must have a secular legislative purpose, must have a principal or primary effect
that neither advances or inhibits religion and must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.”252 According to the majority, some parts of the Ohio program
passed the first prong of the Lemon Test because its secular principle provided a sound education
for its citizens.253 The majority believed that other parts of the Ohio law had difficulty with the
second and third prongs of the Test. “The effect and the entanglement” language in Lemon’s
second and third prongs presented the biggest hurdles the Court.254
Taking up the textbook question, the majority argued that the loan of textbooks to
nonpublic students was similar to the programs approved in the Allen and Meeks cases.
Important to the majority’s decision was the fact that the books were the same for private and
public students. The majority ruled that textbook distribution to nonpublic students was
constitutional and passed the Lemon Test.255
Addressing the testing issue, the majority reported that the testing and scoring of the tests
concentrated on secular subjects and did not include any religious subjects.256 According to the
majority, the State had an obligation to its students, both public and private, to insure a
249
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satisfactory secular education. The State may also mandate that all schools, both public and
private, “meet certain standards of instruction” and guarantee minimum standards are met.257 The
majority observed that there was no excessive entanglement when standardized tests were based
on secular subjects and were used to measure academic achievement, thus satisfying the U. S.
Constitution and the Lemon Test.258
After addressing the instructional components of the legislation, the majority addressed
the diagnostic services. The services provided were speech, hearing, psychological and
therapeutic. Except for the physicians, all other employees providing the services were public
school employees. The public school employees would test students on private school property.
It was argued by the taxpayers that public school employees working on private school property
would create “an impermissible opportunity for the intrusion of religious influence.”259 The
taxpayers believed the public school “staff might engage in unrestricted conversation with
(private school students) and …may fail to separate religious instruction from secular
responsibilities.”260 The majority relied on earlier decisions in Everson and Allen that states were
allowed “to provide church-related schools with secular, neutral, or non-ideological services,
facilities, or materials.”261 These services “were not thought to offend the Establishment
Clause.”262
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As for the instructional materials and equipment, the District Court offered up the
following opinion: under the Ohio program, instructional materials and instructional equipment
that were used in public schools could be used in nonpublic schools. The secular services and
materials used in both public and private schools would be exactly the same. The District Court
found this section of the program to be constitutional and it did not “distinguish” it from the loan
of textbooks approved in Meek.263 Despite the opinion of the lower court, the U. S. Supreme
Court contended that “even though the loan ostensibly was limited to neutral and secular
instructional material and equipment, it inescapably had the primary effect of providing a direct
and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise.”264
While the District Court had ruled in favor of funding field trips because it saw a nexus
with Everson, which allowed reimbursement to private school parents for the cost of transporting
their children to and from school, the Supreme Court disagreed. The lower court found that
providing aid directly to private school parents, as opposed to direct aid to the private school,
was constitutionally acceptable because the private school did not directly benefit from such
aid.265 The majority rejected this argument on two grounds: “First, the nonpublic school controls
the timing of the trips…their frequency and destinations. Second, although a trip location may be

teaching or counseling. The majority stated first, “diagnostic services…have little or no educational content and are
not closely associated with [an] educational mission” and second, the public school employee “has only limited
contact with the child” and the “contact involves…the use of objective and professional testing methods”. Therefore,
the majority reasoned “providing diagnostic services on the nonpublic school premises will not create an
impermissible” entanglement between church and state.).
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educationally beneficial…it is the individual teacher that makes the trip meaningful.”266 The
majority found that it was actually the schools and not the students who were the true recipients
of the government aid.267 The majority reasoned that school field trips, which they considered
“an integral part of the educational experience”, were designed, organized, and led by teachers
working for a sectarian institution.268 As a result the majority saw a link between the funding of
field trips and the funding of educational materials and equipment that was struck down in Meek;
therefore, they declared those sections of the Ohio law unconstitutional because direct aid was
going to private schools.269
The majority concluded that Ohio’s program was constitutional in regards to providing
students’ books, standardized testing and scoring, diagnostic, therapeutic and remedial services
to private schools. Conversely, Ohio’s provisions for providing instructional materials and
equipment and field trips were deemed unconstitutional.270
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In a break from such decisions as Levitt, Nyquist and Wolman, the Supreme Court would
revert back to the Everson and Allen decisions and approve tax deductions for private school
parents in Mueller v. Allen271 because the deductions were available to all parents.

Mueller v. Allen (1983)

In 1982 a Minnesota law272 was established that gave parents tax deductions for tuition,
textbooks, and transportation for their children to elementary and secondary schools. While these
tax deductions could be applied to any state citizen, in reality it was private school parents who
were able to take advantage of the deductions. Claiming that the statute violated the
Establishment Clause by providing financial support to religious schools, taxpayers in Minnesota
brought suit against the Commissioner of the Department of Revenue for the State of Minnesota,
Clyde E. Allen, in United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The District Court
found that the statute was “neutral on its face and in its application and does not have a primary
effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion.”273 The case was appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Agreeing with the District Court, the Appeals Court
found that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was not violated by this statute.
After the two lower courts ruled that the statute was in compliance with the
Establishment Clause, the case was appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. The Court ruled in
favor of the Minnesota statute and used the three-prong Lemon Test to support its decision. The
Court stated: one, the statute had a secular purpose, which was supporting the education of its
271
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citizens; two, the statute did not result in advancing or inhibiting religion; and three, the statute
did not create an excessive entanglement issue between the government and religion.
The majority began by summarizing the Minnesota statute that allowed “taxpayers, in
computing their state income tax, to deduct certain expenses for the education of their
children.”274 The deduction was “limited to actual expenses incurred for the ‘tuition, textbooks
and transportation’ of dependents attending elementary or secondary schools.”275 The majority
admitted that this issue presented a sticky situation for the Court, which in the past had wrestled
with “interpretation and application” of Establishment Clause questions.276
The majority emphasized that the Supreme Court’s past practice had shown that some
examples of government aid to private schools parents and their children were acceptable and
were not necessarily an infringement on the Establishment Clause. The decisions in Everson
(transportation reimbursement) and Allen (loaning of textbooks) were cited by the majority as
examples where the Court found the Establishment Clause was not violated when tax dollars
supported private school families. The majority also stated that there have been other decisions
that have “struck down arrangements” that have offered aid to private schools and the parents
who support them.277 Citing the Lemon, Levitt, Meek and Wolman cases, the Court found that
part or all of the state statutes that provided aid to private schools and/or the parents who
supported them were unconstitutional.278
Weighing these two divergent approaches, the majority’s main concern was whether the
Minnesota law fell under the rulings made in Everson and Allen or did it fall under the
274
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constraints of the decisions in the Levitt, Meek and Wolman cases.279 The taxpayers, who
appealed to the Court, wanted the ruling in Nyquist to guide the Court’s decision.280 In Nyquist
the Court ruled “invalid a New York statute providing public funds for the maintenance and
repair” of private schools and the awarding of “tuition grants to the parents of public school
children attending private schools.”281 The Court rejected the use of the Levitt, Meek, Wolman,
and Nyquist cases and relied on the Lemon Test to decide the case.
The first part of the Lemon Test asks if a statute has a secular purpose. The majority
argued that “little time need be spent on the question of whether the Minnesota tax deduction has
secular purpose.”282 After concluding that it was “essential to the political and economic health
of any community” to see that all children are properly educated, the majority continued,
“…there is a strong public interest in assuring the continued financial health of private
schools.”283 The majority argued “such schools relieve public schools…of a great burden” which
as a result creates a “benefit for all taxpayers.”284 The majority referenced Justice Powell’s
opinion in the Wolman case where he contended that our country’s past has benefitted from the
existence of private schools. Private schools have offered an “educative alternative” to public
education, private schools have created a “wholesome competition” between private and public
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schools, and private schools can relieve the “tax burden” of its citizenry.285 In Justice Powell’s
opinion all of this only improved public education.286
Moving on to the second part of the Lemon Test, the Court asked whether the statute had
the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.287 Important to the majority was the fact
that the Minnesota statute in question was “one of among many deductions…available under
Minnesota tax laws.”288 Another important aspect for the Court was that the Minnesota law
allowed “all parents” no matter where they sent their children to school to apply for the tax
deduction.289 The majority found that the Minnesota law was more in line with the decisions
made in Everson and Allen than in Levitt, Meek and Wolman or Nyquist. In Everson and Allen
both public and private school families were eligible for benefits, while in Nyquist only private
schools or private school parents were eligible for government aid. The majority concluded that
“state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause.”290
The majority admitted that this aid may, as a result, trickle down to the private school;
however, “aid to parochial schools is available only as a result of decisions of individual
parents.”291 According to the majority past dangers that were associated with Establishment
Clause challenges did not apply to the present day.292 The majority believed:
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The risk of significant religious or denominational control over our
democratic process – or even of deep political division along religious
lines – is remote, and when viewed against the positive contributions of
sectarian schools, any such risk seems entirely tolerable in light of the
continuing oversight of this Court.293
The majority noted that past views of some sort of political divisiveness were antiquated in
today’s society. They further stated, “The historic purposes of the Clause simply do not
encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit…that eventually flows to parochial schools
from the neutrally available tax benefit at issue.”294
Another claim by the taxpayers was that the statute truly benefitted only the parents who
sent their children to private schools because parents who sent their children to public schools
could not enjoy the tax deductions. Arguing that the statute was “facially neutral” and therefore
the petitioners’ claim had no basis,295 the majority rejected this argument. In essence what the
majority said was that it is not the concern of the Court when a law is “neutral” and citizens do
not take advantage of the tax deductions set up by that law.296 In addition to this line of thinking,
the majority reasoned that private school parents placed upon themselves an extra “burden” of
financing a private school education.297 The majority believed the State, which benefitted from
not having to seek more taxes for schools because some of its citizens chose to send their
children to private schools, was within its rights to relieve those same parents and provide them
with tax deductions.298
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Taking up the third part of the Lemon Test, the Court asked if the statute caused any
excessive entanglement between church and state. The Court did not see an entanglement issue
because the only opportunity that may have presented an improper relationship would be with
the tax deduction for textbooks. Relying on its decision in Allen, where the Court upheld the loan
of secular textbooks to parents or children attending private schools, the Court ruled that this was
a moot point because the only books that could be deducted on a parents tax form were secular
textbooks.299 Ultimately the Court did not view this as an excessive entanglement issue.300

Grand Rapids v. Ball (1985)

In 1976 the Supreme Court would make a similar ruling to the one made in Meek.301
In Grand Rapids, Michigan, the public school district created the School Shared Time Program
and Community Education Program.302 The programs provided additional after-school classes
for students in several private schools. The programs received funding from the public school
system and were taught by teachers hired by the public school system. Classes were conducted in
private school classrooms, which were rented by the public schools and bore signs identifying
them as public school classrooms while the classes were in session.303 Some of the Shared Time
teaching staff had private school teaching experience. The staffs in the Community Education
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Program were considered part-time public employees and their ranks were comprised of fulltime private school teachers.304 Taxpayers in Grand Rapids filed suit in District Court
challenging that both programs violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The
District Court declared the programs unconstitutional and on appeal the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed both
lower courts’ decisions.305 The Court held that the two programs violated the Establishment
Clause because they both had the effect of promoting and supporting religion.306
The Court described the Shared Time Program as “classes during the regular school day
that are intended to be supplementary to the ‘core curriculum’ courses that the State of Michigan
requires as part of an accredited school program.”307 The courses taught included “remedial and
enrichment” art, math, music, physical education, and reading. The teachers in the program were
“full-time employees of the public schools” and “all of the supplies, materials, and equipment
used in connection with the Shared Time program” were provided by the public school
system.308
The Court explained that the Community Education Program was available to students
and adults. The courses offered included arts and crafts, home economics, Spanish, gymnastics,
yearbook production, drama, newspaper, humanities, chess, model building, and nature
appreciation.309 The teachers in the program were considered “part-time public employees”, but
in many cases these same teachers were fully employed private school teachers.310
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Both programs were led by a public school employee who provided information to a
private school liaison on the courses scheduled to be offered. The private school liaison would
decide which courses would be offered and the classrooms that would be used. The public school
system would rent the classrooms from the private school which had to be free of any religious
symbols. In addition, a sign stating that the room was a “public school classroom” and was
rented by the Grand Rapids School District had to be posted in every room used.311 While the
two programs were open to all students, both public and private, the majority stated that at the
time of the lawsuit, “There is no evidence that any public school student has ever attended a
Shared Time or Community Education class in a nonpublic school.”312 In addition, the majority
pointed out, “Forty of the forty-one schools at which the programs operate are sectarian in
character.”313
The majority made note of the District Court decision that relied upon the Lemon Test.314
The District Court decided that both programs did not violate the first part of the test, the secular
purpose requirement. However, the lower court ruled that the program did not meet the criteria
for the second and third prongs, the primary effect and excessive entanglement prongs. Important
to the lower court’s decision was that the programs were held exclusively in private schools and
solely served private school students. This violated the second prong of the Lemon Test where it
is impermissible for a government-supported program to “advance or inhibit” religion. The third
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part of the Lemon Test was violated because an improper “level of entanglement” existed
between the public and private schools.315
After considering the District Court’s ruling, the majority based their opinion on the
“guarantees of the Establishment Clause.”316 The majority stated the Court’s “…goal has been to
give meaning to the sparse language and broad purposes of the Clause, while not unduly
infringing on the ability of the States to provide the welfare of their people.”317 The majority
continued stating, “…secular purpose cannot validate government aid to parochial schools when
the aid has the effect of promoting a single religion…or when the aid unduly entangles the
government in matters religious.”318
The Court, agreeing with the lower courts, nullified the Shared Time Program as a
violation of Lemon’s second prong where public money cannot have the effect of advancing or
inhibiting religions. In the Court’s opinion the after-school program was promoting a secular
purpose.319 The following conditions were problematic for the Court: first, 40 of the 41 schools
participating in the program were sectarian in nature; second, such teachers working in these
schools could easily advance a religious message; third, a “symbolic link” existed between the
government and religion and as a result students could interpret governmental endorsement of a
particular religion; and fourth, religions may be “directly promoted” as a result of financing of
religious schools.320
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The Court took a strict approach and declared “Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
characterized by few absolutes; the Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed or
government-sponsored indoctrination in the beliefs of a particular religious faith.”321 According
to the Court, any support of “indoctrination” to a particular belief could possibly damage the
“individual” as well as have a negative impact on “the resulting religious beliefs.”322 Citing the
decisions in Meek323 and Lemon,324 the Court argued “state sponsored instructional personnel”
would improperly endorse a religious message.325 The Court believed that the Grand Rapids
private school teachers who had been hired by the public school system to teach in the afterschool program would naturally bring “the tenets and beliefs of their particular faiths” to the
after school program.326 In other words, the Court believed that these same private school
teachers did not shed their religious beliefs at the end of the school day and don the guise of
public school instructors in the after-school program. According to the Court, it was next to
impossible for these teachers to forego inculcating religious beliefs “before the same religious
school students and in the same religious school classrooms.”327
Next, the Court turned their attention to the “symbolism of a union between church and
state.”328 The majority stated that if the end result of an educational program is “a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment Clause
is violated.”329 The Court was concerned about “categories of programs in which public funds
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are used to finance secular activities that religious schools would otherwise fund from their own
resources.”330 However, there are programs where the Court ruled that some government aid
does not advance religion. The Court upheld such aid because it was given to parents and not
directly to private schools: Allen (loan of books was permissible), Wolman (books and other
services were permissible, but not instructional materials and field trips), and Everson
(reimbursement for transportation was permissible).331 While the Grand Rapids School District
argued that the Shared Time program and the Community Education program “supplemented the
curriculum with courses not previously offered in the religious schools,”332 it was the students
who truly received the aid and not the private school. The Court countered that “no meaningful
distinction can be made between aid to the student and aid to the school.”333 The Court
maintained that “masking the aid to individual students” still violated the Establishment
Clause.334
The Court concluded that the two after-school programs “have the effect of promoting
religion in three ways:” (1) the private school instructors who were hired by the public school
system cannot escape the cloak of their religious beliefs. Whether “subtly or overtly”, under the
plan in Ball, students would be inculcated with religious beliefs; (2) the “symbolic union of
church and state” is unavoidable when government aid is used to support education in a religious
setting; and (3) “the programs in effect subsidize the religious functions of the parochial schools
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by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects.”335 Thus,
the Court’s ruling limited state aid to private schools.

1986 – 2000: A Perceivable Shift in U.S. Supreme Court Rulings –
School Vouchers Gain More Momentum
Introduction
After Everson, Allen, Levitt, Nyquist, Meek, Wolman, Mueller, and Ball the Court
continued to define their stance on how public tax dollars could be used and not used in
supporting private school families and private school education. The next set of cases would
begin to broaden that scope. In Witters v. Washington,336 which involved a blind college student
receiving financial aid to attend a religious college; Zobrest v. Catalina,337 which involved using
tax dollars to pay an interpreter for a deaf student who attended a private school; Agostini v.
Felton,338 which involved public school teachers working in private schools; and Mitchell v.
Helms339 which involved public money being spent on instructional materials used in private
schools, the Court would expand their opinion on public money reaching private school interests.

Witters v. Washington (1985)

The Court would decide a case in 1985 that would begin to indicate that they were open
to state aid reaching individuals who in turn would use the aid at private schools. Witters v.
335
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Washington Department of Services for the Blind concerned a legally blind college student,
Larry Witters, who applied for government aid to help defer his costs at a Christian college.340 It
was Mr. Witters’ intention to become a pastor, missionary or youth director in a Christian
church.341
Mr. Witters, who was a resident of the State of Washington, applied to the State’s
Commission for the Blind for financial aid.342 The Commission denied Mr. Witters’ application
for aid because he would use the money on a religious education.343 The Commission based their
decision on the Washington State Constitution which prohibited state funds from being used for
religious instruction.344 Mr. Witters sued State Superior Court, which upheld the Commission’s
decision.345 The case went to the Washington Supreme Court and the court upheld the
Commission’s decision; however, they did not rely on Washington’s State Constitution, but
instead relied on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.346 Mr. Witters appealed his
case to the U. S. Supreme Court.
The central question for the Court was whether Larry Witters could use public funds to
pursue a degree in religious education or was such use “an impermissible direct subsidy” and a
violation of the Establishment Clause?347 In rendering its decision, the majority employed the
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Lemon Test.348 The unanimous Court found that the first part of the Lemon Test was met. It was
clear to the majority that the program in question was developed to “promote the well-being of
the visually handicapped” through financial aid.349 The majority ruled that the Washington
statute was secular and did not violate Lemon’s first prong.350 The second prong presented a
more difficult decision. The majority contended that “the Establishment Clause is not violated
every time money previously in the possession of a State is conveyed to a religious
institution.”351 The majority stated that on the one hand it was permissible for State-paid
employees to make contributions to religious organizations,352 but on the other hand it is not
permissible for the State to grant any aid “directly” to a religious school.353
The majority asserted that the government aid given was “paid directly to the student,
who transmits it to the educational institution of his or her choice.”354 If aid finds its way to a
religious school, it was “only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices” of the
individual.355 Therefore the majority argued the following points: first, Washington’s plan did
not “create a financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian education;”356 second,
Washington’s plan did not “provide greater or broader benefits for recipients who apply their aid
to religious education” and the aid was not “limited…to students at sectarian institutions;”357 and
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third, students receiving this aid had the freedom to choose from a variety of schools. According
to the majority “aid recipients have full opportunity to expend…aid on…secular education, and
as a practical matter have rather greater prospects to do so” and consequently it “means that the
decision to support religious education is made by the individual, not by the State.”358
The Court steered clear of directly addressing Lemon’s third prong, the “entanglement”
issue. However, the majority made the following statement, “…the mere circumstance that
petitioner has chosen to use neutrally available state aid to help pay for his religious education
confer[s] any message of state endorsement of religion.”359 The Court “rejected the claim
that…extension of aid under Washington’s vocational rehabilitation program to finance” a
student’s education at a religious school is “is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.”360
Future cases would look carefully at the Court’s argument that state aid could be used by private
individuals and applied to religious institutions.

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993)

In a case similar to the Meek361 (where the Court allowed the purchase of textbooks for
private schools, but prohibited public school personnel from working with private school
students) and Ball362 (where the Court invalidated after school programs that provided public
employees to act as instructors within private schools) decisions, the U. S. Supreme Court ruled
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in 1993 that the Establishment Clause would not be violated by the presence of publicly-funded
sign language interpreter working with a student in a private school.363
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District concerned Larry Zobrest, a deaf private high
school student in Arizona. Prior to high school Larry Zobrest attended public school, where a
sign language interpreter was assigned to assist him in school.364 The sign language interpreter
was assigned according to the provisions in Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA).365 Upon entering the private high school Zobrest’s parents sought to continue the same
services for their son.366 The public school district where the Zobrests resided declined the
parent’s request for a sign language interpreter on grounds that it would violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.367 The Zobrest family filed suit in District Court
arguing that the school district was obligated to pay for the interpreter because IDEA was neutral
on the type of school a student could attend.368 The District Court decided that the Establishment
Clause would be violated if the interpreter was assigned to a private school.369 The lower court
was specifically concerned with the entanglement issue between church and state.370 The
Zobrests appealed the case to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.371 The Court of
Appeals agreed with the lower court and stated that supporting the placement of an interpreter in
a private school would have the primary effect of advancing religion and would be in violation of
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the Establishment Clause.372 Zobrest’s parents appealed the case to the U. S. Supreme Court on
grounds that the public school district denied their son’s rights under IDEA and the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.373 In a 5-4 decision the U. S. Supreme Court found that
supplying a sign language interpreter would not violate the Establishment Clause.
The majority outlined the District Court’s decision and the Court of Appeals decision,
which used the Lemon Test to decide the case.374 The District Court held that providing a sign
language interpreter would “offend the Establishment Clause” because “the interpreter would act
as a conduit for the religious inculcation” of the student. The lower court reasoned that the
government aid would benefit the “religious development” of the student.375 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision and used the three part Lemon Test to make its
decision.376 The first part of the test was not violated because the IDEA program had a secular
purpose.377 The second part was violated because providing a sign language interpreter “would
have the primary effect of advancing religion.”378 The third part was violated because a
“symbolic union of government and religion” would exist.379 The dissenting judge countered that
the IDEA program was available to “all children” and thus passed “constitutional muster”.380
The majority turned the Court’s attention to the relationship between church and state.381
The majority stated that the Court has “never said” that religious institutions can never receive
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government aid without being in violation of the First Amendment.382 The majority cited
churches receiving police and fire protection as examples where government aid can directly
benefit a religious organization, and the majority asserted that “government programs that
neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are
not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge because sectarian institutions may also
receive attenuated financial benefit.”383 The majority cited the Mueller384 and Witters385 cases to
illustrate their point. In Mueller the Court found that a Minnesota statute that offered tax
deductions to parents for educational expenses did not violate the Establishment Clause. Even
though the vast majority of those who benefitted from the statute were private school parents, the
Court ruled that all parents were afforded the opportunity to file for deductions.386 In Witters the
Court found that a blind college student could receive government aid and apply it to his private
school expenses. The Court ruled that the aid was given neutrally and the recipient was free to
disburse the aid as he saw fit.387
According to the majority, the same analysis in Mueller and Witters applied to Zobrest.
The aid offered through IDEA was provided “neutrally to any child qualifying” and without any
consideration regarding the school the student attends.388 The aid was given to the parents who
then make a private choice on where to send their child. It is only as a result of the parent’s
choice that the sign language interpreter accompanies the student to a private school.389 The
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majority insisted that Zobrest was “an even easier case than Mueller and Witters” because money
to pay for the interpreter never found its “way into sectarian schools’ coffers.”390
The school district refuted the argument that Mueller and Witters applied to Zobrest. The
school district, instead, would submit the decisions in Meek391 and Ball392 had more of a
connection with Zobrest because those decisions denied offering government financed
educational services to private schools.393 In Meek the Court ruled that the same public school
materials and equipment could not be supplied to private schools. The Court also ruled that
public school personnel could not offer services like remedial assistance to private school
students in an after school program.394 In Ball the Court ruled that public school employees could
not teach supplementary classes in an after-school program in private schools.395 The school
district contended that if services in Meek and Ball were denied, then it follows that the
interpreter in Zobrest was not allowed.396
The majority countered that “reliance on Meek and Ball is misplaced for two reasons.”397
First, Meek398 and Ball399 included “direct grants of government aid” that went to the private
schools. The private schools received a direct benefit from the services provided by public
school instructors and the instructional materials and equipment that was made available. Unlike
the Meek and Ball cases, the private school in the Zobrest case was “not relieved of an expense
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that it otherwise would have assumed.”400 Any benefit the private school received was due to the
“private choice of individual parents.”401 Second, the sign language interpreter’s job was far
different than that of the public school teacher assigned to an after-school program in a private
school. The mere presence of a public employee in a private school did not necessarily mean an
automatic violation of the Establishment Clause. The majority insisted, “Nothing in this record
suggests that a sign language interpreter would do more than accurately interpret whatever
material is presented to the class as a whole.”402 The majority continued, “The sign language
interpreter…will neither add to nor subtract from that environment, and…such assistance is not
barred by the Establishment Clause.”403
The majority concluded that IDEA was a “neutral government program” that dispensed
benefits “not to schools but to individual handicapped children” who, in conjunction with their
parents, then makes a personal choice to attend a private school.404 The Establishment Clause did
not prohibit “the school district from furnishing him with a sign language interpreter.”405
Justices Blackmun, Souter, and O’Connor dissented. In his dissent Justice Blackmun
disagreed with the majority on the presence of a public employee placed in a private school. He
asserted that “relaying religious messages” violated the Establishment Clause.406 Justice
Blackmun supported the two points the school district used to originally deny the use of a sign
language interpreter in a private school.407 First, IDEA did not declare that a sign language
interpreter must be given to a student at a private school when a public school offers the same
400
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services.408 Second, a section of IDEA409 prohibited the “use of federal funds to pay for
‘religious worship, instruction, or proselytization’” which would be a direct violation of the
Establishment Clause.410
While the Ball decision had the effect of limiting certain aid finding its way to private
schools, the Court’s decisions in Witters and Zobrest had the opposite effect, thus opening up
ways for government aid to reach private schools. In fact, the decisions in Witters and Zobrest
would bring about a reversal of a previously-decided U. S. Supreme Court case.

Agostini v. Felton (1997)

In 1978 taxpayers in New York sued because a state program used Title I 411 funds to
send public school teachers into private schools to provide remedial education.412 The school
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argued that, “…our cases make clear that government crosses the boundary when it furnishes the medium for
communication of a religious message.” He continued, “…it is beyond question that a state-employed sign-language
interpreter would serve as the conduit for…religious education, thereby assisting” a religious school’s message.
Finally Justice Blackmun believed that the action approved by the majority permitted and endorsed “ongoing, daily
and intimate governmental participation in the teaching and propagation of religious doctrine.”)
411
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board and parents filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The
District Court found in favor of the board and the parents.413 The case was appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit and they reversed the lower court’s decision. Citing the U. S.
Supreme Court decisions in Meek and Wolman, the Court of Appeals found that the Board of
Education violated the Establishment Clause because public school teachers were sent into
private schools to teach.414 In 1985 the case reached the U. S. Supreme Court as Aguilar v.
Felton 473 US 402.415
In 1995 the New York City school board and a group of private school parents filed an
injunction under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,416 which states that when
a rule of law no longer has merit then related cases may be reviewed.417 The school board and
parents contended that the rule of law had been altered by recent U. S. Supreme Court decisions,
namely Witters418 and Zobrest.419 The school board and parents filed suit in the District Court for
the Eastern District of New York. The District Court ruled that the decision in Aguilar was still

students will receive supplementary federal funds to help in meeting students’ educational needs. Typically Title I
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valid.420 The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit who agreed with
the lower court’s decision.421
In 1997 the U. S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 ruling reversed the Aguilar decision on several
points.422 First, the program did not “result in governmental indoctrination.”423 Second, it did not
“define aid recipients by reference to religion” or influence religious “beliefs or practices” so
recipients could acquire State services.424 Third, it did not “create an excessive entanglement
that advanced or inhibited religion.”425 Finally, there was “significant change in the Supreme
Court’s post-Aguilar establishment of religion clause law” which entitled petitioners the
opportunity to apply Rule 60(b)(5).426
Before taking up the constitutionality of using monies from the Title I Program for use in
private schools, the majority reviewed the program’s main components.427 Title I, enacted by
Congress in 1965 and subsequently reenacted for many years after,428 provided funds to Local
Educational Agencies (LEA’s) which in turn provided the following services to students:
remedial education, guidance and job counseling.429 Eligible students had to meet two criteria:
reside in a low income public school district and be at risk of failing.430 Title I funds were to be
made available to all eligible students in both public and private schools. However, the aid
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received by the private school student had to meet certain requirements related to the use of
public school employees which are listed below.431

1. They were employees of the Board of Education and accountable
only to their supervisors.
2. They could only teach those children who met the eligibility
criteria for Title I.
3. Their materials and equipment would be used only in the Title I
program.
4. They could not engage in team-teaching or other cooperative
instructional activities with private school teachers.
5. They could not introduce any religious matter into their teaching or
become involved in any way with the religious activities of the
private school.
In addition to the above conditions placed on the public school teachers, “all religious
symbols were to be removed from all classrooms that were used,” and to make sure the
rules were followed “a publicly employed field supervisor was to make at least one
unannounced visit to each teacher’s classroom every month.”432
Maintaining that the Title I program violated the Establishment Clause, in 1978 New
York taxpayers sued the Board of Education in District Court.”433 The District Court ruled in
favor of the Board of Education. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals which
overturned the lower court’s ruling. Basing its ruling on decisions made in Meek434 and
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Wolman,435 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the use of Title I funds for private
school students to be unconstitutional. The matter was appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court, and
in a 5-4 decision the Court found that the Title I program offered in the private schools was
unconstitutional because it violated the Establishment Clause.436
In 1995 the New York City Board of Education and a new set of private school parents
whose children qualified for Title I services filed motions in District Court seeking relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5).437 The District Court ruled that Rule 60(b)(5) did not
apply and supported the Aguilar decision. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed
with the lower court and the case was appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court.438 According to the
majority the central question on this new issue was: “Are petitioners entitled to relief from the
District Court’s permanent injunction under Rule 60(b)(5)?”439
The majority stated: “Petitioners point to three changes…that they believe justify their
claim for relief under Rule 60(b)(5).”440 One, the high cost441 of running the Title I program for
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private school students off private school property justifies a “modification”.442 Two, “a majority
of justices have expressed their views that Aguilar should be reconsidered.”443 Three, subsequent
cases since Aguilar may have “undermined” the Court’s decision and those cases include:
Witters, Zobrest, and Rosenberger.444
The taxpayers rejected these arguments because “the cost of providing Title I services
off-site were known at the time Aguilar was decided” and the cases mentioned by the petitioners
were not “relevant” and did not apply to Aguilar.445 Even though the majority had agreed with
the residents about the high cost of an off-site program, they ruled that the petitioners presented
the Court with a legitimate question in regards to Rule 60(b)(5).446
Comparing Aguilar’s decision with the decision in Ball, the majority mapped out their
rationale.447 In Ball, the Court held that two private school programs (Shared Time and
Community Education) violated the Establishment Clause because it had the effect of promoting
and supporting religion.448 Using the ruling in Meek, the Ball Court ruled that a teacher working
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in the program could by design or by accident promote religious beliefs.449 Fearing that the
“symbolic union of church and state” would send children a message that the government was
“endorsing” religious doctrine, the Court could not support the Shared Time and Community
Education programs.450 The Court felt that a religious message was being “subsidized” by the
government.451 Irrelevant to the Court was “the fact that the program was provided to the student
[and] that the program only supplemented the courses offered by the parochial schools.”452
Conceding that the “New York Title I program challenged in Aguilar closely resembled the
Share Time program struck down in Ball”, the majority argued that “the New York City’s Title I
suffered from the same” entanglement issues brought up in Lemon and Meek.453 In addition to
the reasons referenced in the Ball case, the Court’s decision in Aguilar stated that “public
employees who teach on the premises of religious schools must be closely monitored to ensure
that they do not inculcate religion.”454
Despite the fact that the Aguilar decision found the New York’s use of Title I funds
improper, the majority believed that cases subsequent to Aguilar had “modified in two
significant respects the approach we use to assess indoctrination.”455 First, the Court had
abandoned the idea that just because a public school employee was placed on private school
property that religious indoctrination is “inevitable”. 456 The majority’s second point was that
they had abandoned the rule relied on in Ball that “all government aid that directly aids the
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educational function of a religious school was invalid.”457 After all, the Witters decision did not
find that the Establishment Clause was violated when it allowed a tuition grant to go to a blind
college student seeking a religious education. The assertion from the majority was that “this
transaction was no different from a State’s issuing a paycheck to one of its employees, knowing
that the employee would donate part or all of the check to a religious institution.”458 Moreover,
citing Zobrest, the majority stressed the public money spent on the sign language interpreter did
not find its way into the religious schools “coffers”.459
Unlike their decisions in Ball and Aguilar the Court was now claiming in their Zobrest
and Witters decisions that an advancement of religions did not automatically take place when a
public school employee “simply…enters a parochial school.”460 Citing the example of the sign
language interpreter in Zobrest, the majority contended that she would not “inculcate religion by
altering her translation of classroom lectures.”461 As the majority pointed out, Zobrest also
rejected the Ball decision that the mere “presence of Title I teachers in parochial school
classrooms will…create the impression of a ‘symbolic union’ between church and state.”462
Continuing their reliance on Zobrest, the majority observed that “in all relevant respects” the
Title I services provided by New York City mirror the services provided by the sign language
interpreter.463 Citing two other similarities between Agostini and Zobrest, the Court found that in
both cases aid was “provided to students at whatever school they choose” and services provided
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were “supplemental” to the courses already offered and therefore they did not reduce any costs to
the private schools.464
Addressing Justice Souter’s dissenting conclusions, the majority countered that the
programs in Zobrest and Agostini were analogous.465 Justice Souter questioned the Court’s ruling
in three areas.466 One, Justice Souter maintained that money went “directly” to religious schools;
two, religious schools received an undue benefit that allowed them to save money they would
have spent otherwise; and, three, more students were served in the Agostini case than in Witters
and Zobrest.467
Refuting these claims, the majority stated, “Title I funds never reach the coffers of
religious schools” and “funds are distributed to a public agency (an LEA) that dispenses services
directly to the eligible students.”468 There was no “evidence in the record” to suggest that New
York City had “provided services that supplant those offered” in private schools.469 Continuing
their response to Justice Souter’s argument that the number of students participating was
relevant, the majority declared, “We are [not] willing to conclude that the constitutionality of an
aid program depends on the number of sectarian students who happen to receive the otherwise
neutral aid.”470 Supporting their decision, the majority used their decision in Mueller to rebut
Justice Souter’s assertion that the number of participants mattered. In Mueller471 the Court
reasoned that it was difficult to determine how many people may or may not benefit from “the
464
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constitutionality of a facially neutral law.”472 Concluding their response to Justice Souter’s claim,
the majority stated that “…placing full-time employees on parochial school campuses does not
as a matter of law have the impermissible effect of advancing religion through indoctrination.”473
Another issue the Court addressed was whether the aid offered by the government
provided “a financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.”474 Stating that “this
incentive is not present” provided it was given on the “basis of neutral, secular criteria”, the
majority found that the program did not “favor or disfavor religion.”475 While Ball and Aguilar
paid no attention to the “incentive” issue, other past cases decided in favor of programs that
“provided aid to all eligible children regardless of where they attended school.”476 The majority
stated that the New York program fell in line with the programs where aid was available to all
students -- namely the programs approved by decisions in Everson, Allen, Witters and Zobrest.477
The entanglement issue was addressed by the majority when they stated that “not all
entanglements…have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.”478 The majority continued
“interaction between church and state is inevitable” and there has always been some permissible
“levels of involvement between the two.”479 The majority emphasized that the entanglement
must be “excessive” before it violates the Establishment Clause. In the Aguilar decision the
Court ruled that the Title I program had three elements that caused an excessive entanglement. 480
First, the program would need persistent “monitoring by public authorities” to make sure religion
472
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was not inculcated.481 Second, the program needed “administrative cooperation” between the
public school system and the private schools.482 Third, the program might heighten “political
divisiveness” between secular and non-secular factions.483
Addressing these conditions, the majority insisted that the first assumption was false.
They stated that “after Zobrest we no longer presume that public employees will inculcate
religion simply because they happen to be in a sectarian environment.”484 The majority also
debunked the last two issues because they “are insufficient by themselves to create an
‘excessive’ entanglement.”485 Summing up the entanglement dilemma, the majority stated,
“New York City’s Title I program does not run afoul of any of three primary criteria we
currently use to evaluate whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion: it does not
result in governmental indoctrination, define recipients by reference to religion, or create an
excessive entanglement.”486
By overturning Aguilar, the Court widened its approach on how public funds could be
used by private school parents and perhaps private schools themselves. Three years later the U.S.
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Supreme Court would apply a “neutrality” principle in a Louisiana case involving federal tax
dollars being used by private schools.487

Mitchell v. Helms (2000)

Chapter 2 of the Educational Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981488 supplied
funds to state and to local educational agencies.489 These funds were used to loan educational
equipment and materials (e.g. library materials, computers and computer software) to schools.490
Under Chapter 2 private schools in the State of Louisiana received the same materials provided
to the public schools.491 The aid had to be offered to both private and public schools and in order
to receive the aid, certain stipulations needed to be met by the private schools.492 The private
schools that received the aid could not use the materials to replace existing materials and
equipment.493 The aid could only add on to what the schools already had and the materials and
equipment had to be “secular, neutral and nonideological.”494 Private schools could not “gain
control” of the aid or own the materials and equipment provided by the funds.495
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In 1985 taxpayers in Louisiana sued in District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
citing that the use of Chapter 2 funds by private schools violated the Establishment Clause.496 In
1990 the District Court found in favor of the taxpayers and stated that aid given to private
schools amounted to government directly aiding religion because most of the private schools
receiving these funds were Catholic.497 In 1997 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed
with the District Court’s decision.498 Relying on the U. S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Meek
and Wolman, the Appeals Court ruled that Chapter 2 violated the Establishment Clause because
federal tax dollars were used to purchase materials and equipment for private schools.499
Voting 6-3, the U. S. Supreme Court found that Chapter 2 did not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause. Using Lemon’s first and second prongs and the latest ruling in Agostini,
the Court rendered its decision. The Court reasoned that Chapter 2 did not violate the
establishment of religion clause because the law met Lemon’s first condition of having a secular
purpose and it met Lemon’s second condition of not inhibiting or advancing a religious purpose.
The Court replaced Lemon’s third prong (whether a government action resulted in an excessive
entanglement between government and religion) with its decision in Agostini:
As we indicated in Agostini, and have indicated elsewhere, the question
whether governmental aid to religious schools results in governmental
indoctrination is ultimately a question whether any religious indoctrination
that occurs in those schools could reasonably be attributed to governmental
action.500
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As a result of their reliance on Agostini, the Court found that their previous decisions in Meek
and Wolman were “no longer good law.”501
Justice Thomas announced the opinion of the Court. Chapter 2 was a federally supported
aid program that allotted funds to state and locals government entities. The state and local
governments then lent educational equipment and materials to public and private schools. Each
school’s enrollment was the determining factor on the amount of the aid. The question before the
Court was whether Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, was a law respecting an
establishment of religion because many of the private schools receiving Chapter 2 aid in the
Jefferson Parish were religiously affiliated.502
Taking up the issue of private schools receiving aid, the majority pointed out that
“participating private schools receive Chapter 2 aid based on the number of children enrolled in
each school.”503 The majority quoted from the Chapter 2 program that any funds used may only
“supplement” existing funds.504 The majority pointed out several limitations that were placed on
private schools that received the aid.505 One, any aid had to be “secular, neutral and nonideological.”506 Two, private schools could not regulate the aid.507 Three, private schools had to
fill out an application “detailing which items the school seeks and how it will use them.”508 If the
application was approved, then the local government agency would purchase the materials and
equipment requested and would lend them to the private school.
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The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment orders that “no law respecting an
establishment of religion” be enacted. The majority observed that “since Everson” it has become
increasingly difficult to decipher and apply this mandate. The majority noted that in Agostini the
Court was able to bring some lucidity to their decisions.509 Before Agostini the Lemon Court used
the following to determine if a government action violated the Establishment Clause: first, does
the law have a secular purpose, second, does the law have a primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, or, third does the law create an excessive entanglement between government
and religion. The ruling in Agostini sharpened that approach in two ways: first, does the law
result in government indoctrination, and, second, does the law define its recipients by reference
to religion?510
In considering this case the majority did not take on the secular issue and only judged the
case based on Chapter 2’s “effect.”511 Considering the effect question, the Court only looked at
the Agostini criteria, namely the issue of indoctrination and asked whether the law defined its
recipients by reference to religion.512 Using Agostini, the majority outlined the first issue by
asking if a connection could be made between the religious activity in a school and any
government action related to the school.513 According to the majority the answer to that question
was whether a government action “subsidized religion.”514 The majority addressed the issue on
indoctrination by claiming the Court has used “the principal of neutrality” as the bellwether in
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“upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups…without regard to their religion.”515
The majority emphasized, “If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for
governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient
conducts has been done at the behest of the government.”516
To make sure the issue of “neutrality” was properly applied the majority maintained, “We
have repeatedly considered whether any governmental aid that goes to a religious institution does
so” only when individuals have made true independent and private choices.517 The majority
believed that the ruling in Agostini required the Court ask whether the criteria for allocating the
aid created a “financial incentive” for religious-minded parties.518
Next the majority took up the taxpayers’ assertion that the Chapter 2 program was
unconstitutional because one, the aid goes “directly” to religious schools and therefore it “is
always impermissible” and, two, the aid is “divertible to religious schools” and this “is similarly
impermissible.”519 The majority explained the “direct and indirect” issue by stating that recent
cases (Agostini, Witters and Zobrest) have been decided “not through the direct/indirect
distinction but rather through the principle of private choice.”520 Again the majority used
previous cases (Zobrest and Witters) to formulate the majority’s opinion that “divertability” is a
nonissue. Quoting from their opinion in Allen, the majority stated, “So long as the governmental
aid is not itself ‘unsuitable for use in the public schools because of religious content’ and
515
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eligibility for aid is determined in a constitutionally permissible manner, any use of that aid to
indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the government and is thus not of constitutional concern.”521
Therefore, the way the aid was used did “not affect the criteria governing the aid’s allocation and
thus does not create any impermissible incentive under Agostini’s second criterion.”522
The majority continued their assertion that the “divertability of aid” is not the real issue
but whether the aid had an “impermissible content.”523 The majority explained, “Where the aid
would be suitable for use in a public school, it is also suitable for use in any private school.”524
Addressing the dissent’s comment on divertability, the majority argued:
The dissent would find an establishment of religion if a governmentprovided projector were used in a religious school to show a privately
purchased religious film, even though a public school that possessed the
same kind of projector would likely be constitutionally barred from
refusing to allow a student bible club to use that projector in a classroom
to show the very film, where the classrooms and projectors were generally
available to student groups.525
Furthermore the majority questioned the dissents “resurrection of concern for political
divisiveness.”526 The majority stated the Court has, in the past, “disregarded” this concern.527
The majority also contended that the issue of the sectarian nature of the schools or the students
that receive the aid no longer matters.528 Speaking on the nature of sectarian schools, the
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majority stated, “…its relevance in our precedents is in sharp decline.”529 Speaking on the
“religious nature” of students, the majority stated:
…the religious nature of a recipient should not matter to the constitutional
analysis, so long as the recipient adequately furthers the government’s secular
purpose. If a program offers permissible aid to the religious (including the
pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mystery which
view of religion the government has established, and thus a mystery what the
constitutional violation would be.530
The majority seemed to be taken aback by the dissents’ divisiveness comment when it stated,
“…the inquiry into the recipient’s religious views required by a focus on whether a school is
pervasively sectarian is not only unnecessary but also offensive.”531 They described the
“hostility” towards “pervasively sectarian schools” as “shameful.”532 They further cited the
“history of exclusion” some sectarian schools have dealt with the “near passing” of the Blaine
Amendment533 in the 1870’s. The majority summed up the Court’s attitude towards this bias,
“…nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools
from otherwise permissible aid programs…”534 The majority continued, “This doctrine, born of
bigotry, should be buried now.”535
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In conclusion, the majority applied Agostini’s two criteria (i.e. aid is available to all and
aid is given on the basis of “neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion”) and
found that Chapter 2 did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.536 The
majority summed up their opinion by stating:
Chapter 2 does not result in governmental indoctrination, because it determines
eligibility for aid neutrally, allocates that aid based on the private choices of the
parents…and does not provide aid that has an impermissible content. Nor does
Chapter 2 define its recipients by reference to religion.537

The intersection of religion and law as it pertains to the funding of religious schools has
been and still is controversial. During the past fifty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has heard a
variety of cases centering on the constitutional legitimacy of distributing public tax dollars that
directly or indirectly relate to private schools. As a result of the first case, Everson, aid was
distributed, not to the school directly, but to parents of private school students. Subsequent
cases, from Allen to Mitchell, have also allowed reimbursement as the Courts have struggled
with the issue of whether or not the government may provide assistance to children who attend
religious schools. The summarized timeline of these cases has revealed, not only the tremendous
difficulty faced in interpreting the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, but also their
broader application, culminating in the Mitchell decision and therefore setting the stage for the
Zelman case.
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2002: The Zelman Decision
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002)
Facts and History
In the early 1990’s, the Cleveland public school system was considered one of the worst
in the country.538 Even though Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s decision to sustain
the school choice program in Cleveland, he felt it necessary in his dissent to use phrases like
“severe educational crisis” and “disastrous conditions” when describing the circumstances
surrounding the Cleveland public school system.539
A 1996 report from the Cleveland City School District Performance Audit stated that the
Cleveland public school system was in the middle of a “crisis that [was] perhaps unprecedented
in the history of American education.”540 The statistics for Cleveland public schools were bleak:
18 state standards for minimal acceptable performance were not met; only 10% of high school
freshmen could pass a basic proficiency examination; more than 66% of high school students
dropped out before graduation; and 25% of all seniors failed to graduate. Those that did graduate
high school could barely read, write, or compute at grade level.541 Finally, student test scores in
the Cleveland public schools lagged behind their counterparts in other Ohio public schools.542
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As a result of the Auditor’s report, the Federal District Court in Cleveland ordered that
the city’s public school system be taken over by the State of Ohio.543 The Ohio State General
Assembly responded as well by passing a statute granting Cleveland parents three options.
Parents could either transfer their child to a neighboring public school, transfer their child to an
approved private school within the city’s limits, or remain in the same public school and get
reimbursed for the cost of enrolling their child in a tutoring program.544 The new law, called the
Pilot Project Scholarship Program,545 was enacted to help Cleveland families whose limited
economic resources gave them few alternatives.546 If parents opted to transfer the child out of
their current school, the program was essentially reduced to two choices: a public school option
and a private school option.547

Public School Option

The public school option allowed Cleveland parents to transfer their child to a different
public school within the Cleveland public school system or to any public school district that
bordered the Cleveland district.548 Public school options included charted and magnet schools.
Any public schools that accepted the transferring students received a tuition credit for each
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student in addition to the money allocated by the state for all students enrolled in the school.549
Any Cleveland public school that lost students to transfers also forfeited the tax dollars
associated with those students.550

Private School Option

The second option for parents was to send their child to a private school. Private schools
were defined as any “religious or nonreligious” schools that were within the boundaries of the
Cleveland district.551 Certain conditions had to be met before a private school could accept any
scholarship students. Private schools had to be located within the City of Cleveland and agree to
accept all requirements set forth in the state-sponsored scholarship program.552 Private schools
accepting the tuition reimbursement could not discriminate based on race, ethnicity, national
origin, or religion.553
Scholarships for families opting for a private school were based on financial need.554
Provided that the private school tuition was greater than the scholarship being offered, the
following conditions governed the disbursement of scholarship funds.555 Families whose gross
income was 200 percent above the federal poverty line qualified for a scholarship not to exceed
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75 percent of the private school tuition or no more than $1,875 per year.556 Families whose
income was below the 200 percent poverty line qualified for a scholarship not to exceed 90
percent of the tuition or no more than $2,500 per year.557 For the 2012-2013 school year the 200
percent guideline is still in effect; however, the maximum amount of the scholarship is currently
$4,250 for grades K-8, and $5,000 for grades 9-12.558 Under the provisions of the statute, all
private school registration fees, book fees, and other additional costs were the responsibility of
the parents.559 Parents needed only to verify their Cleveland address to renew the scholarship and
all renewals ended at grade 12.560

Tutoring Program

Regarding the tutoring program, students and their parents that opted to stay with their
assigned Cleveland public school were eligible for tutoring services.561 Parents could hire private
tutors and then present receipts for reimbursement.562 As with the awarding of scholarships,
families qualified in the same way for tutoring reimbursements. Families above the 200%
poverty line received 75 percent of the amount charged for tutoring, up to $360. Families below
the 200 percent level received 90 percent of the amount charged for tutoring, not to exceed
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$360.563 After 2007 the $360 tutoring cap was raised to $400, where it still remains.564 The total
number of tutorial grants offered to families in a certain district had to equal the total number of
tuition aid scholarships in the same district.565 Those families that elected to attend a private
school were not afforded any tutoring opportunities.566

The Decision

In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision and ruled in
favor of the program, stating that it did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.567 Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court.568
In July of 1999, taxpayers in Ohio sued in the United States District Court, N.D. Ohio,
Eastern Division claiming that the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program violated the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.569 One month later, the District Court
chose to temporarily suspend the program while hearing the case.570 In December of 1999, the
District Court found in favor of the taxpayers. The State of Ohio appealed to the U. S Court of
Appeals, Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court’s decision, stating that the program
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violated the Establishment Clause.571 The decision was appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court and
argued on February 20, 2002.572
The Establishment Clause has been interpreted to mean that the government may not
establish any one religion and may not set up a preference of one religion over another.573 The
Court found that the Ohio program had a “valid secular purpose of providing educational
assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system.”574 The ultimate
question for the Court was whether the Ohio program had the impermissible “effect” of
promoting or obstructing religion.575 To address this question, the majority concentrated their
opinion on private choice and neutrality.576

Private Choice

Finding a difference between programs that provide direct aid to private schools (see
Mitchell and Agostini) and aid given directly to parents who then choose how the aid is to be
spent, the majority used the Court’s reasoning in three cases (Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest) to
reject the Establishment Clause challenge.577 First, the Zelman Court looked to the Mueller
decision which found that the Establishment Clause was not violated because parents who sent
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their children to private schools benefited from a tax deduction program.578 The private decisions
of parents were the key to the Court’s argument.579 Borrowing the reasoning in Mueller and
applying it to the Ohio program in Zelman, the majority stated that the Minnesota tax break was
one of “true private choice, with no evidence that the State deliberately skewed incentives
toward religious schools [and] was sufficient for the program to survive scrutiny under the
Establishment Clause.”580 Second, the Court in Witters found that a program that gave tuition aid
to a blind student who then spent the money enrolling in a religious college did not violate the
Establishment Clause. Using the reasoning in Witters, the Court stated in Zelman that “aid…that
ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of genuinely independent and
private choices of aid recipients.”581 Third, the Court in Zobrest found that public tax dollars
used to pay a sign language interpreter for a deaf student who attended a private school did not
violate the Establishment Clause.582 Again the Court found in Zobrest that the parent’s choice to
enroll their disabled son in a private school was their own decision and government influence in
this instance did not exist.583 The Zelman Court tied all three cases together using private choice
as the cornerstone for finding that the Ohio statute did not violate the Establishment Clause.584
The common thread in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest is that parents receiving the aid
were making the decisions on where the aid went.585 In Zelman the Court concluded that the
government’s involvement ended “with the disbursement of benefits” and any incidental
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advancement of religion was perceived and not supported by the facts, where parents made a
private choice and directed the funds to the school that best fit their needs.586 In the Court’s view,
the Establishment Clause rulings in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest were consistent with each
other and were applied to the Ohio program in Zelman.587

Neutral to Religion

In addition to believing the Ohio program was one of “true private choice” on par with
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest,588 the Court stated that the program was “neutral in all respects to
religion” on three levels.589 One, it was one of many programs that Ohio enacted to provide
educational assistance to Cleveland parents; two, aid was made available to a wide range of
parents without “reference to religion”; and three, all schools, religious or nonreligious, could
participate.590
The Court also made it clear that the Ohio program did not provide any added incentives
to private schools.591 Families who opted to take the financial aid and apply it to a private school
were still responsible for the remainder of the private school tuition. 592 Parents who chose an
adjacent public school paid nothing extra.593
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The dissenting Justices argued that there was a “public perception that the State [was]
endorsing religious practices and beliefs.”594 However, the majority countered that private choice
did not equal government endorsement of religion.595 The Court stated that this was an issue of
an Ohio program helping students and not a state endorsement of religion.596 The minority
pointed out that many more parents who participated in the program chose religious schools over
secular private schools and other public schools.597 The majority countered that it was an
accepted reality that more religious schools were located in Cleveland and that this was not
relevant to the constitutional question of the Ohio program. 598 In answer to the minority’s
assertion that parents choose religious schools over public schools, the majority stated, “The
constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and why,
in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious organizations or
most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school.”599
To recap their argument that the Ohio statute violated the Establishment Clause, the
minority suggested the Court look at the Nyquist decision to decide this case.600 The majority
rejected this suggestion, stating that Nyquist was different from Zelman because, in Nyquist, the
financial aid offered by the State of New York went directly to the private school without ever
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going to the parents.601 The majority concluded that the Ohio Scholarship program “…is entirely
neutral with respect to religion.”602
In sum, the majority’s opinion that the Cleveland Voucher Program did not violate the
Establishment Clause relied on two main points. First, parents had a choice between enrolling
their children in a public school or a private school.603 Second, the voucher program was neutral
toward religion.604
Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence

Concurring with the majority, Justice O’Connor wrote a separate opinion for two
reasons.605 First, Justice O’Connor wrote that the Zelman decision was not inconsistent with
“other government programs” and second, “prior Establishment Clause” decisions had supported
parents’ rights to “true private choice.”606

Consistent with Other Programs

Addressing the first issue of Zelman’s connection to other government programs, Justice
O’Connor addressed Justice Souter’s dissenting claim that the Ohio Scholarship program favored
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private schools, specifically religious schools.607 She asserted that the money reaching private
religious schools was not as extensive as Justice Souter would claim.608 While the facts stated
that 96 percent of participating students attended a religious school and 82 percent of the schools
participating were religious schools, Justice O’Connor countered that “these statistics do not take
into account all of the reasonable educational choices that may be available to students in
Cleveland public schools.”609 She compared the $2,250 tuition assistance that low income
families received to the $4,518 per pupil expenditure for the public magnet schools in Cleveland
and the $7,097 per student allocation for all other Cleveland public schools.610 Justice O’Connor
stated:
…the amount spent on religious private schools [$8.2 million] is minor compared
to the $114.8 million the State spent on students in the Cleveland magnet
schools…the $8.2 million…pales in comparison to the amount of funds that
federal, state and local governments already provide religious institutions.611

Pointing to tax breaks for non-for-profit organizations, Justice O’Connor stated that more
than religious schools received a government benefit.612 Besides tax exemptions, she mentioned
Medicare, Medicaid, Pell Grants, and the G.I. Bill of Rights as other examples of where aid is
available to institutions like hospitals, churches, colleges and universities.613 Summing up the
comparison between Ohio’s program and other similar government programs, Justice O’Connor
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stated that the Cleveland voucher program did not offer religious institutions “substantial” or
“atypical” government support.614

Consistent with Prior Decisions

In the second part of her concurrence, Justice O’Connor relied on the Lemon Test615 and
the decision in Agostini to further her argument that the Establishment Clause had not been
violated by the decision in Zelman.616 When originally implemented, a statute passed the Lemon
Test only if it had “a secular legislative purpose,” if its “principal or primary effect” was one that
“neither advance[d] nor inhibit[ed] religion,” and if it did “not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.”617 Justice O’Connor noted the evolution of Lemon and combined it
with the Agostini decision.618 She noted that the Court’s ruling in Agostini “folded the
entanglement inquiry into the primary effect inquiry.”619 This inquiry emphasized whether or not
“a program that distributes aid to beneficiaries, rather than directly to service providers, has the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.”620 Ultimately, Justice O’Connor asked two
questions: one, was aid given in a “neutral fashion” without regard to who received it or the
organization to which it was applied, and two, did parents have an option between a public and
private organization?621 Concluding that the Zelman decision was true to prior Establishment
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Clause decisions, Justice O’Connor reasoned that the aid was neutral to both parents and the
schools that benefitted and parents had a choice between public and private schools. 622
Believing that Cleveland parents had “true private choice”, Justice O’Connor observed
that some parents chose religious schools not affiliated with their own religion and that no
students were denied admittance to any private school.623 Judging that there was no financial
advantage afforded parents who opted for sending their child to a religious school, Justice
O’Connor concurred with the majority opinion.624

Justice Thomas’ Concurrence

In addition to Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote his own
concurring opinion. In his opinion, Justice Thomas’ main concern was for the African-American
students in Cleveland. Justice Thomas asserted that the voucher program was an answer to
institutional racism. Quoting from Brown v. Board of Education,625 Justice Thomas wrote that all
children were guaranteed an opportunity to an equal education. 626 In his opinion the Cleveland
public school system had “continually fail[ed]” minority students and the city’s deplorable public
school system conditions affected black children in disproportionate numbers.627 According to
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Justice Thomas, this “academic emergency” was reason enough to enact vouchers.628 In his
conclusion Justice Thomas advocated for inner city school children when he stated:
The failure to provide education to poor urban children perpetuates a vicious
cycle of poverty, dependence, criminality, and alienation that continues for the
remainder of their lives. If society cannot end racial discrimination, at least it can
arm minorities with the education to defend themselves from some of
discrimination’s effects.629

The Dissent

Justice Souter seemed to write the primary dissent,630 as he was joined by Justices Breyer,
Stevens, and Ginsburg. Justice Souter believed that “doctrinal bankruptcy” was at hand when the
Ohio program was instituted.631 Justice Souter’s dissent detailed the jurisprudence from Mueller
to Zelman and through his criticism on those decisions he disparaged the majority’s dependence
on what he called “inadequate reliance” on the positions of “neutrality and free choice”.632

Problem with Neutrality

As for neutrality, Justice Souter argued that the amount of $2,500 to attend a private
school rendered the support for neutrality indefensible. In his opinion, the government aid
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improperly “skewed the scheme” towards religion.633 While it was clear to the majority that “all”
schools could participate, it was not so clear to Justice Souter who contrasted the tutoring aid the
public school parent received (the maximum amount available was $360) to the private school
scholarship available (the maximum amount available was $2,500).634 It was Justice
Souter’s opinion that $360 versus $2,500 did not translate to a neutral environment for parents.635

Problem with Choice

Justice Souter also found fault with the majority’s argument on choice.636 He argued that because
the vast majority of parents who used vouchers sent their children to Catholic schools, choice did
not truly exist.637 For Justice Souter, true private choice existed when parents were “free to send
the money in either a secular direction or a religious one.”638 However this was not the case for
the Cleveland Voucher Program where the vast majority of the aid went to religious schools.639
The crux of Justice Souter’s dissent relied on his assertion that the “aid to religious
schools approved today is unprecedented, both in number of dollars and in the proportion of
systemic school expenditures.”640 He argued that the “greater the aid, the greater its proportion to
religious schools existing expenditures, and the greater the likelihood that public money was

633

Id at 697.
Id at 697-698.
635
Id at 697-698.
636
Id at 699.
637
Id at 699.
638
Id at 699.
639
Id at 700.
640
Id at 709.
634

118
supporting religious as well as secular instruction.”641 Justice Souter maintained that the Ohio
Scholarship Program violated the Establishment Clause.642 He believed a door had been opened
and was fearful of the government becoming too involved in religion. 643 Finally Justice Souter
contended, “When government aid goes up, so does reliance on it; the only likely thing to go
down is independence.”644
Justice Breyer joined in the dissent and wrote “parental choice” did not “significantly
alleviate the constitutional problem.”645 Believing that our “Constitutional doctrine” was
developed to avoid “religious strife,” Justice Breyer claimed that vouchers provided aid to
parents with the possibility of the government unintentionally creating tension between secular
and non-secular groups.646
Justice Stevens also wrote a dissent and questioned if government tax dollars should be
used to “indoctrinate” students in religious schools.647 He refuted the majority’s opinion with
three points: first, it mattered not whether a school system was under performing; second, it was
inconsequential that just because a program had a variety of options it did not violate the
Establishment Clause; and third, it was irrelevant that the choice was a private one.648
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Justice Stevens concluded, “Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was
designed to separate religion and government, we increase the risk of religious strife and
weaken the foundation of democracy.”649

2002-2011: Post-Zelman – Do We Have a Mandate?

Introduction

After the Zelman decision, voucher supporters eagerly awaited the new programs that
would be created.650 While the eagerness grew, others offered caution.651 A court case in Florida
and a voters’ referendum in Utah would suppress any thoughts of a Zelman mandate.
In his editorial to the Washington Post, then Secretary of Education Ron Paige hailed the
Supreme Court’s decision.652 Echoing Justice Thomas’ comments in Zelman about economic
inequities Secretary Paige proclaimed, “At issue in this case was the future of thousands of lowincome students stuck in some of the most poorly performing schools in the country.”653
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Secretary Paige concluded that Zelman’s most significant point was that the parents, rather than
the government, made the decision about where to send their children to school.654
Months after the Zelman decision Frank Kemerer655 offered a more temperate comment
in his paper.656 For Mr. Kemerer, the Zelman decision gave a “green light” to voucher supporters
“only from the perspective of the federal constitution.” His point was that state constitutions may
hold sway over the whole deal because there are obstructions specifically built into state
constitutions657 that would prohibit state funds from reaching sectarian schools.658 Mr. Kemerer
reported that besides a flat-out statement prohibiting state funds from reaching sectarian schools,
there are other obstacles which included “restricting public funding to public schools only,
requiring all education to be under state control, and requiring the legislature to assure that
education serves a public purpose.”659 His point was that there were more complications for
vouchers in state constitutions than just Blaine Amendments. Due to these adverse conditions,
Mr. Kemerer predicted the future of vouchers was at best uncertain.660
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Despite the apparent opening Zelman created, voucher measures took some hits in
Florida661 and Utah.662 The Florida state legislature, with support from Governor Jeb Bush,
enacted a statute that created the Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP). The OSP was
designed to allow parents, whose children attended a failing Florida public school, the option to
send their children to a private school or a nearby public school. Taxpayers in Florida challenged
the law and filed suit. The trial court ruled in favor of the tax payers and stated the OSP was
unconstitutional. On appeal the First District Court of Appeals supported the trial court’s
decision. The case was appealed to the Florida Supreme Court which agreed with the previous
decisions. Citing the Florida State Constitution that stipulated that a system of free public
education be provided to every child, the State Supreme Court overturned the OSP and
concluded that using state funds to provide students with a private school education was
prohibited.663 Voucher supporters would fair no better in Utah.
In 2007 the state legislature in Utah enacted a voucher plan, the Parent Choice in
Education Act (PCEA), for any student in the state.664 The plan would grant vouchers to students
to attend a private school.665 The Utah legislature reasoned that parents were the best informed to
make choices for their children, including the educational environment that would best fit their
child.666 Scholarships were to be awarded exclusively on financial need and would be applied to
the cost of tuition at a private school.667 Depending on the level of a family’s income eligibility,
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full year scholarships would range from $3000 to $5000 per student. To offset the loss of
revenue that a school district might encounter, the PCEA included a provision that allowed
school districts to recoup lost funding based on a loss of enrollment to private schools. In
essence, Utah was willing to financially support both public schools and the parents who chose
to send their students to a private school.668
The PCEA attempted to address the neutrality and choice issues outlined in Zelman.
Addressing the neutrality concern over any assistance reaching a private school, the PCEA
specified that “school-age children are the primary beneficiaries of the [aid]…and any benefit to
private schools…is indirect and incidental.”669 Speaking to the question on who directs the aid
and where it lands, the PCEA identified parents as the ones making the “genuine and
independent private choices” and not the government.670
Despite the legislature’s attempts to create a voucher program that neutrally applied aid
and gave parents a genuine private choice, Utah voters in November of 2007 repealed the PCEA
via a referendum initiated by teachers’ unions.671
This was a blow to voucher supporters who were counting on the voucher plan in Utah, a
politically conservative state,672 to be a template for more plans across the country.673
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The Zelman decision had a ripple effect in other cases in Washington, Maine,
Washington D.C., and Arizona. However, in these subsequent cases the voucher movement
seemed to stall. The following decisions seemed to muddy the waters further or at the very least
set voucher supporters back a few steps. Resting on a “razor-thin”674 majority, the Zelman
decision did not usher in a mandate for systemic voucher initiatives.

Locke v. Davey (2004)675

In 1999, the State of Washington established the Promise Scholarship Program (PSP) to
assist students, who qualified financially, with college tuition costs. The scholarship specifically
stated that the funds could not be used for the pursuit of a degree in theology. Joshua Davey, a
student who qualified for aid, was denied tuition assistance from the State of Washington
because he was pursuing a theology degree. The State maintained that its constitution prohibited
it from awarding the scholarship funds to students like Davey. Washington’s constitution
contains a Blaine Amendment prohibiting State funds from reaching any religious groups. Davey
believed that the State’s constitution infringed upon his religious rights. Taking his case to the
District Court for the Western District of Washington, Davey sued on the grounds that the denial
of scholarship funds violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
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The District Court did not accept Davey's constitutional claims and found in favor of the
State. Davey appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth District who ruled in
favor of Davey on grounds that the prohibition was unconstitutional. Overturning the Court of
Appeals decision, the Supreme Court found the State of Washington’s constitution could be
much more expansive in regards to avoiding an establishment of religion. While the U.S.
Supreme Court believed the federal constitution did not prohibit the use of funds to support
Davey’s religious education, the Court ruled that Washington’s constitution could include a
stricter policy than the federal constitution on the prohibition of State funds reaching Davey.676
Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Several points were made in the
majority’s decision. First, The PSP was not presumptively unconstitutional.677 The Court
reasoned that the PSP did not “disfavor” religion.678 According to the Court the PSP did “not
deny to ministers the right to participate in political affairs” and it did “not require students to
choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”679 Second, it was not
true that because the PSP funded training for all secular professions; the State had to fund
training for religious professions.680 Maintaining that educating a minister was “essentially a
religious endeavor,” the Court ruled that the Establishment Clause would be violated.681 Third,
there was nothing in Washington’s constitution or in the application of the PSP that suggested
any “animus towards religion.”682 Pointing out that the PSP was actually friendly toward
religion, the Court stated that PSP recipients were allowed to attend religious colleges and enroll
676
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in religious courses.683 The majority concluded that the “State’s interest” in not funding the
pursuit of religious degrees outweighed the “minor burden” placed on Promise Scholars to only
pursue secular degrees.684
Although the Zelman decision set up ways for public money to reach religious
institutions that was not a violation of the Establishment Clause, the decision in Locke presented
another impediment to voucher supporters.685 Voucher supporters looking for a positive outcome
in the Locke decision were blocked by more precise language in state constitutions prohibiting
vouchers for religious education.686 Likewise, those looking for a pro-voucher decision in a
Court of Appeals case in Maine would be equally disappointed.

Eulitt v. State of Maine (2004)687

The question before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was whether
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution required Maine to give tuition funds to
private sectarian secondary schools on behalf of parents who resided in areas of the State that did
not offer public education. Maine’s law,688 dating back to 1981, provided that when a free public
education was not available, parents were able to send their children to a private school. Under
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the law, the State would cover the cost of the tuition to a private school. However, State law
prevented any payment of tuition to private religious schools.
Parents John and Belinda Eulitt brought suit against the State declaring that the restriction
on paying for private religious school tuition violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Asserting that the State’s action discriminated against their religious
practice, the parents filed suit in United States District Court for the District of Maine. The
District Court found in favor of the State and ruled that the Equal Protection Clause did not
mandate “the provision of public funds to private sectarian schools, even when a school district
has chosen to subsidize the payment of tuition to private nonsectarian schools on a limited
basis.”689
The Eulitts appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Using the
decision in Davey, the Appeals Court ruled that the State law prohibiting state funds from
reaching sectarian schools did not violate the parents’ Equal Protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court wrote:
Maine’s decision not to extend tuition to religious schools does not
threaten any civil or criminal penalty…it does not in any way inhibit
political participation…it does not require residents to forgo religious
convictions in order to receive the benefit offered by the state – secular
education.690
Furthermore the court stated that, Maine was justified “in concentrating limited state
funds on its goal of providing secular education” and “avoiding entanglement” issues by not

689
690

Eulitt, supra note 687, at 355.
Id. at 355.

127
supplying those funds to private religious schools.691 As with the Davey decision, a post-Zelman
decision did not support vouchers.

American Jewish Congress v. Corporation for National and Community Service (2005)692

AmeriCorps,693 under the auspices of the Corporation for National and Community
Service, provided programs and training for volunteers who taught in impoverished Catholic
schools. The American Jewish Congress (AJC) brought suit against AmeriCorps and the
University of Notre Dame in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia because they
contended that aspects of the community service program involving Notre Dame’s students
violated the Establishment Clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia ruled that the program did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Judge Randolph wrote the opinion of the court. After completing community service at
impoverished Catholic schools, qualified students at the University of Notre Dame received an
AmeriCorps Education Award that could be applied to their own school tuition or to repay
existing student loans. Notre Dame students in the program taught secular and religious subjects
in disadvantaged Catholic schools.694
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AJC brought suit alleging that the AmeriCorps program had the effect of advancing
religion.695 AJC’s suit purported that there were two ways the AmeriCorps program was
unconstitutional. The AJC claimed that the AmeriCorps program was not neutral towards
religion and that participants did not exercise true private choice.696 The district court agreed
with AJC and found that the program violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed that decision.697
In writing the opinion of the Appeals Court, Judge Randolph cited U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in Zelman, Zobrest, Witters, and Mueller where the Court found programs of “true
private choice” did not infringe upon the Establishment Clause.698 The Appeals Court claimed
that government aid set up through the auspices of AmeriCorp was neutral toward religion and
therefore the Establishment Clause was not violated.699 Quoting from Zelman, the Appeals Court
stated that the Establishment Clause was not violated when aid was given to a wide range of
individuals who on their own decided where to direct the government funds.700 The Appeals
Court found the same conditions in the AmeriCorps program. The court reasoned that no
reasonable person would infer that the government was improperly influencing AmeriCorps to
direct the funds towards religious purposes.701
The Appeals Court cited the following as reasons why the AmeriCorps program was
neutral: (1) “participants [were] chosen without regard to religion”; (2) “the awards [were]
available to a broad class of citizens”; (3) “individuals who elect[ed] to teach religion in addition
695
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to secular subjects [did] so as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice”; and
(4) “AmeriCorps create[d] no incentives for participants to teach religion…and they may count
only the time they spend engaged in non-religious activities toward their service hours
requirement.”702 The Appeals Court claimed that a government-sponsored program could be
constitutional even when religious choices outweighed secular choices.703 Citing the example in
the Zelman decision, the Appeals Court pointed out that the vast majority of schools in the
Ohio’s aid program were religious.704 In the AmeriCorps case, “only 328 of the 1608 schools
employing AmeriCorps participants…were religious schools.”705
Echoing the decision in Zelman, the Appeals Court concluded that educational awards to
AmeriCorps participants did not promote religion.706 The court decided that the Establishment
Clause was not violated because there was a “true private choice” for teachers in choosing
between private and public schools.707

Anderson v. Town of Durham (2006)708

Based on the Supreme Court ruling in Zelman, parents in Maine filed a suit against the
State claiming that a state law, which prohibited the funding of sectarian education, now violated
their Free Exercise right to choose a religious education for their children. The Supreme Court of
Maine ruled that the law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the State did not
702
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provide funds to parents so they could in turn use those funds to send their children to a religious
school. The court ruled that the law was constitutional because it was designed to avoid any
excessive entanglement issues between the government and religion.
The Maine statute709 authorizes the use of tax dollars to pay tuition at approved private
schools on behalf of students who live in districts that do not have a public high school, as long
as the school is nonsectarian.710 A group of parents in Maine contested the section of the law that
prohibited funds reaching religious schools. They asserted that the decision in Zelman had
changed the law and made the Maine statute unconstitutional in respect to the Free Exercise
Clause.711 Before 1980, Maine’s tuition statute permitted payment of public funds to approved
sectarian schools for tuition payment purposes. In 1980, in response to a member of the
Legislature, Maine’s Attorney General issued an opinion stating that using public funds to pay
tuition at private, religious schools violated the Establishment Clause.712 In response, the Maine
legislature created Section 2951(2) which disallowed any funds reaching religious schools.713
The majority relied on the Supreme Court decision in Locke714 citing that “there are some
state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise
Clause.”715 In other words, just because the Supreme Court ruled in Zelman that vouchers were
legal, it did not necessarily mean that state laws forbidding the release of such funds were
unconstitutional. Basically the Supreme Court stated in the Locke decision that Washington State
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could permit scholarship money to go to a sectarian school, but it could also deny it without
violating the Free Exercise Clause.716
Relying on the decision in Eulitt the Maine Supreme Court stated that the Maine statute
posed “no impermissible burden on religion” and because it did not prevent parents from
choosing a religious education for their children. In essence, the Maine Supreme Court reasoned
that protection from government encroachment did not also automatically mean that the
government was obligated to supply funds to support religious education.717 The Court reasoned
in Eulitt that there was “legitimate concern about excessive entanglement with religion” when
the State considered funding private education.718
The parents maintained that the State of Maine made “a range of choices available to a
group” when it allowed funds to be used by parents choosing non-public schools for their
children. Furthermore, they reasoned the State could not “limit those choices” without violating
the Free Exercise Clause.719 The Maine Supreme Court responded that while Zelman allowed
Maine to enact “some form of tuition payment”, the decisions in Locke and Eulitt “held it [was]
not compelled to do so.”720 In other words, any state-sanctioned publicly-funded school choice
initiative did not automatically mean tax dollars could be used by parents to help send their
children to religious schools.
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Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn (2009)721

This case involved a group of tax payers contesting an Arizona law that allowed
individuals or companies to receive state tax credits for donating to school tuition organizations.
These school tuition organizations then created scholarships for students who wished to attend
private schools. Many of these schools were religious in nature. Before outlining the details in
this case, it should be noted that there is a need to reference both the U.S. Supreme Court
decision and the decision in the case preceding it, namely Winn v. Arizona Christian School
Tuition, 562 F. 3d 1002 (2009).722 While the U.S. Supreme Court relied on their constitutional
interpretation on the legal standing of taxpayers to file suit against the government, the Appeals
Court used the school voucher decision in Zelman to make their ruling.
The State of Arizona offered its citizens tax credits for donations to school tuition
organizations (STOs).723 The statute offered a yearly dollar-for-dollar tax credit up to $500 for
individual taxpayers and $1000 for married couples filing jointly for contributions to a STO.724
Although taxpayers could choose the child who would benefit from their donation, parents were
not allowed to donate to their own child’s tuition needs.725 STOs in turn created scholarships for
students attending private schools. STOs were private nonprofit programs that allotted no less
than ninety percent of their funds for scholarships to private school students in elementary and
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high school.726 Many of the STOs worked exclusively with private religious schools.727
Responding to what they felt was an infringement on the Constitution, a group of Arizona
taxpayers sued the State on grounds that the STO tax credit violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.728
Finding that the statute did not violate the Establishment Clause, the U.S. District Court
ruled in favor of the State program.729 The taxpayers appealed to the U.S Court of Appeals for
the Ninth District, which reversed the District Court’s ruling.730 The Court of Appeals ruled that
the Arizona statute did not fall in line with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Zelman.731 In
the Zelman decision the U. S. Supreme Court found in favor of the Cleveland voucher program
because parents had “true private choice” about where their child would attend school and the
Cleveland program was neutral toward religion.732 According to the Appeals Court, the Winn
case differed from the Zelman decision because parents and taxpayer choices were different in
both cases.733
The Appeals Court pointed out the parents in Zelman had true private choice because the
financial aid went directly to them and not the schools. The Zelman decision held that parents
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were then free to spend the money on a public or private school.734 Contrary to the Cleveland
program, the Arizona statute did not provide scholarships directly to parents. 735 Instead the
scholarship money first came from taxpayers and then through a private scholarship
organization.736 Taxpayers could restrict their donations to a specific STO.737 The STOs that
received taxpayer contributions were the responsible parties when it came to disbursing the
funds.738 The STOs collected the funds, selected the school that would benefit from the financial
aid, and decided the conditions under which the scholarship would be awarded.739 Deciding that
this was not the same true private choice found in Zelman, the Appeals Court ruled in Winn that
taxpayers and STOs exercised greater control over the disbursement of funds than did the
parents. Ultimately the Appeals Court found that the Arizona statute violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.740 The Appeals Court decision was appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Arizona statute did not violate the U.S.
Constitution. Unlike the Appeals Court, the Supreme Court did not use their decision in Zelman
to render their ruling. Relying instead on taxpayer standing in an Establishment Clause case,741
the Court rejected the taxpayers claim that the Arizona law was unconstitutional.742
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While Zelman seemed to usher in a new era for vouchers, the decisions in cases like
Locke v. Davey, Eulitt v. Maine, and Anderson v. Durham denied voucher supporters the kind of
mandate they were looking for. However, the decisions in American Jewish Congress v.
Corporation for National and Community Service and Arizona Christian School Tuition
Organization v. Winn fell more in line with Zelman and the principles of parental choice and
neutrality.

School Voucher Programs
Parental Choice Program – Milwaukee

In 1990, the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP), the first school voucher
program in a major city, was started in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.743 When the MPCP first got
started, 337 students participated in the program in seven schools.744 When the program was
created, religious schools were not an approved option for parents. After the Wisconsin Supreme
Court declared that the program did not violate the U. S. Constitution,745 religious schools were
included and as a result more students were added to the program. According to the MPCP facts
and figures, for the 2012-2013 school year there were 112 private schools participating in the
program, with 24,941 students receiving a voucher.746 In 2011, the Wisconsin State legislature
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expanded vouchers by approving the Parental Private School Choice Program, which created a
separate voucher program in the City of Racine.747
In June 2013, Governor Walker signed into law the Wisconsin Parent Choice Program
(WPCP) which in effect expanded the Milwaukee and Racine programs state-wide.748 The new
state program grants school vouchers to families who do not reside in Milwaukee or Racine.749
For the 2013-14 school year the enrollment in the WPCP is capped at 500 students and there is
an enrollment cap of 1000 students in the following years.750 To qualify, a family’s income
cannot be more than 185% of the federal poverty level.751

Scholarship and Tutoring Program – Cleveland

Following in Milwaukee’s footsteps, the State of Ohio in 1996 offered Cleveland
residents school vouchers.752 Originally called the Pilot Project Scholarship Program (PPSP), the
Cleveland voucher program was designed to give Cleveland parents options.753 In the early
1990s the Cleveland public school system was considered one of the worst performing districts
in the country.754 Just like in Milwaukee, the Cleveland voucher program started small and grew
over time. Beginning with the 1996-1997 school year, 1,996 Cleveland students received a
747

Milwaukee and Racine Parental Choice Programs. http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/informationalpapers/documents/2013/26_milwaukee%20and%20racine%20parental%20choice%20programs.pdf.
748
Wisconsin Parent Choice Program. http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/118/60.
749
Milwaukee, supra note 746.
750
Id.
751
Id.
752
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program, supra note 544.
753
Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program. Cleveland parents were given three options: first, their children could
remain in the current public school and receive a stipend for tutoring services; second, they could transfer their
children to another Cleveland public school or an neighboring public school outside of Cleveland; and third, they
could transfer their children to a private school and receive a voucher to help defer costs. Most parents selected
option three. http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/3313.975.
754
Henderson, supra note 538.

137
voucher and they attended fifty-five private schools.755 By the year 2012, the total number of
students in Cleveland receiving a voucher was close to 6,000.756 While the Cleveland voucher
program remains intact for its residents, the State of Ohio has expanded vouchers, called the
EdChoice Scholarship Program, to the rest of its citizens.757 In 2012, the EdChoice Scholarship
had granted a total of 15,900 Ohio students, not including Cleveland students, a voucher.758 In
another comparison to Milwaukee, the Cleveland voucher program withstood a battle in the
courts culminating in a 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision that found the Cleveland voucher
program did not violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.759

Opportunity Scholarship Program – Washington D.C.

After the Alum Rock experiment failed in the 1970’s, the federal government stepped
away from the idea of incorporating school vouchers and left matters to individual states. That
changed in 2003 when Congress passed the Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) for
residents in Washington D.C. The OSP was originally set up by the D.C. School Choice
Incentive Act of 2003.760 For the 2012-2013 school year the OSP provided funds to 1,584 low-
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income students to attend any one of the fifty-two participating schools.761 Each year Congress
has to reauthorize the OSP, and while there has been strong debate on both sides of the political
aisle, the OSP has been continually renewed.762

Choice Scholarships – Indiana

The State of Indiana’s program, officially called the Choice Scholarship Program (CSP),
began with the 2011-2012 school year and the number of eligible families was capped at 7,500.
For the 2012-2013 school year the eligible family number was capped at 15,000. For the 20132014 school year all Indiana families will be eligible. For Indiana residents the voucher amounts
are determined in three different ways, with the smallest of the following amounts being awarded
to parents:763


Tuition and fees



$4,500 for grades 1 through 8



An amount based off of the per-student State funding formula for the student’s school
district of residence, determined as follows:
o 90 percent of funding formula amount if the family income falls within 100
percent of the Reduced School Lunch eligibility
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o 50 percent of funding formula amount if the family income is above 100% but
under 150 percent of the Reduced School Lunch eligibility


If the participating private schools’ tuition and fees are lower than the amounts above, the
voucher is worth the lower amount

To be eligible to receive voucher students, private schools have to meet several conditions,
including accreditation from the Indiana State Board of Education. They must also administer the
state-wide testing program (ISTEP) and they are obligated to participate in Indiana’s school
improvement initiative. While private schools are not subject to regulations affecting course
content, religious instruction, teaching practices, and staffing issues like hiring, schools receiving
voucher students must meet the mandatory curriculum expectations outlined by the State Board
of Education for all public and private schools. As of this writing the Indiana State Supreme
Court has upheld the Choice Scholarship Program.764

Lack of Judicial and Voter Support – School Voucher Failures in Florida and Utah

As previously mentioned, vouchers have become an established offering in the cities of
Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Washington D.C. However, other attempts at initiating vouchers,
specifically state-wide voucher programs, have not experienced the longevity seen in the big
cities. In 2006 and 2007, two voucher programs, one in Florida and the other in Utah, were
dismantled. In Florida, the state Supreme Court struck down a state voucher law765 and in the

764
765

Meredith v. Pence, 984 NE 2d 1213 (2013). http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03261301bd.pdf.
Bush, supra at 661.

140
same year Utah enacted a state law766 providing vouchers to every family, a voter’s referendum
struck down the law.767

Privately Funded School Vouchers

In addition to the publicly funded vouchers in places like Milwaukee, Cleveland,
Washington D.C., and Indiana, private voucher programs can be found in major cities throughout
the United States. Two such programs, the Student Sponsor Partners (SSP) and the Children’s
Scholarship Fund (CSF), both based in New York City, have awarded privately funded vouchers
to selected applicants since 1986 and 1998, respectively.768 According to the SSP website, in
1986 the SSP awarded forty-five scholarships for students to use at one of two private high
schools. In 2012, those numbers increased to 1,400 students choosing from twenty-eight
different private, mostly Catholic, high schools. Since its inception, the CSF has granted
vouchers to over 130,000 students and for the 2012-2013 school year they have awarded 25,700
students with vouchers. In Chicago a group called Freedom to Learn Illinois (FLI) provides
privately funded scholarships to low-income families whose children are entering kindergarten
or first grade. Scholarships are in the amount of $5,000 and may be applied to any private school.
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This past school year (2012-2013) a total of fifteen scholarships were awarded from a pool of
over 200 applications.

Public Support – Polls and Surveys

Polling completed in the last decade with the American public on school vouchers found
a mixed bag of data – with neither side of the debate able to claim a mandate. Depending on the
questions asked, it would appear that vouchers are not very popular or vouchers are gaining
steam in public opinion. In a 2009 Gallup Poll only 2 percent of respondents cited vouchers as
the best way to improve schools, which is consistent with a similar poll Gallup conducted in
2004.769 Countering the findings in 2004 and 2009, a Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup poll in 2012 found
that support for school vouchers in America had risen from 34 percent to 44 percent.770 Looking
at the specific questions and responses can shed some light on how polls can differ. In the 2009
poll, where vouchers received only a 2 percent favorable response, parents were asked an openended question: Just your opinion, what would be the best way to improve kindergarten through
12th grade education in the U.S. today? Respondents came up with twenty-two different answers.
While vouchers received a low percent of responses, so did getting rid of No Child Left Behind –
3 percent, abolishing teacher unions – 3 percent, and spending more time in school – 2 percent.
However, when parents were asked the following question in 2012: Do you favor or oppose
allowing students and parents to choose a private school to attend at public expense? 44 percent
of those responding favored school vouchers. Recently the Chicago Tribune in collaboration
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with the Joyce Foundation and the University of Chicago conducted a survey of Chicago adults
and asked them a series of questions about the state of Chicago Public Schools (CPS). One
question parents were asked was: When schools consistently underperform would you agree or
disagree with giving parents a tuition voucher so that they can send their children to a private
school? 46.5 percent of those responding favored school vouchers, while 47 percent were against
vouchers.771 With the most recent Gallup poll in 2012 and the Chicago Tribune poll in 2013 it
would appear that while vouchers have gained in popularity with parents, the poll results do not
offer any kind of mandate either way.

Issues Facing Chicago Public Schools

In the State of Illinois the problems facing public education are no less severe than they
are in any other state. This especially holds true for the state’s largest school district. The City of
Chicago Public School system, with more than 400,000 students, over 21,000 teachers, and 681
schools, and a budget over $5.1 billion,772 is the third largest public school district in the United
States.773 The Chicago Public Schools (CPS) have been called “underperforming” and the
conditions facing CPS students have been described as “challenging” and “extensive”.

A 2011

report supports these claims:
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About one-third or a little more than 125,000 CPS students are in
underperforming schools.



In 2011 only 7.9 percent of CPS 11th graders would graduate ready for college.774



Compared to the 2011national high school graduation rate of 72 percent,775 CPS
had a high school graduation rate of just 57.5 percent.



“Achievement gaps”776 for CPS minority students have continued to grow for the
past twenty years.777

Who made these claims and called CPS underperforming and who used these statistics to
drive home the point? The answer: CPS. Through their own internal audit, CPS made these
conclusions public in a November 2011 press release.778 In response to this, Jean-Claude Brizard,
the CPS CEO at the time, announced the creation of ten “turnaround” schools affecting 5,800
students. “Turnaround” schools were described as “a top-to-bottom school transformation” with
“comprehensive teacher training that prepares them to tackle the challenges of growing student
achievement within low-performing schools. Students return in the fall to renovated facilities, a
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new curriculum, new principal, new teachers, and an entirely new culture of success.”779 Six of
the ten “turnaround’ schools were to be handed over to Academy for Urban School Leadership
(AUSL). The AUSL describes itself on its website as “a non-profit organization whose mission
is to improve student achievement in Chicago’s high-poverty, chronically failing schools through
its disciplined transformation process, built on a foundation of specially trained AUSL
teachers.”780 The press release also went on to mention the possible closing and/or relocation of
another ten schools.781
However two years later not much is different for the majority of students in the Chicago
public schools. CEO Brizard is no longer leading CPS, but little else has changed the plight of
the low-income public school students. While attempting to “turnaround” ten schools is a start, it
hardly puts a dent into improving the number of schools for tens of thousands of students
affected by an inadequate education system. As of this writing the 2013 school report cards for
CPS are not available, however the statistics for the 2012 school year are no different than those
reported in 2011.782 Compared to the rest of the State, CPS high school graduation rates continue
to lag behind the rest of the State by more than twenty percentage points (83.3 percent for the
State and 61.1 percent for CPS).783 This narrative seems to be perpetual. All across our country
major cities are confronted with poor public schools and the challenge of what to do to improve
the situation.
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The Debate Continues
From the “A Nation at Risk” report to No Child Left Behind, school reform has been a
much debated topic throughout the country.784 Public schools have been under a microscope,
and demands for higher test scores and accountability have created favorable conditions for provoucher advocates. In a Chicago Tribune editorial, 2011 was dubbed “The Year of School
Choice.”785 The editorial cited various state voucher programs in Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin
that have either been newly-implemented or expanded. Under Indiana’s plan,786 parents whose
combined annual income does not exceed $61,000 are eligible for a voucher, and by 2014, all
families, no matter what their income level, will be eligible. In Ohio, available vouchers have
increased from 15,000 to 60,000.787 In Wisconsin, the Milwaukee program was expanded to
include the city of Racine, and, as a result, 3,000 more students have become eligible.788 Taking
a different approach, Arizona and Oklahoma now provide savings account and tax credit
opportunities to assist private school parents.789
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Naturally, taking public money and using it for private purposes has been a touchy
subject. The contentious debate over the distribution of public money to private-sectarian schools
has been on the national scene for over a hundred years.790 The 1870’s saw a rise in nativist
sentiment where established Americans were hesitant to welcome the newest wave of European
immigrants. Most of these new arrivals came from predominantly Roman Catholic countries and
brought with them their religion and customs. In 1875, Representative James Blaine of Maine
proposed an amendment to the U. S. Constitution that would forbid federal funds going to
private organizations. Even though the Blaine Amendment failed at the federal level, it still
resonates in thirty-seven state constitutions today.791
Between 1875 and 1955, the voucher debate remained essentially dormant until
economist Milton Friedman championed the voucher cause.792 Pointing out built-in flaws in our
system of public education, Friedman proposed school choice for parents.793 Subsequent state
legislatures and some municipalities sought out avenues for public money to reach private school
parents and ultimately private schools. In reaction to this, voucher opponents challenged them in
court, and the litigation, both state and federal, debated this issue in the ensuing years. Several
Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s had pro-voucher leanings. Some believed the
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culminating case to decide vouchers would be Zelman v. Simmons-Harris794 which tested the
constitutionality of the Cleveland voucher system.795
In the 2002 case, Zelman,796 the United States Supreme Court ruled that school vouchers
were permissible, under certain circumstances, thus flaming a debate that is still controversial
today.797 After the decision, many798 felt the Zelman case would open the door for vouchers for
all. Legislators, judges, parents, teachers, and school administrators have argued about school
vouchers and continue to do so. The purpose of this dissertation is to outline the history
surrounding the Supreme Court decision in Zelman and review the legal issues surrounding the
debate over the implementation of vouchers in Illinois. Ultimately, this paper suggests ways the
State of Illinois could implement some form of a school voucher system for the City of Chicago.
After 135 years, the ideas of James Blaine and Milton Friedman, in addition to the
opinions rendered in a multitude of court cases, may be applied in the State of Illinois which
finds itself at an important juncture: Should school vouchers be implemented as a choice for
families with school-age children who are “districted” and sent to underachieving public
schools? Which leads to another interesting question: Why can a military veteran use a G.I.
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Bill799 – in essence a school voucher – on a college education at a private religious school, but
the same veteran cannot receive a school voucher for her own children to attend a private
religious school from kindergarten to twelfth grade?

Attempts in Illinois to Create School Voucher Programs

In the past few years two separate bills were introduced in the Illinois General Assembly
that would have created vouchers for parents and their children. The first was introduced in 2009
by then State Senator James Meeks. From 2003 until January of 2013 Senator Meeks represented
the 15th district, which comprised parts of the south side of Chicago and several southern
suburbs. Senator Meeks’ proposal would have created the Illinois School Choice Program. The
voucher bill, which would have provided reimbursement to private schools wishing to enroll
eligible students, did not make it out of committee, so a formal vote was never taken.800
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The most recent school voucher bill in Illinois was introduced by State Representative
LaShawn Ford in January 2013.801 Representative Ford’s district encompasses parts of the west
side of Chicago and parts of several surrounding western suburbs. Representative Ford’s voucher
bill, if it becomes law, would create the School Choice Act and would amend the Illinois Lottery
Law.802 The basic premise of the bill is to redirect the state’s lottery proceeds to a general
education fund and from there a voucher would be distributed to any student who lived in the
“20 zip codes that generated the greatest amount of sales of State lottery tickets in 2012”.803 As
of August 2014, the bill remained in the Illinois House and was referred to a rules committee.804

Summary

Chapter Two provided a summary of the legal issues involved with challenges to school
voucher legislation. It began with an historical perspective of the First Amendment and a review
of the purpose of the Constitution’s Religion Clauses and an examination of the court cases that
helped define the Establishment Clause Tests. What followed next was an investigation of the
Establishment Clause and its relationship with public schools. Through a detailed examination of
eight relevant Supreme Court cases, this study provided insight into the difficulty our legislatures
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have with how, when, and where it is permissible to allow religion into our public schools.
Religious schools right to exist, as decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, was also examined.
After addressing the Establishment Clause and its relationship with public schools, this
study turned back to the relevant judicial precedent determining the constitutionality of school
vouchers. In this section a total of eighteen cases were divided into three groups. The first group
of cases contained an analysis of legal decisions from 1947 to 2000 which opened the door or set
up roadblocks for school vouchers. The second part of the analysis concentrated solely on the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002).805 After a review of
Zelman, the study turned to the third group of cases that followed the Zelman decision. Covering
the years 2002 to the present, an analysis was provided for five court cases, both federal and
state, where the support for Zelman wavered.
The final part of Chapter Two examined the school voucher programs in Milwaukee,
Cleveland, Washington, D.C., and Indiana. Attention was also given to failed programs in
Florida and Utah. Publicly funded vouchers and public opinion polls on the subject were also
considered. Finally, Chapter Two concluded with stating the issues facing the Chicago Public
Schools System as well as recent attempts in Illinois to create a voucher program.
Chapters Three follows with a description of the research involved. Utilizing Professor
Derrick Bell’s theory on social change, Chapter Four will frame the analysis of school vouchers
and examine the political and legal events to evaluate whether or not Bell’s theory can be
employed at times when state legislation or important court decisions supported or prevented
low-income families from attending the school of their choice.
805
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

In order to provide state legislators in Illinois with a relevant legal history of school
vouchers, a legal research methodology was employed for this study. Research included an
extensive search for relevant sources of law, including federal and state law, regulations, case
law, related law review articles, scholarly publications, and other documents. Legal opinions
both in favor and those opposed to school vouchers were studied and considered. Each case was
properly cited according to the rules of citation found in The Bluebook: A Uniform System of
Citation.806 The brief of each case included a summary of the important facts that defined the
dispute, a procedural history, a presentation of the legal issue(s) in question, the holding or in
other words the court’s decision, the court’s rationale or reasoning behind its decision, and an
analysis or examination of the significance of the case and its influence on other cases and
legislation.
Using deductive analysis and triangulation, these sources were reviewed, analyzed, and
synthesized to construct an historical perspective on the development of school vouchers and a
current merger of perspectives on their present legal status. The most contemporary legal issues
were considered with the purpose of formulating a recommendation to state legislators in Illinois.
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By employing an exhaustive examination of all relevant information, the conclusions
used to prepare said recommendations are designed to be fully informed and topically definitive.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS
Education is one of those semi-singular terms in the language that one should always
consider placing in either italics or quotation marks. This is because it is impossible to use the
term without creating a schematic framework in the mind of the audience. Everyone has a
conception of it. In fact, it is one of the few terms in the language that has social, historical, legal
and moral implications. In his book the Moral Imperative of School Leadership, Michael Fullan
outlines the “moral condition” that exists between public schools and society. 807 Echoing John
Dewey, Fullan believes that our democratic society is charged with a moral imperative to raising
the bar and closing the gap for all students. One of Fullan’s tenets is for “whole system
reform”.808 He believes that the entire system needs to refocus as well as adapt and change.
Fullan contends that when we “change the situation…we have a chance to change the people’s
behavior.”809 For the purposes of this study, this Chapter means to frame the field within its
engendered context both historically and morally. It is the contention of this researcher that the
educational system and, more importantly, the process of education has the unique ability to act
as an emancipatory agent within the societal context. The contention is that through an
examination of the historical elements of school voucher programs and an application of the
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moral obligation held by schools, it will become evident that said programs allow for an effective
way to bring about meaningful, substantive social change.
While it is true many times movements in education are deemed to have “revolutionized”
the field, a more astute observation will show that education, as both an art and a science, is
primarily evolutionary. It is never the case that the field has revolutionized itself. Rather, it
builds upon its contextual frameworks of the past to address the issues of the present with
consideration for the future.810 Therefore, in order for one to fully grasp the issues at play in a
discussion regarding the efficacy of school vouchers, one would be remiss to not consider the
lengthy historical situation within which this educational movement rests. It is also the case that
the schools have a moral obligation to provide children with an opportunity to participate in the
promise of a democratic, capitalistic society. That is to say schools are charged with the
authority to prepare the next generation for the act of full participation in American Life.811 Only
by considering both the historical and moral implications surrounding vouchers can one fully
reach the conclusions that emancipatory change is more possible when the status quo is
challenged in this specific instance.

Professor Derrick Bell’s Theory on Social Change

The most significant academic perspective directly related to this emancipatory
conceptualization of vouchers is found within contemporary theories regarding social change.
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This study will draw from Professor Derrick Bell’s theory on Social Change, specifically.
Professor Bell theorized that four conditions must be present in order for social change, such as
access for low-income families to quality schools, to be cemented. Professor Bell’s conditions:
1.

“Initially or over time, the issue gains acceptance from a broad segment of the populace;

2.

the issue protects vested property in all its forms through sanctions against generally
recognized wrongdoers;

3.

the issue encourages investments, confidence, and security through a general upholding
of the status quo; and

4.

while recognizing severe injustices, the issue does not disrupt the reasonable expectations
of society.”812
For the purposes of this study, conditions one, three and four were of primary relevance

and, therefore, were considered. The second condition is also considered, but at a lesser
significance. This study examined the political and legal events to evaluate whether or not Bell’s
theory can be employed at times when state legislation or important court decisions supported or
prevented low-income families from attending the school of their choice. These conditions were
also specifically important because of the degree to which they were able to develop the moral
agency within the historical and legal context. As this study examined, the voucher movement,
while primarily a moral one, was impacted by the historical and legal constructs of the nation. In
fact, in order to impact the movement at all, one must find ways to work within the reality of the
current situation. These three conditions of Bell’s theory were the best entry points to transition
812
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thinkers, policy makers and stakeholders to a place where they are better able to see the
opportunities presented by dismissing current educational policies and understandings as a priori.

Bell’s First Condition

Bell theorizes that in order for social change to be able to be manifested, the culture must
be in a place to accept it. This first condition explains that if one hopes to bring about change
that is emancipatory, one must acknowledge the degree to which the populace at large has come
to see the ideas behind the change as acceptable. An examination of the constitutional and legal
frames surrounding and impacting the issue of school choice will show that the idea itself has,
overtime, indeed gained acceptance.
While it may seem that by appropriating Bell’s theory one can examine the issue of
school vouchers through only a lens of achieving social justice, it is not the case. Indeed, when
discussing the issues surrounding state and federal monies going to private and parochial
agencies, one has to consider the legal context first. It is for this reason that one must begin any
discussion regarding vouchers with an examination of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
While it is true that the Constitution makes no direct mention to education, it does act as a
legal guide as to how the state may approach the religious sector. The first section of the First
Amendment is designed to prevent two things: one, the establishment of a national religion, often
referred to as the Establishment Clause and two, the preference of one religion over another,
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often referred to as the Free Exercise Clause. However basic and straightforward these clauses
may seem, the issues of establishment and free exercise have been debated in State Courts and
the United States Supreme Court on numerous occasions. One area where agreement on the
intent of the First Amendment usually ends involves the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses and their relationships with religious schools. Whereas some are convinced that there
should never be a connection between government and religion, others maintain that such a
relationship is inevitable. When this debate reaches the courts, contradiction and confusion are
inherent in the discussion. During the past sixty years, both sides of the argument have been
well-represented in our court systems as the result of lawsuits challenging the interpretation of
these clauses.
The First Amendment itself is not the end of the conversation, however. The concept of
Judicial Review established the need for the court system to act as arbitrator between the
framers’ intentions and the application of their words.813 Several cases specific to the pragmatics
of the separation of church and state as it can be applied; both conceptually and legally, act as
benchmarks that need to be considered when examining any voucher system. There are four
pivotal Supreme Court decisions that need to be considered when establishing an historical
perspective. The majority opinions in Everson, Lemon, Agostini, and Mitchell act as a road map
to guide the establishment of public practice and acceptance of private, religious schools
receiving public monies. In fact the decisions also build a consensus around the expanded use
and application of these funds. When one considers this “road map,” one is also able to see how
the decisions justify the voucher system within Bell’s framework of public acceptance.
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The Everson ruling indeed opened a door in terms of allowing public monies to be used
to support private, religious schools. In this case the idea that the state could fund the
transportation cost accrued when children attended a private, religious school was ratified by the
Court. The Court stated that this payment was in no way a subsidy that could read as detracting
from the wall between church and state. The decision in Everson is of primary importance in
terms of vouchers because of the degree to which it informed the legal conversations that were to
follow.
The Lemon case is the most immediate and significant continuation of said conversation.
In debating exactly where the wall between church and state was impacted by the use of public
monies in private, religious schools, the Court – through the Lemon decision – established a
three-pronged test to make the determination. This test mandated that government funds could
only be used when: 1) any such funds must be applied to services that are solely secular; 2) any
such aid may neither advance nor inhibit religion; 3) any such aid must not create “an excessive
entanglement with religion.”814 This “Lemon Test” became the new prism through which all
programs and initiative were to be viewed. It became the arbitrator of the First Amendment as it
applied itself to issues of religious schooling.
In Agostini the Court continued to develop their position regarding this issue. Here the
Court established an extension of the intertwining of the two educational systems when it came
to public resources to help struggling students attending religious schools. The only condition
added to the Lemon Test was that when public schools supplied academic assistance to these
students, the program had to maintain religious neutrality. This specific legal conversation
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culminated in the decision of the Mitchell case. Here the Court cleared up the language
concerning “excessive entanglement.” The new standard was to center on a primary effect
component.
The historical perspective brought to the First amendment centers on three primary cases.
The decisions handed down in these cases allowed for clarity to be brought to the legislatures
and makers of educational policy. They, in fact, further clarified the law of the land. The end
result of the cases also builds the first of Bell’s conditions.
Over time it has indeed become the case that the issue has developed a sense of social
acceptance. Before the Mitchell case, there was a clear argument that there was a limited
opportunity to bring about social justice through this reform movement, not because of the
limitations of the movement itself, but because the perception of readiness amongst the populace.
The Court’s actions can be viewed as the road map from strict separation to a contextual one.
Bell’s theory rests within the contextual frame as it is predisposed to consider the
opportunity to bring about social change in terms of the social understandings and underpinnings
that might allow for the change to take place. While it is true that the impetus for social change
itself is born out of a moral allowance, in order for the change to have a chance to actually
manifest large scale social augmentation, Bell’s theory suggests that not only those responsible
for bringing about the change but also those impacted by it need to have achieved a level of
readiness. For this reason it is important to continue to examine the progression of the school
voucher movement as it has developed. By moving this way, one is able to not only understand
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the political and judicial landscape that has developed over time but also the interpretation of that
landscape that has grown into conventional wisdom regarding the issue.
Between 1947 and 1968 the courts, having developed language and decisions regarding
the partition between church and state as it exists in the educational setting, moved to consider
the voucher movement directly. First, Everson v. Board of Education acted as a gradual
movement toward both restating the importance of the Establishment Clause and also narrowed
its specific implementation as it impacted public monies in a religious school. By affirming that
the wall between church and state must remain “high and impregnable,” while also allowing for
parents to be reimbursed for the cost of transporting their school-aged children to religious
schools, this decision created an environment where a more sophisticated view of the
Establishment Clause was needed. It raised the notion of contextual application of said Clause.
The Court went one further when they handed down the Board of Education v. Allen decision. In
this decision, the court acknowledged that there was a duality to the religious school. Such an
institution was both focused on academic learning and faith-based development. In this case, the
majority continued to implement this new “understanding” of the Establishment Clause. By
stating that public funds could go to purchase academic textbooks, the majority acknowledged
that it was no longer the case that a religious school could only be seen as advancing a specific
religious belief.
These rulings would become heavily cited in the years that followed when policy makers
and lower courts would consider the legality of public monies going to private, religious schools.
At the core of every decision was the matter of advancing religious beliefs. This specific part of
the argument would be the major one at play in the cases from 1973-1985. During this time the
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Court was asked to consider the implications of the doors that had been opened by their previous,
recent verdicts.
In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education the Court held that it was unconstitutional for
the state to compensate private, religious schools for the cost of developing state-mandated tests.
The argument laid out in the decision acknowledged that this testing would, by the very nature of
the schools developing them, be “drafted with an eye…to inculcate students in the religious”
dogma of a specific faith by funding the instruction of it.815 Here the Court saw the possibility for
the wall developed by the Establishment Clause to have the potential to be breached. Unlike
textbook programs that supported only secular teachings, such a testing plan would, indeed, act
as the state legitimizing a specific faith. In Grand Rapids v. Ball the Court continued to develop
their view point when the found the Shared Time and Community Education Program to be
unconstitutional. Here the Court viewed the compensation of educators within a nonpublic
setting to be problematic because this specific program, according to the majority opinion,
promoted religion in three ways: 1) the people working in this program were private school
instructors who would be unable to not represent their religious beliefs in the instructional
process; 2) the “symbolic union” created between church and state in this instance was such that
the students could be reasonably expected to receive specific instruction regarding religious
beliefs; 3) the program itself was an appropriation of large parts of the private, religious schools
responsibilities.
These cases indeed show the Court walking back some of their earlier decisions when it
comes to the role of public monies in private, religious schools. However, it really should be
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seen more as their developing conditions rather than complete rebuke. Here we see the
development of Bell’s condition within the proper context. This is true because of the outcome
of the Mueller v. Allen case which allowed for a state statute to remain in standing even though
the only ones who could benefit from its tax deductions were those who sent their children to
private, religious schools. Just like with other social justice issues the Court took time to develop
its mind regarding the specific legal applications of the larger movement.
As this development continued, the Court continued to use specific cases to apply past
legal precedent and framer intentionality to more contemporary cases. Here the Court developed
their understanding of the particulars of the Lemon Test by considering the flow of any monies
that might be used in a private, religious school. In Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind the Court found that, when the Lemon Test was applied, there was no
constitutional problem with allowing a student to use state funds to pursue a Ministry Degree at a
Christian school. The argument the student made was that he would have been able to receive
aide, based on his visual impairment, if he was pursuing a secular profession. The Court ruled,
unanimously, that the Lemon Test was not violated because the money in question went to an
individual who chose to give it to a religious institution; therefore, the state was not directly
sending money to said institution. This precedent would become instrumental in the expansion
of voucher-like programs in the future.
The summative decision handed down by the Court regarding this issue is, indeed, the
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. In this decision the Court ruled 5-4 that a school voucher system in
Ohio was constitutional because the program was based within the states’ rights to provided
educational opportunities for its children and that the only way any state money actually ends up
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in a religious, private school is when individuals chose to spend it there. Here we see an
expansion of the Witters decision. In that case, the majority clearly identified the negligible
amount of money being considered in that specific instance as a mitigating factor. However,
Zelman ignored that provision and pushed the matter forward even when large sums of money
were to be funneled. The majority saw that this case was more about the choice in a marketplace
and less about the religious indoctrination of students.
The impacts of these cases are still being felt throughout the field. Every year
legislatures and courts are looking to establish more clarity when it comes to the exact nature of
public money going to private, religious schools. While it is true that there is no clear legal
mandate, that is not the pressing issue here. What we are left to consider is the degree to which
Bell’s conditions for social change have been met.

It is indeed the case that, overtime, the issue

has developed in such a way that acceptance has become likely. Initially, the court threw up a
firewall between public and religious schools. However, as one can see by examining the
decisions culminating in Zelman, that firewall had been breached.
By extension there is an applicability of Michael Fullan’s argument that there exists a
“moral imperative” for public schools which “focuses on raising the bar and closing the gap in
student learning for all children regardless of background.”816 Fullan’s book, The Moral
Imperative of School Leadership, details approaches for restructuring school culture through
reform. Fullan is seeking for the shifts that are needed to provide all students a quality education
with high expectations. Fullan’s premise is, then, that schools are the best chance of impacting
the most impactful element of personal success: a quality education. Here we see a need for
816
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reform to not only address the problems within schools, but emancipate all those involved in the
schooling process from the beliefs, structures, and systems that have consistently provided
subpar results. This supplies one with both the moral obligation and philosophical framework
from whence to implement said emancipatory shifts. This study will further explore the
connection between Fullan’s moral imperative and Bell’s Third condition.
This examination shows the degree to which Bell’s theory, indeed, is properly placed
within the context of cultural understandings and societal norms. Initially, it was the case that
the firewall developed by the justices was the accepted norm of the legal minds of the nation.
This bled into the legislative frame as well. However, over time, the country developed more of
an acceptance of the concept of public funding for private, religious schools. The idea has
become more commonplace. This progression of thinking and understanding is a perfect
example of the first condition as put forward by Bell. This examination of the progression of
legal acceptance to the idea of public monies going to religious schools is an exemplification that
Bell’s first condition has been met.

Bells’ Second Condition

This paper focuses exclusively on school vouchers as a possible option for low-income
families who reside in a large urban school district. The implementation of school vouchers
could potentially have an impact on a number of different areas. One of those areas where
vouchers could be a threat is with schools that are predominately white. The second condition
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from Professor Bell’s theory on social change contends that “vested property”817 (i.e. white
schools) would need to be protected.
In his book Silent Covenants818 and in his follow up New York University Law Review
article, Colloquium: Relearning Brown: Applying the Lessons of Brown to the Challenges of the
Twenty-First Century, Professor Bell concentrates on the Brown decision and its role in
protecting white interests. According to Bell, pre-Brown segregated schools “provided whites
with a [feeling] they were superior to blacks.”819 Bell argues that Brown came to pass because
white interests converged with black interests.820 In other words, when the white majority was
willing to desegregate schools, “the demand for equality had been satisfied and blacks had no
just cause for complaint.821 The Brown decision “legitimized” arrangements.822 That is, while
blacks remained poor and lacked the resources to move to the suburbs, their “status was no
longer a result of the denial of equality.”823 Rather, “it marked a personal failure to take
advantage of one’s [defined] equal status.”824 While the Brown decision afforded opportunists to
blacks to attend desegregated schools, white flight to the suburbs prevented true integration
across all public schools – particularly those in inner-cities.825
How are vouchers and the second condition related? In Silent Covenants Bell mentions
school vouchers as a possible solution to parents not satisfied with educational outcomes in
inner-city public schools. In fact, Bell states, “disenchantment with desegregation as a means of
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solving educational inequalities led to alternative means of achieving effective school for those
not able to escape to the suburbs or enroll in expensive private schools.”826 Bells sees a
“resurgence” of inner-city educational options including tuition vouchers as a means for
addressing this “disenchantment.”827

Bell’s Third Condition

By developing a mindset over time that shifted legal interpretation from one of
absolutism to one of contextualization, the Court’s decisions have also allowed for Bell’s third
condition to have been met. By redefining the voucher movement as an opportunity to exercise
choice, proponents of the movement appropriated capitalistic language to make their movement
about a fundamental precept of the American Situation. This use of markets has transitioned the
voucher movement away from one of change to one of upholding the status quo of the market
place.
An overview of the decisions regarding vouchers will show that the ideas surrounding
their legal status have developed over time. No single decision has been revolutionary; instead
they have all been evolutionary. The Court has used a constructivist approach to dealing with the
issue so that schooling in this country is still a stable element of society. While it is true that the
Court has moved from the firewall to a more market-based finality, it is also true that the state of
American education is still relatively constant. The largest parochial agency in education today is
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the Catholic Schools.828 However, enrollment in those schools and the number of schools
themselves has dwindled consistently from their peak in the 1960’s. In the United States
Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools 2013-2014: The Annual Statistical Report on
Schools, Enrollment, and Staffing, the National Catholic Education Association details trend data
that shows a continuing decline in the number of students who are attending Catholic schools.829
According to this report, the influx of potential monies into their system from public sources has
not had the specific effect of directly impacting their enrollment numbers.830
The perception of public schools is also maintaining at a near constant level. In 2010, the
Gallup Organization released data showing that, while most of the population feels that public
schools in general were failing, parents were relatively happy with their local public school and
sent their children there.831 Here are some details Gallup collected from 1985 through 2010:
Americans continue to believe their local schools are performing well, but that the nation's
schools are performing poorly.832 77 percent of public school parents give their child's school a
grade of an "A" or "B," while only 18 percent of all Americans grade the nation's public schools
with the same letter grades. This was true even when school vouchers were available.833
All of the attention and litigation that has been focused on the voucher movement seems
to have had little impact on the perceptions and actions of the general public. It is still the case
that people send their children to the local school a preponderance of the time. What we see here
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is a negligible impact in terms of the beliefs and behaviors of the consumers in the educational
market place. For this reason, Bell’s condition is further advanced considering those beliefs and
behaviors are the mitigating factor when one considers the degree to which the public schools
have been negatively impacted.
Bell’s third condition forces all social activists to consider the pragmatic realities of the
power of the status quo. To illustrate the influence of the status quo, we can look again at
Michael Fullan and his reflections on Change Theory.834 In his paper, Change Theory – A Force
for School Improvement, Fullan argues that Change Theory can be a powerful tool in
enlightening our approach to educational reform. Specifically, Fullan considers those theories
that have more value and are more likely to bring about a lasting change. Relevant to this study
Fullan points out the “negative aspect” of the power of the status quo.835 According to Fullan,
“There are many things occurring in the system that favor the status quo by diverting energy to
maintenance activities, which are at the expense of devoting resources and attention to
continuous improvement.”836 These activities can often be confused with meaningful action and
even reform, but really only reaffirm the organizations structure. Fullan cites “distractors” in the
educational system that can empower the status quo and they are: collective bargaining conflicts,
unnecessary bureaucracy, and constantly seeking to address managerial issues.837 For Fullan,
“theories of action must have the capacity to change the larger context.” 838 Here we see a new
premium placed on the concept of action as a catalyst for change. For there to be systemic
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change Fullan contends that building capacity is a necessary “strategy that increases the
collective effectiveness of a group to raise the bar and close the gap of student learning.”839
These individual capacities include developing the knowledge, competencies, resources, and
motivation that can bring about the “positive pressure” needed to affect the status quo.
In a perfect world policy makers and educators would concern themselves only with
questions that begin with the word “should.” When we consider “should” we need not consider
how, when, or where. We are not able to exist in an idealized vacuum, and Bell understood
this. Instead he calls on us to place reform in a garden where it can grow. We have decades of
legal precedent regarding school vouchers. The U.S. Supreme Court has made several landmark
decisions in just the last few decades that have impacted the narrative. Even with that, schooling
in the United States remains a consistent system. This reform movement has yet to show itself as
running so counter to the status quo as to become problematic. The investments that have been
made in this movement have not drastically shifted funding in such a way that public schools are
being adversely impacted. In fact, while Catholic School enrollment has dropped, public school
enrollment is expected to set a new record every year over the next decade.840
In order to fully understand the degree to which the education of children is a moral issue
that lines up with Bell’s theory, one needs to consider the specifics surrounding the achievement
gap. While it is true that student achievement is, indeed, difficult to quantify, it must be
considered as a quantifiable element for the purposes of this academic discussion. For the
purposes of this examination, the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP)
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assessment will be used. The NAEP assessment is a reading and mathematics test administered
to a nationally representative sample of students at the age of 9, 13, and 17.841 While there is a
wealth of information from NAEP to study, one part of the 2012 report uses data from 1971 and
1973 and compares them to results from 2012 and finds higher scores for 9 and 13 year olds and
not much difference for 17 year olds.842 When viewed over time, the results present a
representative understanding of students’ ability as identified by the results of the exam. For this
reason Bell’s third condition can be considered to have been met.
The use of federal funding to address the gaps in achievement is another area where
Bell’s condition has crossed the threshold. A study of student achievement in a national level
over the past decade shows that schools receiving targeted and school-wide Title I assistance
have made significant gains when it comes to closing the achievement gap created by the poverty
demographic.843 Through federal monies delineated to these schools, while the federal
government has also been advancing funding through vouchers, schools have seen their ability to
educate the most vulnerable students rise. While it is true that the achievement gap, in all its
forms, is still a serious issue for educators in this country, one can see that the federal
government is still using funding mechanisms to address the needs of those in poverty who
attend public schools. This is a clear indication that while more funding has been diverted to
private institutions, there is still a schematic to be sure that schools in need receive aid that can
improve the academic standing of those students. It would seem that the existence and
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prevalence of voucher systems has not negated the ability of the government to meet the
financial needs of those in need.
Bell’s third condition calls us to consider the ramifications of social change to those who
will not directly benefit from it. It is a pragmatic approach. There is no way a democracy would
manifest social change that so drastically changed the status quo that the majority found
themselves with a radically lessened social experience. Over time the establishment and
expansion of policies that allow public funding to go to private schools has not negatively
impacted the traditional school model. In fact, there are academic gains and a positive perception
by the public of their educational choices. For this reason it is this researcher’s contention that
Bell’s third contention has been met.

Bell’s Fourth Condition

Another of Bell’s conditions that is directly at play in the debate regarding the school
voucher program is his fourth. It is the case that the implementation of a school voucher system
does have, at its heart, the desire and motivation to recognize injustices while not disrupting the
reasonable expectations of those not directly responsible for the wrongs that created the injustice
itself. An examination of the nature of failing schools and the consequences associated with
their existence coupled with an understanding of the impacts of a school voucher system will
show that this issue clearly meets the benchmark set by Bell’s fourth condition.
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It is also the case that during the course of time when voucher programs and access to
other alternatives to traditional public education grew, the achievement level of students
attending traditional public schools also rose. Results from the NAEP exams over the past
decade indicate that student achievement in both reading and math has increased over that time
period. While it is true that students may not be at anticipated levels in terms of grade level, they
are making progress when viewed both in terms of their cohort and when viewed globally. Thus,
drawing on this data point, one can conclude that the U.S. is making the same trend gains as
most other industrial nations.844
This assessment seems an ideal focal point for several reasons. First the data that it
produces is presented across grades and states in a biannual timeline. Second the assessment
itself exists outside of individual state standards and is, often, above the standards put forward by
some of the states. This, combined with the fact that there is no “high stakes” element to the
exam allows the results to be considered independent and “manipulation-free.”845 There has been
discussion regarding the degree to which the data from NAEP, specifically the cross-grade
statements can be considered to be the final statement regarding even the tracking of student
achievement over time.846 Also, education experts remind us that only through a varied
assessment system can student achievement come close to being quantified, especially if said
quantification is going to be used to make instructional decisions.847 However, it is also the case
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that if one hopes to draw from a data point that is most likely to provide a cross section of
student achievement across the country, the NAEP offers the best opportunity to do that due to
its construction and administration.848
An examination of this achievement data shows that, even though national reform has
had the closing of the achievement gap at its heart, the research has shown that “patterns evident
so far do not suggest a strong effect of NCLB on achievement gaps.” (Trends in Academic
Achievement Gaps in the Era of NCLB p. 4).849 In fact, even though there has been some
movement regarding the closing of the achievement gap, the gap itself still exists and is
substantial. When one considers that “the black-white gap in reading skills is roughly half of a
standard deviation at the beginning of kindergarten but then widens to about three-fourths of a
standard deviation by the end of third grade and to nearly a whole standard deviation by the end
of eighth grade,” one can see that public schools are still failing to provide an adequate education
to students of color.850
Even when one considers that there has been some movement regarding the closing of the
achievement gap, one must consider the reality that “black, Hispanic and low-income students
were more than three times as likely as their peers to perform within the lowest achievement
category in 2011.”851 More alarming is the fact that when one considers achievement at the high
end, the gap has increased over time. When considering math scores specifically, 1 in 10 white
students scored in the advanced level on the fourth grade math exam while only 1 in 50 Hispanic
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students and 1 in 100 black students achieved at the same level. When the achievement at
advanced levels is considered, achievement that is most corollary with college success, the gap
has actually widened recently and continually.852 Most alarming is that when the poverty factor
is added in, as identified by students receiving free and reduced lunch, the gap widens even
more.
While it is true that the NAEP is the test of record, it is also true that school achievement
data is currently managed at the state level. One must also consider the degree to which the
achievement gap exists when an examination of this assessment data is conducted. This data also
shows that the achievement gap exists in both reading and mathematics and that the gains that
are being made are not enough to close it.853 Through an examination of testing data at three
different intervals (4th grade, 8th grade, and a high school level) this researcher was able to
examine the achievement scores in three bands: basic and above, proficient and above, and
advanced. The conclusions were that, even with the intensity provided by the NCLB legislation,
children from minority and low income families were under performing their white, affluent
counter-parts and were not making the desirable gains needed to close the gap.
This information is what legitimizes the first contention of Bell’s fourth condition. There
indeed is a statistically relevant level of discrepancy between the achievement of white students
and the achievement of students of color. The achievement gap exists as a statistical reality;
however, it needs to be dealt with an issue of social justice. If this researcher is to develop an
action research project that can truly be emancipatory in nature, this researcher must develop a
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plan that functions from the perspective of bringing about the greatest social change as a means
to achieve some measure of social justice. “In the contemporary United States, universal
schooling is available for all students regardless of socioeconomic class, race, or ethnicity.
However, substantial disparities in educational achievement…exist. These disparities deny the
common good by significantly undermining the ability of individuals to participate in the
American society.”854 There are direct economic advantages that correlate with the advancement
of learning in this country (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). These statistics show a direct
correlation between unemployment and education level as well as earnings and education level.
When we see that education allows for a greater ability to earn a living, we understand that the
achievement gap is a direct contributor to the continuation of poverty.
The second conduit of the fourth condition now must be examined. According to Bell the
issue must not disrupt the reasonable expectations of society. It is not this researcher’s contention
that the students achieving at high levels are drawing on any privilege other than those that are
the byproducts of the hegemonic principles of their reality. While it is true that Bell’s theory
would suggest that the environment itself is an unjust one, the student benefiting from the current
system should be considered blameless and, therefore, not deserving of unreasonable distress in
the righting of the wrongs. In order for this to be the case, it has to be that the establishment of a
school voucher system would not necessitate a disruption to the schooling of these students. The
research would be clear to support this contention.
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The research surrounding the effectiveness of school vouchers is, in and of itself, an
entire research project. However, in order to meet Bell’s fourth standard, one need only show
that the establishment of such a program does not necessitate a negative effect on the current
students benefiting from the status quo. While it would be this researcher’s contention that a
voucher system would “raise all ships,” there is some discussion regarding the efficacy of that
statement. Typical anti-voucher rhetoric includes the following opinions: the funding
assertion855 – vouchers take money away from already cash-strapped public schools and further
damage the inadequate conditions for poor urban students; the extra scrutiny assertion856 – if the
government provides money to private schools, then more invasive government control of those
schools will follow; the religious assertions857 – vouchers for private sectarian schools promote
religion and violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution; and vouchers will likely
cause increased religious conflict in our country.858 While the feelings on either side are strong
and the arguments continue to be debated, the research presented herein suggests not only that a
continuation of the status quo is an assurance that schools do not improve, but also that the
potential impact on the current students benefiting from that status quo would be negligible.859
The question then becomes: Are we comfortable keeping the status quo in place because it
benefits some at the expense of others? And another more pointed question was asked by
voucher critic Gordon MacInnes, “Is it fair to deny educational opportunities to low-income
children with motivated parents in order to maintain a ‘better mix’ of strivers and nonstrivers in
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public schools?”860 While he still maintains his anti-voucher stance, MacInnes admitted that this
was an “uncomfortable question.”861
However, a meta-analysis of 19 empirical studies that examined the effect of vouchers on
the performance of public schools showed there was no occurrence of the quality of the public
school option being negatively impacted.862 Since the funding in these scenarios allows for the
student to bring their “money with them” any amount of money lost by a school was offset by
the fact that the student no longer needed services provided by the school. Also, since, by
definition, a voucher system allows a student or parent to choose what school they want, there
would not be a case that a student attending a school that is currently meeting their needs would
have to leave for another educational option. So, regardless of the degree to which vouchers
might alleviate the achievement gap and allow for a movement of social and economic justice,
the contention is that allowing for the option does not place undue hardship on those not
responsible for the wrongs of the current system. This combined with the examination of the
achievement gap allows for the fourth condition to be met.
Education is a moral exercise. It is one of the few elements of the American Experience
that is a provided and protected right for all. It therefore becomes one of the quickest ways to
impact the American culture. It acts as an entry point for social change. Change theorist
Michael Fullan has said a “moral imperative” exists to raise the bar and close the gap for all
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students.863 Coupled with his credo all students deserve a quality education with high
expectations, Fullan looks to school leaders to bring about the necessary shifts to ensure this
quality. Fullan’s premise on change and Bell’s Framework connect nicely. While Fullan believes
schools offer the best chance of impacting students with a quality education, Bells’ Framework
provides the philosophical foundation to begin implementing these emancipatory shifts.
The school voucher system has shown itself to be a potential agency for the improvement
of the living conditions of millions of Americans. While it is true that the debate regarding the
degree to which this agency can be effective, there is no argument that in its conception it does
have the ability to become truly emancipatory. Using Bell’s framework one can see that it is also
in line with agreed upon contingencies of social change. By meeting three of the four standards
established, the voucher system does, indeed, have the potential to not only win the theoretical
argument but also meet the standard of practicality.

Challenges to the Application of Bell’s Theory

While it is true that the research contained herein affirms the fact that Professor Bell’s
conditions have indeed been met, there is room for discussion on this point. The exigency for
this discussion exists in the interpretation of the data’s implications on the points addressed
within this study (1, 3, and 4), the overall context of the conditions themselves as they relate to
impacting individual thought, and the lack of a fully developed 2nd condition. It would be naïve
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to submit the findings here without an entry level consideration for any potential
counterarguments.
Bell’s conditions exist in a place where language meets ideas. This is to say that two
individuals might seem to agree with them even if they actually do not. The struggle is in fully
vetting exactly what the terminology means from both a linguistic and psychological perspective.
For example, while it is true that this research finds the data to suggest that there has indeed been
over time acceptance from a broad segment of the population toward public funding of private
schools, this is clearly a point that needs to be agreed upon by individuals. The research has
shown that the numbers of people supporting such an idea has increased over time. However,
according to a 2014 Gallup Poll the numbers of people supporting such funding has decreased
slightly over the past three years.864 The contention made here is that this slight regression is not
significant enough to impact the overall trend data. Also, it is not now nor ever has been the
case that a majority of Americans believe in this movement. However, a “broad segment” does
not necessitate a majority. The conclusions made here do claim that the lower standard
established by Bell has indeed been met.
Another area where one must think through the potential ramifications is in consideration
of the 3rd and 4th condition. While it is true that the recommendations made here would create an
environment where this condition is met in the short term, one must consider what full
implementation might look like and the impact it would have on the status quo. What if
vouchers were made the law of the land? One could argue that such a tectonic shift in
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educational funding would accelerate educational reform in such a way that it is impossible to
understand the degree to which either the status quo would be upheld or the reasonable
expectations of those not responsible for the wrongs would be disrupted. This research
acquiesces to this point; however, it is also the case that any future is indeed unknowable.
Perhaps then the better way to examine these elements of Bell’s conditions is not through a onetime application, but rather as applied constantly through the steps of social change.
Finally, Bell’s 2nd condition seems to have little to do with the contentions made in this
study. This is for one reason, it is impossible to label any of the actors in the educational setting
as “wrongdoers.” While it is true that the current system exists as hegemony, this does not mean
that those that benefit from it are doing wrong. Instead they are passive participants within a
system that existed before they contributed to it. While one could argue that there is a moral
obligation for every person to think about the life situation of everyone else, it is not the case that
being primarily concerned about oneself and one’s family is the same as actively displacing
another. Outside of any action that meets this standard of responsibility, the educational system
is indeed different than the sum of its parts. It may produce wrong even though those who
comprise it never behave as wrongdoers.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARIES

Introduction
This final Chapter is broken into six parts. The first section offers a summary of the study
and provides an overview of the entire project. The specific problem surrounding school
vouchers will be outlined and the research question will be restated. There will also be a brief
review of the court cases presented in Chapter Two. The second section will present the findings.
Using information presented from Chapter Four, this second section will analyze Professor
Bell’s theories and how they apply to the research. Section two will also address the influence of
political will on this study’s topic. Section three will provide concluding statements drawn by
this researcher. The conclusions will be based on the research questions in Chapter One and will
bring the research to its completion. The fourth section will discuss the potential implications
from the result of this study. Future research will be the topic of section five. Attention will be
given to what questions are left unanswered. Section six will provide a complete summary of this
project.
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Part 1
Summary of the Study

This study began with the premise that since the 1983 report “A Nation at Risk”,865 not
much had changed for inner city, low-income, minority students. The report’s dire warnings of a
“rising tide of mediocrity”866 continue to be debated by both public school supporters and their
critics. Nevertheless, the thirty year debate has generated few concrete solutions on ways to
improve the public education for low-income minority students living in our big cities. While our
nation’s best students can generally be found in predominately white, suburban, and middle to
upper-middle class school districts, our weakest students can generally be found in
predominately inner-city school districts with high minority populations.
After the “Nation at Risk” report was published, several reform movements and
initiatives, all geared to fixing the perceived problem with public education, were considered.
These reforms have included improving instruction, lengthening the school day, lowering class
sizes and improving teacher training. Merit pay for educators has also been considered and
continues to be debated. In addition to the above reform efforts, school choice options have been
instituted in several cities. These alternatives include magnate schools, charter schools, and
school vouchers. It was this last option, school vouchers, which became the focus of this study.
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School Vouchers as a Possible Solution to the Plight of Our Public Schools

For the purposes of this study, school vouchers were described as government (in most
cases state governments) coupons given directly to parents who then spend it on the private
school of their choice. This government allowance led to heated debates about the use of tax
dollars going directly or indirectly (depending on your view) to private, and in most cases
religious, schools. Commentators on both sides of the discussion have presented compelling
reasons for and against school vouchers.
Arguments representing the pro-voucher side include: the values assertion867 – vouchers
allow all parents the right to send their children to schools which reflect their values; the civil
rights assertion868 – vouchers provide poor children the same opportunity to a quality education
as children who come from wealthy families; the free market assertions869 – vouchers create
needed competition between private and public schools and this competition makes both schools
better; and vouchers eliminate the monopoly public schools have, and as a result it affords
parents the option to choose the best environment for their children.
Those opposed to vouchers typically espoused the following: the funding assertion870 –
vouchers take money away from already cash-strapped public schools and further damage the
meager conditions for poor urban students; the extra scrutiny assertion871 – if the government
provides money to private schools, then more intrusive government oversight of those schools
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will follow; the religious assertions872 – vouchers for private sectarian schools promote religion
and violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution; and vouchers have the potential to
cause increased religious conflict in our country.873 The public debate on school vouchers
remains robust and contentious.

A Social Justice Framework

A social justice approach was used to frame this study. This study assumed that access to
quality public schools was both a legal and a moral right. At the heart of this legal and moral
right was the idea of social justice. Social justice was defined as “…the quality of fairness that
exists within communities or societies. Educational leaders are held responsible for the extent to
which fairness and equity exist in a school community.874 Thus, this study postulated that access
to quality public schools would be a right for all students, regardless of race, family income, or
the location of their home. In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the disparities in public
education and ruled that separate educational opportunities for whites and blacks were
unconstitutional.
The ground-breaking case Brown v. Board of Education875 found that separate but equal
public schools left black students at a disadvantage. The Court ruled in Brown that segregating
black students in so-called equal but separate public schools was unconstitutional. While Brown
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addressed the rights of all students to attend quality public schools, this study went one step
further from Brown and asked: how fair was the environment in which poor performing public
schools were the only option for blacks and other minorities? Was it inherently unequal when
some families got to choose a better school, be it private or public, merely based on the location
of their home or the income the family generated? More precisely – sixty years after Brown did
we still have de facto segregation in our schools? Brown guaranteed all students equal access to
quality public schools, but what if those public schools did not offer the “quality” parents were
looking for? If inequalities still existed, then another question was asked: what options did black
and other minority parents have if they were not satisfied with the public schools?
In order to fully develop this process of thought and answer the pertinent questions,
Professor Derrick Bell’s Theories on social change were employed. Professor Bell suggested that
four conditions must be present in order for social change, such as access for blacks and
minorities to quality schools, to be cemented. Professor Bell’s four conditions are:
1. “Initially or over time, the issue gains acceptance from a broad segment of the populace,
2. The issue protects vested property in all its forms through sanctions against generally
recognized wrongdoers,
3. The issue encourages investments, confidence, and security through a general upholding
of the status quo, and
4. While recognizing severe injustices, the issue does not disrupt the reasonable
expectations of society.”876
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This study considered conditions 1, 3, and 4 of primary importance and examined political
and legal events to judge whether or not Bell’s theory could be employed at times when state
legislation or important court decisions supported or prevented low-income families from
attending the school of their choice.

Historical and Legal Aspects of School Vouchers

To provide a proper historical and legal perspective this project outlined the origins of
school vouchers. The idea for school vouchers was first disseminated by economist Milton
Friedman. Professor Freidman was a libertarian who promoted free markets and capitalism.
Friedman first mentioned school vouchers in a 1955 journal article,877 but not until 1962, when
he dedicated an entire chapter to the topic in his book Capitalism and Freedom, did the idea of
school vouchers become part of the public debate.878 After Freidman published his thoughts on
school vouchers, Professor James Coleman conducted a study in 1982 that reported students in
Catholic schools performed better than their public school counterparts. Coleman, a sociologist
and professor at the University of Chicago at the time of the study, interpreted the findings and
concluded that students learned more in an environment where there were strong bonds between
parents, teachers, and religious leaders.879 In 1990, John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe completed
reanalysis of Coleman’s findings and concluded private schools had more autonomy and
therefore, they were more inclined to be better organized and be run with more efficiency than
public schools. Chubb and Moe echoed Milton Freidman’s assertion that parents should be given
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a choice when it comes to the education of their children. Chubb and Moe deemed parents – not
the government – as the best judges for selecting the appropriate school for their children. As an
alternative to the inherent deficiencies they saw in public schools, Chubb and Moe supported the
idea of school vouchers as an option.880
While there are several anti-voucher voices, this study cited two groups that countered
the findings by Coleman, Chubb, and Moe: the Center on Education Policy (CEP) and the
National Education Association (NEA). The CEP has used their own research stating it is
difficult to decipher results from school voucher studies and the NEA argued that vouchers did
not improve conditions for public school students.
In 2011, the CEP came out with a report on school vouchers.881 The report, titled Keeping
Informed about School Vouchers, synthesized findings on school vouchers and found it was
difficult to draw any conclusions about their effectiveness and the positive impact that some
studies claim.882 After reviewing twenty-seven different studies, the CEP found the majority of
those studies were funded or otherwise supported by pro-voucher organizations.883 According to
the CEP, when school voucher studies were supported by organizations sympathetic to vouchers
– then it was possible that an unfair bias played a role in the positive conclusions drawn about
vouchers.884 The CEP recommended that an “independent advisory committee” be established to
certify that school voucher studies be conducted in a fair and evenhanded manner.885
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The NEA, the largest union in the United States, has vehemently fought against any
voucher program.886 The NEA listed several reasons why vouchers were unsuccessful and
impractical. According to the NEA, vouchers actually denied access to a large majority of
students. Where vouchers existed, the NEA claimed lotteries inherently excluded a majority of
students from receiving a voucher. In addition, limited space was available in private schools for
public school students wishing to transfer to a private school. NEA also contended that student
achievement was not significantly increased with vouchers. Using the results of studies done on
voucher programs in Milwaukee and Cleveland, which found no significant academic growth for
voucher recipients, the NEA argued that vouchers have failed to improve student test scores. The
lack of accountability with state oversight of private schools and the cost to the taxpayer for
sending students to private schools were other arguments set forth by the NEA in opposition to
vouchers.887
While the school voucher debate was argued by pundits on both sides of the issue, over
the last few decades state legislatures enacted laws that channeled public tax dollars to private
schools. Some of those laws are still in place while others were turned over by the courts. Over
the course of seventy years a myriad of court cases, both state and federal, addressed public
funds reaching private schools. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court finally addressed the school
voucher issue. In the 2002 case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,888 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
school vouchers were permissible, under certain circumstances, thus flaming a debate that is still
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controversial today.889 Legislators, judges, parents, teachers, and school administrators have
argued about school vouchers and continue to do so. The purpose of this dissertation was to
outline the history surrounding the Supreme Court decision in Zelman and review the legal issues
surrounding the debate over the implementation of vouchers in Illinois. Ultimately, this paper
suggests possible ways the State of Illinois could implement a limited school voucher system in
the City of Chicago.
Before a deeper discussion on the history of school vouchers could begin, this researcher
felt it important to provide a synopsis of the Blaine Amendment890 and its influence on state
constitutions. In 1875, Representative James Blaine of Maine proposed an amendment to the
U.S. Constitution that would forbid federal funds going to private organizations. The Blaine
Amendment came about at a time when there were strong nativist feelings about immigration.
Blaine’s amendment to the U.S. Constitution passed in the House, but it fell short by four votes
in the Senate.891 Even though the Blaine Amendment failed at the federal level, it still resonates
in thirty-seven state constitutions today.892 While the specific language in the state constitutions
varies from state to state, the purpose of any of the states’ Blaine amendments is to stop public
money from reaching sectarian institutions – particularly private schools.
To further illustrate the impact of the Blaine Amendments, this study presented a review
on the continual debate on the intent and the influence of the Blaine Amendment. This study
used one example from 2007, when the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (CCR) took up the
issue and summoned a conference in Washington D. C. on the status and effect of Blaine
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Amendments.893 The CCR heard from two different groups – those in support of state Blaine
Amendments and those opposed. The backdrop for this investigation included how Blaine
Amendments place constitutional restrictions on school vouchers.
In their written report to the CCR, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL)894 assumed a proBlaine stance. The ADL reported that Blaine Amendments stopped the government from
providing financial support to religious institutions.895 The ADL acknowledged that antiCatholicism may have been at the root of the Blaine Amendments in the 1870’s. However,
ADL’s argument was that present-day Blaine Amendments were no longer filled with any bias
against Catholics. The ADL listed several reasons why they believed school vouchers were not
advantageous. They argued that school vouchers were “bad public policy” because they threaten
the constitutional principle of separation of church and state.896 Without government control, the
ADL feared that vouchers supported schools that discriminated against minorities and promoted
the creation of private schools that were not as inclusive as our current public school system.897
The ADL’s final concern about vouchers was that they did not help the poorest of the poor. They
argued that most vouchers did not cover the entire cost of attending a private school. As a result,
the ADL reasoned that vouchers only served a select few who can supplement the costs of
private school tuition.898
The ADL contended that because of our diverse population we needed a public school
system that unites and ties us all together. School vouchers take needed funds away from the
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poorest parts of that diverse population and the neediest children suffer the consequences. In the
opinion of the ADL, Blaine Amendments helped prevent this from happening. The ADL
concluded that the introduction of school vouchers undermined our American system of public
education.
Contradicting the ADL’s position was the Institute for Justice (IJ),899 represented by,
Richard D. Komer, Senior Litigation Attorney for the IJ. Calling the American public school
system an expensive failure, Komer argued that the education monopoly held by the government
was disproportionality affecting minority students.900 Using civil rights as the foundation for his
argument, Komer argued against the Blaine Amendments and the negative impact it has on
minority students and their lack of opportunities. Komer argued public schools were not meeting
the needs of a large portion of the student population – namely low-income students who were
primarily members of minority groups. Komer claimed that low-income minority students were
worthy of an education equal to the education more affluent students received.901
According to Komer, school choice evened the playing field for disadvantaged students.
However, Komer contended the Blaine Amendments stifled the opportunity for minority groups
to have a choice. School vouchers were necessary to emancipate low-income students from
failing schools, but Komer argued that Blaine Amendments must first be stricken from state
constitutions. Komer believed that once this was accomplished school vouchers would become
more readily available to low-income students, and as a result provide them equal opportunities
to a quality education that their more affluent counter parts already enjoyed.
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Vouchers: Status and Public Opinion

After outlining the debate on school vouchers, this study presented overviews on school
voucher programs. These programs included Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP),
Cleveland’s Pilot Project Scholarship Program (PPSP), the Opportunity Scholarship Program
(OSP) in Washington, D.C., and Indiana’s Choice Scholarship Program (CSP). All of these
programs had the following in common: qualifying low-income minority students received
money from the government to apply to school of their choice. As of this writing, all four
programs are still operating.
However, not all school voucher attempts have been successful. This study detailed two
such efforts in Florida and Utah that failed to sustain themselves. In 2006 and 2007, two voucher
programs, one in Florida and the other in Utah, were dismantled. In Florida, the state Supreme
Court struck down a state voucher law902 and in the same year Utah enacted a state law903
providing vouchers to every family. The following year a voter’s referendum struck down the
law.904
Besides publicly funded vouchers, privately funded vouchers have existed and this study
mentioned two of them. The Student Sponsor Partners (SSP) and the Children’s Scholarship
Fund (CSF), both based in New York City, have awarded privately funded vouchers to selected
applicants since 1986 and 1998, respectively.905 According to the SSP website, in 1986 the SSP
awarded forty-five scholarships for students to use at one of two private high schools. In 2012,
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those numbers increased to 1,400 students choosing from twenty-eight different private, mostly
Catholic, high schools. Since its inception, the CSF has granted vouchers to over 130,000
students and for the 2012-2013 school year they have awarded 25,700 students with vouchers. In
Chicago a group called Freedom to Learn Illinois (FLI) provides privately funded scholarships to
low-income families whose children are entering kindergarten or first grade. Scholarships are in
the amount of $5,000 and may be applied to any private school. This past school year (20122013) a total of fifteen scholarships were awarded from a pool of over 200 applications.
This study also cited public opinion polls and surveys concerning school vouchers.
Completed in the last decade, these polls and surveys presented a mixed bag of data on the issue.
Phrasing of questions and the types of follow up questions appeared to have an affect on
responses. Based on the poll and survey results cited, drawing any concrete conclusions about
public opinion on school vouchers would be problematic.

The Plight of the City of Chicago Public School System

The premise of this study was to offer to low-income parents of the City of Chicago an
option to the City’s public school system. This study needed to identify the problems facing
public education in the City of Chicago. As reported in the introduction of this study, the City of
Chicago Public Schools (CPS), with more than 400,000 students, over 21,000 teachers, and 681
schools, and a budget over $5.1 billion,906 was the third largest public school district in the
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United States.907 CPS had been called “underperforming” and the conditions facing CPS students
were described as “challenging” and “extensive”. In their own 2011 report CPS admitted that
about one-third or a little more than 125,000 CPS students were in underperforming schools,
only 7.9 percent of CPS 11th graders graduated ready for college,908 and compared to the 2011
national high school graduation rate of 72 percent,909 CPS had a high school graduation rate of
just 57.5 percent.
What was the response from CPS? The creation of ten “turnaround” schools affecting
5,800 students. “Turnaround” schools were described as “a top-to-bottom school transformation”
with “comprehensive teacher training that prepare[d] them to tackle the challenges of growing
student achievement within low-performing schools. Students return[ed] in the fall to renovated
facilities, a new curriculum, new principal, new teachers, and an entirely new culture of
success.”910 Six of the ten “turnaround’ schools were handed over to Academy for Urban School
Leadership (AUSL). The AUSL described itself on its website as “a non-profit organization
whose mission is to improve student achievement in Chicago’s high-poverty, chronically failing
schools through its disciplined transformation process, built on a foundation of specially trained
AUSL teachers.”911 The press release also went on to mention the possible closing and/or
relocation of another ten schools.912
However two years later not much was different for the majority of students in the
Chicago public schools. CEO Brizard was no longer leading CPS, but little else has changed the
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plight of the low-income public school students. While attempting to “turnaround” ten schools
was a start, it hardly put a dent into improving the number of schools for tens of thousands of
students affected by an inadequate education system. As of this writing the 2013 school report
cards for CPS are not available, however the statistics for the 2012 school year are no different
than those reported in 2011.913 Compared to the rest of the State, CPS high school graduation
rates continued to lag behind the rest of the State by more than twenty percentage points (83.3
percent for the State and 61.1 percent for CPS).914 This narrative seems to be perpetual. All
across our country major cities are confronted with poor public schools and the challenge of
what to do to improve the situation.

The Voucher Debate Continues

While Chicago’s public education problems are severe, they are not unique. From the “A
Nation at Risk” report to No Child Left Behind, school reform remains a much debated topic
throughout the country.915 Public schools have been under a microscope, and demands for
higher test scores and accountability have created favorable conditions for pro-voucher
advocates. In a Chicago Tribune editorial, 2011 was dubbed “The Year of School Choice.”916
The editorial cited various state voucher programs in Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin that have
either been newly-implemented or expanded. Under Indiana’s plan,917 parents whose combined
annual income does not exceed $61,000 are eligible for a voucher, and by 2014, all families, no
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matter what their income level, will be eligible. In Ohio, available vouchers have increased from
15,000 to 60,000.918 In Wisconsin, the Milwaukee program was expanded to include the city of
Racine, and, as a result, 3,000 more students have become eligible.919 Taking a different
approach, Arizona and Oklahoma now provide savings account and tax credit opportunities to
assist private school parents.920
Unsurprisingly, taking the public’s tax dollars and using it for private purposes has been a
controversial business. The quarrels over the distribution of tax dollars to private-sectarian
schools have been on the national scene for over a century.921 The 1870’s saw a rise in nativist
emotion where established Americans were hesitant to welcome the newest wave of European
immigrants. Most of these immigrants came from predominantly Roman Catholic countries and
brought with them their religion and customs. In 1875, Representative James Blaine of Maine
proposed an amendment to the U. S. Constitution that would forbid federal funds going to
private organizations. Even though the Blaine Amendment failed at the federal level, it still
resonates in thirty-seven state constitutions today.922
Between 1875 and 1955, the voucher debate remained essentially dormant until
economist Milton Friedman championed the voucher cause.923 Illustrating the built-in flaws in
our system of public education, Friedman suggested school choice for all parents.924 Subsequent
state legislatures and some municipalities pursued possible ways for public money to reach
private school parents and eventually private schools. In reaction to this, voucher opponents
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challenged them in the courts, and the litigation, both state and federal, debated this issue in the
coming years. Numerous Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s had pro-voucher
predilections. Some believed the culminating case to decide vouchers would be Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris925 which tested the constitutionality of the Cleveland voucher system.926
In the 2002 case, Zelman,927 the Court ruled that school vouchers were permissible, under
certain circumstances, thus flaming a debate that is still controversial today.928 After the
decision, many929 felt the Zelman case would open the door for vouchers for all. Legislators,
judges, parents, teachers, and school administrators have argued about school vouchers and
continue to do so. The purpose of this dissertation was to outline the history surrounding the
Court’s decision in Zelman and review the legal issues surrounding the debate over the
implementation of vouchers in Illinois. Ultimately, this paper will suggest ways the State of
Illinois could implement some form of a school voucher system for the City of Chicago.
After 135 years, the ideas of James Blaine and Milton Friedman, in addition to the
opinions rendered in a dozens of court cases, may be applied in the State of Illinois which finds
itself at an important juncture: Should school vouchers be implemented as a choice for families
with school-age children who are “districted” and sent to underachieving public schools? Which
leads to another interesting question: Why can a military veteran use a G.I. Bill930 – in essence a
school voucher – on a college education at a private religious school, but the same veteran
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cannot receive a school voucher for her own children to attend a private religious school from
kindergarten to twelfth grade?

School Voucher Attempts in Illinois

There have been previous attempts in Illinois to create school voucher programs, but in
all cases those attempts have not bared any fruit. Two separate bills were introduced in the
Illinois General Assembly that would have created vouchers for parents and their children.
Senator Meeks’ proposal would have created the Illinois School Choice Program. The voucher
bill, which would have provided tax dollars to private schools wishing to enroll eligible students,
did not make it out of committee, so a formal vote was never taken.931
The most recent school voucher bill in Illinois was introduced by State Representative
LaShawn Ford in January 2013.932 Representative Ford’s voucher bill, if it becomes law, would
create the School Choice Act and would amend the Illinois Lottery Law.933 The basic idea of the
bill is to redirect the state’s lottery proceeds to a general education fund and from there a voucher
would be distributed to any student who lived in the top twenty zip codes that generated the most
sales of State lottery tickets in 2012.934 As of August 2014, the bill remained in the Illinois
House and was referred to a rules committee.935
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A Re-Statement of the Problem

With approximately 400,000 students, more than 22,000 teachers, and over 600 schools,
the CPS is a behemoth of an organization.936 Attempting to reform a system as large and
complex as the CPS is, indeed, challenging. While the attempts in 2012 to create ten so-called
“turnaround” schools may have had an impact on a few thousand students, more than 400,000
students, of which eighty-six percent were minorities, were not afforded an opportunity to go to a
better school.937 If our society is to hope for significant growth, we may need to prepare for
systemic change.
Adding to the complexities of the situation is the problem with continued segregation in
public schools. Gary Orefield’s 2009 study on public school segregation found that sixty years
since the Brown decision, low-income minority students are more segregated today than they
were in the 1950’s.938 According to Orfield, millions of non-white students are forced to attend
high schools that he termed “dropout factories”, where large percentages do not graduate, have
bleak futures in a tough economy, and are not properly prepared for college.939
Social justice concerns itself with equal economic, political and social rights and
opportunities. Social justice in education advocates for our society to make available the best
possible education to all students. 940
Almost a hundred years ago educational scholar John Dewey, in his book Democracy and
Education, outlined a thoughtful dichotomy as a means to developing a populace able to
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contribute to the American Ideal. According to Dewey, a school system must provide students
with both a rigorous curriculum that emphasized the acquisition of content knowledge and with
the knowledge on how to live productive lives.941 While both elements of this school are an
important part of developing a society, it is the later that finds its focus, clearly, in the realm of
social justice. If a society is to hope for a school system that does place students in a position to
possess the myriad of skills, conceptual understandings, and personal abilities needed to be a
fully formed, productive adult, that society may need to address the negative results that manifest
when large parts of specific populations are not afforded the opportunity to participate in an
educational culture and setting that facilitates such development.
Some have sought school vouchers as an answer to our public school woes. As the
school voucher debate continues across Illinois, the plight of Chicago public school students
remains grim and the prospect of fixing a system the size of CPS is daunting. In light of the
Zelman decision and more recent lower court interpretations of this Supreme Court ruling, this
paper makes a recommendation on school vouchers to Illinois State legislators.

Research Questions Re-visited

This study investigated the following research questions:
1. What is the relevant legal history of school vouchers?
2. To what extent do the legal and political frames (social justice) meet Bell’s conditions for
social reform?
941
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3. What affect do school vouchers have on assuring that low-income minority students have
access to an equitable quality education?

After introducing the topic of school vouchers and laying out the issues surrounding the
school voucher debate in Chapter One, Chapter Two provided a summary of the legal issues
involved with these challenges to school voucher legislation. It began with an historical
perspective of the First Amendment and a review of the purpose of the Constitution’s Religion
Clauses and an examination of the court cases that helped define the Establishment Clause Tests.
What followed was an investigation of the Establishment Clause and its relationship with public
schools. Through a detailed examination of relevant court cases, this researcher discussed the
difficulty our legislatures have with how, when, and where it is permissible to allow religion into
our public schools. Religious schools right to exist, as decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, was
also examined.
After addressing the Establishment Clause and its relationship with public schools, this
study presented the relevant judicial precedent determining the constitutionality of school
vouchers. In this section the cases were divided into three groups. The first group of cases
contained an analysis of legal decisions from 1947 to 2000 which opened the door or set up
roadblocks for school vouchers. The second part of the analysis concentrated solely on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002).942 Many thought that this was
the seminal case for school vouchers.943 After a review of Zelman, the examination turned to the
third group of cases that followed the Zelman decision. Covering the years 2002 to the present, I
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analyzed five court cases, both federal and state, where the support for Zelman fluctuated
between solid to doubtful.
Chapter Two concluded with a report on existing school voucher programs in the cities of
Milwaukee, Washington D.C, and Cleveland as well as a fairly new program in the State of
Indiana. This research also detailed the decision in Meredith v. Pence (2013) – a case decided by
Indiana’s State Supreme Court that validated the State’s school voucher program. The next
section of this summary presents the findings.

Part 2
Findings
This second section will present the findings. Using information presented from Chapter
Four, this section will analyze Professor Bell’s Theories and how they apply to the research.
At the beginning of this analysis it was assumed that access to quality public schools was
both a legal and a moral right. It was the contention of this researcher that the educational system
and, more importantly, the process of education had the unique ability to act as an emancipatory
agent within the American society. The contention was that through an examination of the
historical elements of school voucher programs and an application of the moral obligation held
by schools, it would become evident that said programs allowed for an effective way to bring
about meaningful, substantive social change.
To properly frame this issue of school vouchers a contemporary theory on social change
was required. Accordingly, this study drew from Professor Derrick Bell’s theory on Social
Change. Professor Bell theorized that four conditions must be present in order for social change,
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such as access for blacks and minorities to quality schools, to be cemented. Professor Bell’s
conditions:
1.

“Initially or over time, the issue gains acceptance from a broad segment of the populace;

2.

the issue protects vested property in all its forms through sanctions against generally
recognized wrongdoers;944

3.

the issue encourages investments, confidence, and security through a general upholding
of the status quo; and

4.

while recognizing severe injustices, the issue does not disrupt the reasonable expectations
of society.”945
Chapter Two provided a detailed analysis of those court cases and legislative acts that either

created an environment conducive to the formation of school vouchers or curtailed their
development. In Chapter Four this study examined those political and legal events to evaluate
whether or not Bell’s theory could be applied to state legislation and the relevant court decisions
that supported or prevented low-income minorities from attending the school of their choice.
Bell’s three conditions were also specifically important because of the degree to which they were
able to develop the moral intervention within the historical and legal context.
As this study examined, the voucher movement, while primarily a moral one, was impacted
by the historical and legal principles of the nation. In fact, in order to impact the movement at
all, one must find ways to work within the reality of the current situation. Bell’s first, third, and
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fourth conditions represented the best starting points to transition legislators and stakeholders to
a place where school vouchers can be considered viable.
Bell’s first condition states, “Initially or over time, the issue gains acceptance from a broad
segment of the populace.”946 Bell supposed that in order for social change to be able to be
manifested, the society must be ready to accept it. This first condition explained that if we hope
to bring about change that was emancipatory, we must acknowledge the degree to which the
society has come to see the ideas behind the change as acceptable. This study’s examination of
the constitutional and legal frames surrounding and impacting the issue of school choice showed
that the idea itself has, overtime, indeed gained acceptance.
This study of school vouchers did not assume that Bell’s theory could be examined through a
social justice lens alone. Indeed, when discussing the issues surrounding state and federal monies
going to private and parochial agencies, this study had to consider the legal context first. This
legal analysis began with an examination of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
The U.S. Constitution makes no direct mention to education. However, when legislatures
pass laws affecting education and those laws are challenged, the courts use the Constitution as a
legal guide to render rulings on the enacted laws.
One area that sees these challenges is the First Amendment. The first section of the First
Amendment is designed to prevent two things: one, the establishment of a national religion, often
referred to as the Establishment Clause and two, the preference of one religion over another,
often referred to as the Free Exercise Clause. Despite the clear language of these two sections,
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the issues of establishment and free exercise have been debated in State Courts and the United
States Supreme Court on numerous occasions.
The first part of the research examined the court decision when the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses and their relationships with religious schools came into conflict. Whereas
some were convinced that there should never be a connection between government and religion,
others maintained that such a relationship was inevitable. When this debate reached the courts,
contradiction and confusion were inherent in the discussion. During the past sixty years, both
sides of the argument have been well-represented in our court systems as the result of lawsuits
challenging the interpretation of these clauses.
Despite the fact the First Amendment set forth clear language on the relationship between
church and state, the debate did not end there. The concept of Judicial Review established the
need for the court system to act as an authority between the Constitution’s language and the
application of its words.947 Several cases addressing the separation of church and state have acted
as benchmarks that need to be considered when examining any school voucher system. When
this study considered school vouchers and their viability, four key cases stood out. The majority
opinions in Everson, Lemon, Agostini, and Mitchell acted as a blueprint to guide the
establishment of public practice and acceptance of private, religious schools receiving public tax
dollars. In fact, the decisions also built a consensus around the expanded use and application of
these funds. When one considers this “blueprint,” one is also able to see how the decisions
justify the voucher system within Bell’s first condition concerning public acceptance.
The first ruling that opened the door for the debate on school vouchers was the Court’s
decision in Everson. In this case the idea that the state could fund the transportation cost accrued
947
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when children attended a private, religious school was ratified by the Court. The Court stated
that this payment was in no way a subsidy that could read as detracting from the wall between
church and state. The decision in Everson was the foundation for future legal opinions on public
tax dollars reaching private schools.
The Lemon case continued the debate. In discussing exactly where the wall between church
and state was impacted by the use of public monies in private, religious schools, the Court
established a three-pronged test that determined a law’s constitutionality. The Lemon Test
mandated that government funds could only be used when: 1) government aid was applied to
services that were solely secular; 2) government aid did not advance nor inhibit religion; 3)
government aid did not create “an excessive entanglement with religion.”948 The Lemon Test was
the new authority on the First Amendment as it was applied to public monies reaching religious
interests. Nevertheless, several years later the Court would reshape the Lemon Test.
In Agostini the Court continued to develop their position regarding this issue and made a
ruling that restructured part of the Lemon decision. Here the Court established an extension of
the intertwining of the two educational systems when it came to public resources to help
struggling students attending religious schools. The only condition added to the Lemon Test was
that when public schools supplied academic assistance to these students, the program had to
maintain religious neutrality.949 This specific legal conversation culminated in the decision of the
Mitchell case.
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The Mitchell decision Court cleared up the language concerning “excessive entanglement.”
The Court held that a law that provided educational materials and equipment to both public and
private schools did not violate the Establishment Clause.950 Using Agostini, the Court replaced
the excessive entanglement component with a primary effect component. In other words, the
Court determined whether the legislation had an immediate and direct effect of advancing
religion. The Court in Mitchell deemed the program did not advance religion. The new standard
was to center on a primary effect component.
This study’s historical perspective concerning the First Amendment began with a
concentration on four primary cases. The decisions handed down in Everson, Lemon, Agostini,
and Mitchell allowed for clarity to be brought to the legislatures and makers of educational
policy. The end result of the cases also supports the first of Bell’s conditions. Over time it has
indeed become the case that the idea government aid reaching private schools has developed a
sense of social acceptance. Prior to the Mitchell case, there was a clear argument that there was a
limited opportunity to bring about social justice through this reform movement, not because of
the limitations of the movement itself, but because the perception of readiness amongst the
populace. The Court’s actions is evidence that shows America is moving away from a strict
interpretation of the separation of church and state doctrine to a more contextual one.
The foundation of Bell’s theory rested within the contextual frame. Bell’s theory
suggested that not only those responsible for bringing about the change but also those impacted
by it need to have achieved a level of readiness. It was important for this research to continue to
examine the progression of the school voucher movement – especially the acceptance of
government funds reaching private schools. Over time legislative and legal decisions that
950
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influenced school vouchers created a conventional wisdom regarding this issue. This study
presented an interpretation of that landscape.
Between 1947 and 1968 the courts, having developed language and decisions regarding
the partition between church and state as it exists in the educational setting, moved to consider
the voucher movement directly. First, Everson v. Board of Education acted as a gradual
movement toward both restating the importance of the Establishment Clause and also narrowed
its specific implementation as it impacted public monies in a religious school. By affirming that
the wall between church and state must remain “high and impregnable,” while also allowing for
parents to be reimbursed for the cost of transporting their school-aged children to religious
schools, this decision created an environment where a more sophisticated view of the
Establishment Clause was needed. It raised the notion of contextual application of said Clause.
The Court went one further when they handed down the Board of Education v. Allen decision. In
this decision, the court acknowledged that there was a duality to the religious school. Such an
institution was both focused on academic learning and faith-based development. In this case, the
majority continued to implement this new “understanding” of the Establishment Clause. By
stating that public funds could be used to purchase academic textbooks, the majority
acknowledged that it was no longer the case that a religious school could only be seen as
advancing a specific religious belief. The Allen Court acknowledged that private religious
schools also served a secular purpose. The decisions in Everson and Allen would impact Court
decisions in the following decades.
The decisions in Everson and Allen would be cited in the years that followed when policy
makers and lower courts would consider the legality of public monies going to private, religious
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schools. The advancement of religious beliefs was at the core of several decisions cited in this
study. This precise argument would be the central theme at play in the cases from 1973-1985.
During this time the Court measured the implications of the doors that had been opened by their
previous decisions. However, some Court decisions continued what Everson and Allen had
started, while others did not.
At first glance the Court’s decisions in Levitt and Ball might be construed as a roadblock
to the gains made in Everson and Allen. In the Levitt decision the Court held that it was
unconstitutional for the state to compensate private, religious schools for the cost of developing
state-mandated tests. Likewise, the Ball Court viewed the compensation of educators within a
nonpublic setting to be problematic because this specific program, according to the majority
opinion, promoted religion. However, when we begin to pull back and look at the entire picture
and take into account more Court decisions, we can see the decisions in Levitt and Ball began to
limit the conditions where government aid reaching religious schools was permissible.
After parameters were set by Levitt and Ball, decisions in Mueller and Witters would
open the door for voucher-like programs. In the Mueller decision the Court allowed for a state
statute to remain in standing even though the only ones who could benefit from its tax deductions
were those who sent their children to private, religious schools. Along the same lines, the Court
decided in Witters there was no constitutional problem with allowing a man to use state funds to
pursue a Ministry Degree at a Christian school. When we consider the Court’s decisions over
time, we begin to see the development of Bell’s first condition. That is, over a period of time
society began to accept the idea of public funds reaching citizens who when then in-turn spend
that money on private religious schools.
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In all of the decisions that this study considered, from Everson to Witters to Mitchell, the
culmination would arrive in the Court’s ruling in Zelman. This summative decision held that a
school voucher system was constitutional because the program was based within the states’
rights to provide educational opportunities for its children and that the only way any state money
actually ended up in a religious, private school was when individuals chose to spend it there. In
Zelman, the Court had now given credence to a parent’s choice in the marketplace and was less
concerned about the religious indoctrination of students.
Evolution, like nature itself, is evolutionary…not revolutionary. This includes the
educational implications of government funding from religious organizations. It is not the case
that one can point to a singular legal instance that acts as the capstone or even catalyst for the
current levels of funding such schools receive. Instead one has to consider the concept of such
funding as a mosaic, only fully realized when one steps away from its nuanced individual pieces
to see its totality.
Using Bell’s theory as conceptual framework leads one to fully understand the degree to
which this issue has, indeed, functioned with a specific pattern of social change. In fact, if there
were a singular case or legislative moment, this movement would be an example of a change to
an institution that impacts people rather than a change to the socially accepted norms that are
shared and reinforced by people. This examination shows that the idea of such funding has
indeed traveled down a road that meets the conditions set forward by Bell. Each specific case
and law has acted as a catalyst not for the larger idea itself, but for the next specific case and law.
In this way the movement has never revolutionized the way we fund schools, but rather has
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evolved our mindset. And that evolution is at that heart of Bell’s theory. The next section will
analyze Bell’s third condition and how it can be applied to the school voucher issue.
Bell theorizes that in order for social change to be established, the culture must be in a
place to accept it. His third condition states that the “issue encourages investments, confidence,
and security through a general upholding of the status quo.”951
By developing a mindset over time that has shifted legal interpretation from one of
absolutism to one of contextualization, the Court’s decisions have also allowed for Bell’s third
condition to have been met. By redefining the voucher movement as an opportunity to exercise
choice, proponents of the movement have been able to appropriate capitalistic language to make
their movement about a fundamental precept of the American Situation. This use of markets has
transitioned the voucher movement away from one of change to one of upholding the status quo
of the market place.

Political Will

In addition to the religious and values implications of school vouchers, political influence
has played a role as well. While this study’s main emphasis did not concern itself with political
associations and school vouchers, it is prudent to mention its impact here. Starting with Milton
Freidman’s assertion in the 1950’s that parents were the best decision makers when it came to
making school choices and up until to the 2002 Zelman decision, it has been theorized that
conservative Christians had been the stalwarts championing the cause of school vouchers – with
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little success.952 In 2007, James Forman maintained that up until the Zelman decision school
voucher advocates relied on a values claim to make their case. Likewise, David M. Powers wrote
in 2009 that prior to the Zelman decision the majority of parents who supported school choice
were Catholics and evangelical Christians, whose support for vouchers came from their need to
be in control of what values their children were exposed to.953
When the Zelman decision was announced, the successful voucher argument avoided
religion and values and instead concentrated on building a coalition. A coalition built on racial
equality and education. This new angle, which Forman called a “racial justice claim”954 and
which Powers called a “civil rights claim,”955 employed a political strategy in Milwaukee and
Cleveland whereby voucher supporters solicited the involvement of black and Hispanic
politicians and community leaders.956 According to Forman, this approach had “political
advantages” and helped pave the way for the Court’s decision in Zelman.957 As a result, the
voucher movement could now count among its leadership minorities and prominent
Democrats.958 By tying education quality, not religion or values, to the voucher movement, the
racial or civil justice claims could attract a wider and more diverse audience. Political barriers to
a landscape that is more accepting of school vouchers still exist, but those hurdles are more
easily cleared when a coalescing of originally divergent groups advocate for said vouchers.
Professor Bell’s comments about interest-convergence seem to ring true here as well, “The
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interests of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges
with the interests of whites.”959

Part 3
Conclusions
This section will address the research questions in Chapter One. This section of the study
will bring the research full circle. This study developed the following three questions:
1.

What is the relevant legal history of school vouchers?

2.

To what extent do the legal and political frames (social justice) meet Bell’s
conditions for social reform?

3.

What affect do school vouchers have on assuring that low-income minority
students have access to an equitable quality education?

The following conclusions will address these questions in order.
The first question posed asks: What is the relevant legal history of school vouchers? To
begin the legal section of this study, an examination is made of the First Amendment and its
Establishment Clause. Consideration is also given to the little know Blaine Amendment (which
still appears in thirty-eight different state constitutions), which prohibits tax dollars from
reaching private school interests. Particular attention is paid to U.S. Supreme Court cases
(namely Everson, Lemon, Agostini, and Mitchell) that would later be used by the Zelman Court.
Coupled with the analysis of these four cases, eight more cases concerning the relationship
between the Establishment Clause and public schools are studied and briefed.
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In addition to the Establishment Clause cases, other court cases, mostly U.S. Supreme
Court cases, are simplified and analyzed. This is no small task. All in all, twenty-eight cases –
some whose decisions favored school vouchers and some whose decisions inhibited their growth
– are examined. Culminating in the Zelman decision, a clear picture and direction is established.
That is, under certain circumstances school vouchers can exist in an urban setting – especially
one beset with low performing public schools.960 However, it should also be clear that since the
Zelman decision in 2002 school vouchers have not become prevalent. In fact, Frank Kemerer
offered a more tepid comment in his paper.961 While Kemerer admits Zelman gave the go ahead
it did so only through a federal constitutional level. His point was that state constitutions may
hold sway over the whole deal because there are obstructions (Blaine Amendments) specifically
built into state constitutions that would prohibit state funds from reaching sectarian schools.962
Due to these adverse conditions, Mr. Kemerer predicted the future of vouchers was at best
uncertain.963 While this is certainly an inhibitor to a widespread school voucher program, it is
this researcher’s argument that such a universal program is unwarranted. In short, Zelman laid a
foundation and it is up to local officials to map out a more detailed blueprint.
Having addressed the legality of school vouchers, the second research question needs to
be answered. Consideration is now given to the second question: To what extent do the legal and
political frames (social justice) meet Bell’s conditions for social reform? In order for one to fully
grasp the issues at play in a discussion regarding the efficacy of school vouchers, this study
considers the lengthy historical situation within which this educational movement rests. This
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study also considers the moral obligation schools have to provide children with an opportunity to
participate in the promise of a democratic, capitalistic society. This study draws from Professor
Derrick Bell’s theory on Social Change and used three of his four conditions to examine the
efficacy of school vouchers and its application for social reform. As a reminder, here are the
three conditions that have been applied:
1.

“Initially or over time, the issue gains acceptance from a broad segment of the populace;

2.

the issue encourages investments, confidence, and security through a general upholding
of the status quo; and

3.

while recognizing severe injustices, the issue does not disrupt the reasonable expectations
of society.”964
Bell theorizes that in order for social change to be able to be manifested, the culture must

be in a place to accept it. In addition to examining school vouchers through a social lens, it is
also prudent to consider the legal context first. This study researched a number of court cases and
applied Bell’s first condition to their decisions.
To begin with, this study applies Bell’s first condition to the following U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, Everson, Lemon, Agostini, and Mitchell. These decisions act as a road map to
guide the establishment of public practice and acceptance of private, religious schools receiving
public monies. In Chapters two and four considerable space is provided examining each case.
What follows are some abbreviated summaries to remind the reader of their impact. Everson –
the Court’s ruling opens a door in terms of allowing public monies to be used to support private,
religious schools. In this case the idea that the state could fund the transportation cost accrued
964
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when children attended a private, religious school was ratified by the Court. Lemon – as a result
of Court’s decision, the Lemon Test is created. The Lemon Test is the new lens through which all
programs and initiative were to be viewed. The Court establishes a three-prong test to make
determinations on when it was constitutional for public money to reach non-secular interests.
Agostini – the Court’s decision continues to develop their position that in some instances public
money can be used to help struggling students attending religious schools. Mitchell – here the
Court clears up the language concerning “excessive entanglement.” The new standard is to
center on a primary effect component. In other words, if a public supported program does not
have the “primary effect” of advancing a religious message, than it does not breach the wall of
separation of church and state.
Accordingly, the decisions also build a consensus around the expanded use and
application of these funds. When one considers this blueprint, one is also able to see how the
decisions justify the voucher system within Bell’s framework of public acceptance. The
decisions handed down in these cases allowed for clarity to be brought to the legislatures and
makers of educational policy. As a result, they further elucidated the law of the land. The end
result of the cases establishes the first of Bell’s conditions.
While the decisions in Everson, Lemon, Agostini, and Mitchell establish a level of
acceptance toward public monies reaching private hands, this is not the case in all future
decisions. This study cites three cases in particular where the Court considers the implications of
the doors that had been opened by their previous, recent verdicts. Again, what follows is a brief
summary of those cases. Levitt - the Court decides that it is unconstitutional for the state to
compensate private, religious schools for the cost of developing state-mandated tests. Unlike

217
Agostini that supported some assistance for private school students, such a testing plan would,
indeed, act as the state endorsing a specific faith. Grand Rapids – citing Lemon, the Court state
that government aid to private schools must not have the effect of promoting a religious program.
While these last three cases appear to show the Court walking back some of their earlier
decisions, it really illustrates the Court developing parameters rather than repudiating a program.
Here we see the development of Bell’s condition within the proper context. This is true because
of the outcome of Mueller - a case which allows for a state statute to remain in standing even
though the only ones who could benefit from its tax deductions are those who send their children
to private, religious schools. Following Bell’s first condition, the Court takes time to develop its
mind regarding the specific legal applications of the larger movement.
This development continues with the decision in Witters. Witters – applying the Lemon
Test again, the Court decides there is no constitutional issue with allowing a student to use state
funds to pursue a Ministry Degree at a Christian school. Once again the Lemon Test is employed
by the Court and it is decided that no violation of the Constitution exists because the money in
question goes to an individual who chooses to give it to a religious institution. The Court ruled
the state was not directly sending money to the school. This precedent becomes integral in the
expansion of voucher-like programs in the future.
All of this culminates in the Zelman decision. Zelman - In this decision the Court rules
that a school voucher system in Ohio is constitutional because the program is based within the
states’ rights to provided educational opportunities for its children and that the only way any
state money actually ends up in a religious, private school is when individuals choose to spend it
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there. The majority decides this case is more about the choice in a marketplace and less about
the religious indoctrination of students.
Therefore, this study shows the degree to which Bell’s theory, indeed, is properly placed
within the context of cultural understandings and societal norms. Originally, the parameters
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court were the accepted norm of the legal minds of the nation.
This trickled into the legislative setting as well. Over time the country developed more of an
acceptance of the concept of public funding for private, religious schools. The idea has
gradually become more acceptable. This progression of thinking and understanding is a perfect
example of the first condition as put forward by Bell. After a thorough review of these cases, it is
this researcher’s contention that Bell’s first condition has been met. The next section will address
the degree to which Bell’s third condition is met.
Professor’s Bell’s third condition, and the second one being considered by this study,
asserts that for social reform to be sustainable a general upholding of the status quo is necessary.
For this study status quo refers to the current state of affairs for public education in America.
Upholding or maintaining the status quo for public education would mean that outside influences
(i.e. school vouchers) would have minimal, if any, impact on public education. It is the belief of
this researcher that, in fact, school vouchers do not negatively impact the status quo of public
education.
Previously, an overview of the decisions regarding school vouchers demonstrated that the
ideas surrounding their legal status were developed over time. No single legal decision on public
money reaching private school interests created a new system for school vouchers to flourish.
There was no bellwether moment for school vouchers. On the contrary, this process has been
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evolutionary. The state of American education is still relatively constant. The largest parochial
educational system today is the Catholic Schools.965 However, as was reported, enrollment in
those schools and the number of schools themselves has dwindled consistently from their peak in
the 1960’s. Trend data continues to show a decline in the number of students who are attending
Catholic schools.966 Consequently, adding monies into the private school system from public
sources has not had the specific effect of directly impacting their enrollment numbers.967
In addition to public schools maintaining their enrollment numbers, how they are
perceived by America has remained at a constant level. According to a 2010 Gallup Poll, parents
were relatively happy with the local public school their children attended.968 While respondents
gave lower marks to public education in general, Americans continue to believe their local
schools are performing well.969
We have five decades of legal precedent regarding school vouchers. The U.S. Supreme
Court has made several landmark decisions that have impacted the narrative. Even with that,
schooling in the United States remains a consistent system. School vouchers have not proved to
be counter to the status quo. The investments that have been made in this movement have not
drastically shifted funding in such a way that public schools are being adversely impacted. In
fact, while Catholic School enrollment has dropped, public school enrollment is expected to set a
new record every year over the next decade.970
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Student achievement is another area that does not appear to be adversely affected by
school vouchers. In 2012, The National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) assessment
found that data from 1971 and 1973 that compared favorably to 2012 results. In fact, when
comparing 1971 and 1973 scores with the 2012 results, the 2012 results showed higher reading
and math scores for 9 and 13 year olds and not much difference for 17 year olds.971 Student
achievement in high-risk areas seems to be unaffected as well. A study of student achievement at
a national level over the past decade shows that schools receiving targeted and school-wide Title
I assistance have made significant gains when it comes to closing the achievement gap created
by the poverty demographic.972 Despite money being siphoned off to private schools for
vouchers, public schools have seen an increase in their ability to educate the most vulnerable
students. While it is true that the achievement gap is still a serious issue for educators in this
country, one can see that the federal government is still using funding devices to address the
needs of those in poverty who attend public schools. This is a clear sign that while more funding
has been diverted to private schools, there is still a plan that public schools in need receive aid
that can improve the academic standing of their students. It would seem that the existence of a
voucher system has not negated the ability of the government to meet the financial needs of those
in need.
Professor’s Bell’s third condition declares that for social reform to be sustainable a
general upholding of the status quo is necessary. Bell’s third condition calls us to consider the
consequences of social change to those who will not directly benefit from it. This social change –
manifested through school vouchers – has evolved over decades with no impact to the status quo.
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On the contrary, American education remains relatively constant. Enrollments are increasing and
federal funds, through Title I funding, continue to assist public schools and their at-risk students.
In short, over time we have seen that the establishment and expansion of policies that allow
public funding to go to private schools has not negatively impacted the traditional school model.
In fact, there have been academic gains and a positive perception by the public of their
educational choices. For this reason it is this researcher’s contention that Bell’s third contention
has been met. The next section will take up the final research question.
Professor’s Bell’s fourth condition, and the third one being considered by this study,
claims that recognition of severe injustices does not disrupt the reasonable expectations of
society. The analysis in Chapter Four makes the case that the implementation of a school
voucher program does have, at its core, the desire and motivation to recognize injustices while
not disturbing the reasonable expectations of society. Chapter Four’s analysis uses an
examination of the nature of failing schools and the consequences associated with their existence
combined with an understanding of the social justice implications to illustrate this issue (i.e. the
implementation of a school voucher program) clearly meets the standard set by Bell’s fourth
condition.
Data shows there is a statistically relevant level of discrepancy between the achievement
of white students and the achievement of students of color.973 The achievement gap exists as a
statistical reality; however, it needs to be dealt with an issue of social justice.
Under this lens it is true that Bell’s theory would suggest that the environment itself is an
unjust one, the student profiting from the current system should be considered blameless and,
therefore, not deserving of unreasonable distress in the righting of the wrongs. Chapter Four’s
973

Reardon, supra note 839.

222
analysis argues that the establishment of a school voucher system would not necessitate a
disruption to the schooling of these students. Ultimately the analysis shows that regardless of the
degree to which vouchers might alleviate the achievement gap and allow for a movement of
social and economic justice, the contention is that allowing for the option does not place undue
suffering on those not responsible for the wrongs of the current system. This combined with the
examination of the achievement gap allows for the fourth condition to be met.
The final question is: What affect do school vouchers have on assuring that low-income
minority students have access to an equitable quality education? Voucher opponents contend
that diverting money from public schools to private schools would increase inequities. On the
opposite side voucher supporters believe that school vouchers provide low-income minority
families an opportunity to attend a quality private school. While the issue of school vouchers
continues to be debated, some evidence exists that may aid us in figuring out their influence
those that receive the vouchers and on the racial and economic makeup of neighboring public
schools. Two groups stand out when one considers the effect of vouchers. This next section will
analyze the impact on those that receive vouchers and the impact on the surrounding public
schools.
Admittedly, there is not much evidence on how vouchers have affected voucher
recipients. In 2002, one study analyzed student achievement data from Dayton, New York, and
Washington D.C. The results were inconclusive – with no clear indication of improvement in
student achievement.974 Another study, also completed in 2002, examined the impact of vouchers
in Washington D.C. and found slight gains in student achievement in only the second year of a
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three year analysis.975 However, when race was considered, there were slight gains for African
American students – compared to white and Hispanic students who did not experience the same
increases.976 Likewise, in a third separate study comparing voucher students in New York, Ohio,
and, Washington D.C. the results for African American students were more encouraging when
compared to other races.977
Along the same lines, some graduation rates have been analyzed with some positive
comparisons favoring vouchers.978 According to a 2010 report released by the National Center
for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance high school voucher students in Washington
D.C. graduated at a rate of 91 percent, while the average graduation rate in D.C. public high
schools was 56 percent.979 Nevertheless, critics of school vouchers may point out that influences
like parental involvement, or lack thereof, or socio-economic status had an impact on these
percentages.
Inherent problems exist with some of these studies. First, these studies have a difficult
time with comparing control groups (those who do not use vouchers) with experimental groups
(voucher recipients). In many circumstances comparing public schools to private schools is
cumbersome because the differences in their characteristics (i.e. demographics of staff and
students, curriculum and assessment, access to resources, mission and focus, etc.) can vary
greatly. In addition, because private schools are not required to report student data like the public
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schools, accessing private school data may be difficult. The next part in this section will address
the effect of vouchers on the racial and economic makeup of surrounding public schools.
There is limited research examining the impact of school vouchers on the racial and
economic makeup of surrounding public schools. Moreover, because school voucher programs
are few in number, it would follow that small numbers of students use them. As a result, there
could be minimal impact on the demographics of public schools. However, there are a couple of
research studies to investigate. In 2012, a study conducted on the Milwaukee voucher program
found no significant change in the racial makeup of surrounding public schools or in the price of
housing in the same area.980 Patrick Wolf, the lead investigator on the study, surmised that the
lack of change in demographics was because typical voucher students were minority students
who transferred from heavily populated minority public schools to mostly minority private
schools.981 Conversely, in two separate studies, one in Milwaukee982 and the other in
Cleveland,983 researchers found lower levels of racial segregation at the private schools accepting
voucher students compared to their local public school counterparts.
In short, depending on the researchers’ affiliations, many of the results seem to be slanted
toward one side of the argument or the other. Navigating these opinions and issues is difficult
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and there does not seem to be a clear cut answer or direction. In Parts 4 and 5 this study responds
to these issues with practical suggestions for addressing the problems that have been raised in the
research. There will be suggestions on what should be done coupled with how it can be done. In
addition, future research will be considered. Some thought is given on what further could be
studied in the area of school voucher research.

Part 4
Implications

The 2013-2014 deadline established by NCLB has expired. Public education in the U.S. is at
another crossroads. Public perception of schools coupled with increased political pressure
contributes to an environment open to school choice. Parents are more knowledgeable and savvy
when it comes to judging their schools, but more information is needed.
Because school vouchers can illicit visceral responses on both sides of the discussion, it may
be prudent to try and educate the public on what vouchers can and cannot do. In addition, if
private schools are going to benefit from the potential increase in funding, then there should be
some reciprocation from the private schools.
Where school vouchers exist or where they are introduced for the first time, they should be
placed in the proper frame. School vouchers offer an option for parents to choose the school they
believe best fits their child’s needs. It should be clearly communicated that school vouchers are
not the panacea that some have made them out to be. Our system of public education has its
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positives and negatives, but it should not be forced on everyone. The same is true for private
education – it is not necessarily for everyone. The message should be: you have options.
If vouchers provide private schools the bonus of an increase in enrollment and additional
revenues, then it makes sense they be held accountable for state testing. Private schools
accepting voucher students should be held to the same standards that their public school
counterparts adhere to. Moreover, the results from private school testing should be made
available to the public. It follows, if the private school cannot meet the same standards, then the
government should pull the voucher funding from schools not making the grade.

Part 5
Future Research

With a subject as vast and controversial as school vouchers, this study was not able to
address all of the issues. An attempt was made to answer some of them, but here is a breakdown
on subjects that need further exploration.
More empirical evidence is needed on the efficacy of school vouchers. While there are
studies presenting some data from Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Washington D.C., these represent
only three – more information is needed. Here are three suggestions for addressing the need for
more data.
1. Create an independent and bi-partisan state or federal board of examiners whose main
responsibility would be to conduct unbiased research on school vouchers used by low-income
minority students. If a government agency cannot be created, then public funds could be made
available to accredited universities who would conduct the research. Longitudinal studies, using
high-quality scientific methods, are needed to see the lasting effect of school vouchers. An
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independent agency is best fitted to complete this task. The purpose of these studies would be to
present evidence to the general public on the effectiveness of school vouchers.

2. Build a comprehensive evaluation for all voucher programs. Each program would be subject to
an exhaustive evaluation that would include defining its mission, reviewing current approaches,
and making plans for improvements. Ensure all stakeholders, including parents, students,
teachers, and school leaders, are surveyed and participate in the evaluation. Use the results to
inform stakeholders and make necessary improvements.

3. Future studies will be needed to determine the impact vouchers have on the low-income minority
composition of both public and private schools. Related questions include: If racial disparities
occur, should race be taken into account when vouchers are awarded? Or should vouchers be
race-neutral? Furthermore, research may be needed on the possible impact vouchers have on the
racial makeup of neighborhoods.

Part 6
Complete Summary

Education is a fundamental human right and essential for the exercise of all other human
rights. It promotes individual freedom and empowerment and yields important development
benefits. Yet millions of children and adults remain deprived of educational opportunities,

228
many as a result of poverty. – United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO)984
Our nation’s best students can generally be found in predominately white, suburban, and
middle to upper-middle class school districts, while our weakest students can generally be found
in predominately inner-city school districts with high minority populations.985 This study
suggested that for over thirty years the reforms, programs, and initiatives created to combat this
disparity have given us few sustainable solutions. In fact, it may be worse than before 1954 when
the Brown decision forced the desegregation of public schools. According to one study, school
segregation has increased dramatically across the country and minority students are more likely
to attend poor performing schools than their white counterparts.986
So called movements labeled Excellence, Restructuring, and Standards were conceived
and implemented – with little or no lasting impact.987 Several of the school reforms mentioned in
Chapter One were broken down into two main categories: improving the schools (e.g. smaller
class sizes, longer days, more technology, etc.) and improving the way we prepare teachers (e.g.
more rigorous training, higher standards for evaluations, merit pay, etc.). In 1983 the federal
report “A Nation at Risk” our society was warned of a “rising tide of mediocrity” in our public
education system. This was followed almost twenty years later with the 2002 federal law No
Child Left Behind (NCLB). NCLB mandated change and accountability – with the unrealistic
goal of 100 percent of the students meeting or exceeding state standards by the 2013-2014 school
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year. Dire warnings and unrealistic approaches have had minimal impact. To put it in baseball
parlance – there have been plenty of swings, but little contact.
So what’s to be done? It is this researcher’s contention that the one reform movement that
was different from the others mentioned was school choice. This study considered school choice
different because it was the only reform measure that leaves the decision on what is best for a
student up to the parent. Of course, this would be a drastic change for an entire system.
Therefore, a more localized plan would be in order.
For any real and systemic change to occur, Change theorist Michael Fullan concludes it
must be “implemented locally.”988 In addition, Fullan contends change should be manageable.989
It follows, then that any voucher movement that has any chance of success needs to happen
locally. It is this researcher’s belief that deciding the best school for a child’s education should
be made at the kitchen table and not in some congressional, or worse, some bureaucrat’s office.
As Fullan states, “Wishful thinking and legislation have poor records as tools for social
betterment.”990
That’s not to say all legislation is inherently bad. On the contrary, many laws are enacted
with the best of intentions. Of course, this researcher sees the benefit of the school voucher laws
enacted in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Indiana as a legitimate way for parents to exercise more
control over their children’s education.
While the topic of school choice is expansive, this study focused exclusively on school
vouchers as a possible vehicle for low-income families who reside in a large urban school
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district. Some have sought school vouchers as an answer to our public school woes. As the
school voucher debate continues across Illinois, the plight of Chicago public school students
remains grim and the prospect of fixing a system the size of CPS is daunting. In light of the
Zelman decision and more recent lower court interpretations of this Supreme Court ruling, this
study supports the inclusion of vouchers. Therefore, it is recommended they be included as an
option for Chicago’s residents.
In the meantime, Illinois’ neighbor, Indiana has enacted a far-reaching voucher program.
The State of Indiana’s program, officially called the Choice Scholarship Program (CSP), began
with the 2011-2012 school year and the number of eligible families was capped at 7,500. For the
2012-2013 school year the eligible family number was capped at 15,000. For the 2013-2014
school year all Indiana families were eligible. As of this writing the Indiana State Supreme Court
has upheld the Choice Scholarship Program.991 The spot light may be on Illinois leaders to come
to a consensus as to whether or not a voucher program will address the perceived deficiencies in
the Chicago Public School system.
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